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Labor market change in societies where an information economy is evolving, is a 
central area of concern for information society scholars today. While ther has been 
considerable research conducted on cases of developed countries, research on labor 
market changes during a transition to an information economy outside of the advanced 
industrial economies is scarce. Thus, this dissertation proposes to examine the chang s in 
wage, employment, and occupation structure that take place when an NIC, such as
Taiwan, ushers in an information economy, and to explore the reasons behind these 
changes.  
This dissertation combined the historical, policy, and statistical analyses and 
concluded that the transformation from labor intensive manufacturing to an information 
intensive economy, as arranged by the Taiwanese government due to its own political and 
 v
governing purposes, and also in the context of international political and economic 
circumstances, determined Taiwan’s economic resource arrangement, which resulted in 
an increasingly unbalanced labor market in terms of wage distribution, unemployment, 
and occupation structure. This transformation changed and shaped the structure of the 
labor market to benefit workers more skilled with information, more professional, having 
higher level knowledge and a higher level of education, while an increasing amount of 
white-collar and service workers began earning comparatively low wages. At the same 
time the demand for blue-collar and lower skill workers severely declined. Moreover, the 
total labor demand of information manufacturing and information intensive service is 
much less than that of traditional labor intensive manufacturing, resulting in Taiwan’s 
increasing unemployment problem. Among these processes, many different social, 
political, policy, and economic factors interacted and collectively determined this result. 
Among them, the role of the state in shaping Taiwan’s information economy in general 
and the labor market situation in particular did matter considerably.
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
INTRODUCTION  
Labor market change and its impact on workers in societies where an information 
economy is evolving is a central concern for information society scholars today. A great 
deal of research focuses on emerging unbalanced labor market trends such as polarized 
occupation structure, unemployment, and increasing wage discrepancy. Though a number 
of changing labor market trends have been identified such as a decline of blue collar and 
managerial occupations, scholars are still far from having a consensu  on exactly which 
labor market trends are brought on by transitions to information economies.  Nor do they 
agree on the exact factors leading to these changes. A number of different possible causes 
are proposed, including information technology itself, knowledge/information expansion, 
industrial causes, and certain political economic factors such as government policies, 
market or monopoly power, and trade and globalization. The need to clarify and 
distinguish the specific reasons for labor market changes in an iformation economy is 
important because different determinants implicate different policy positions and 
solutions when facing unbalanced labor market outcomes. For example, scholar  of 
informationalism, technological determinism, or postindustrial society may tend to agree 
more on improvement of individual’s education and job training because they believe 
reduced disparity of skill and knowledge would be the cure for an unbalanced labor 
market in an information society. However, critical economic and political economic 
scholars tend to believe that it is political and economic structures that result in an 
unbalanced labor market, and hence they believe a government’s macroeconomic policy 
should be the cornerstone for repairing skewed labor markets. All in al , it is important to 
research these issues not only because of their theoretical and philosophical contributions 
but also because these trends have real social and economic consequences with 
significant political and policy ramifications. 
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While there has been considerable research conducted on developed countries, 
research on labor market changes during a transition to an information economy outside 
of the advanced industrial economies is scarce. According to Castells (2004b), the 
development of information economies (or in his words “network societies”) in 
developed countries was brought on by three accidental coincidences in the 1970s, 
linking three independent processes: the crisis and restructuring of i dustrialism and its 
two associated modes of production, capitalism and statism (deregulation, privatization, 
and market liberalization); the freedom-oriented, cultural social movements of the late 
1960s and early 1970s; and the revolution in information and communication 
technologies (Castells, 2004b, pp. 3-45).  But this throws little light on how information 
economies developed in newly industrialized countries.  For example, as Wang (2003) 
points out, the ways that East Asian developing countries established their information 
economy were different from those of developed countries. First of all, unlike developed 
countries, which mainly offered incentives to stimulate high-tech R & D and information 
economy development, developing countries’ governments built information economies 
directly by deciding on the preferred direction for industry and guiding the advancement 
of strategic industries (mainly information industries) by establishing favorable industry, 
tariff, and technology policies. Second, developed countries emphasized the invention 
and innovation of new avant-garde technologies, while developing countries stres ed the 
acquisition of technological production knowledge obtained from developed countries. 
Third, the financial resources supporting information economy development in developed 
countries mainly stemmed from free capital markets, while in developing countries, the 
new economy was financed by public bank systems that complied with the government’s 
industrial developmental plans.  Given these differing historical, political, and economic 
factors in the development of an information economy, were the labormarket changes 
under the growing information economy also different?   Moreover, although some of the 
countries identified as “newly industrialized countries” (NICs) (or the above-mentioned 
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developing countries) such as Taiwan or South Korea have already reached a very similar 
or even higher level of economic informatization as that of developed countries, until 
now there have been very few, if any, empirical studies regarding their information 
economy development in general, and in particular their labor market situations during 
the transition to an information economy.  
Seeking to help close these gaps in research and provide additional empirical 
evidence gathered through examinations of an NIC such as Taiwan, this dissertation 
offers two main contributions. First, it will become one of the first documents to 
comprehensively describe, record, and explain an NIC’s (Taiwan’s) labor market 
consequences in its transition to an information economy. Second, this dissertation will 
analyze the inter-play of various technological, economic and political forces in the 
processes of shaping an information economy and its labor market conditions. 
Specifically, this dissertation proposes to examine the changes in occupation, 
employment, and wage structure that take place when an NIC, such as Taiwan, ushers in 
an information economy, and to explore the reasons behind these changes. Thus, with a 
focus on labor market conditions, this research aims to reveal how the introduction of 
information, information technology (IT), and information industry into the economy, 
also known as informatization, along with other political and economic factors such as 
state policies, political elites, technical experts, enterprises, trade and globalization, labor 
market institutions, and international political economic causes, have shaped the 
trajectory of wages, employment, and occupation structure during Taiwan’s transition to 
an information society.  
The social and economic consequences of the transition to an information 
economy in newly industrialized countries have not been the subject of signi icant 
research.  This is a significant issue because these labor market changes are critical to the 
overall social and economic structure of a society. A systematic study of labor market 
changes brought on by the evolving information economy in NICs would shed lig t on 
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one of the most important transformations underway in many countries and may further 
shed light on the social and economic future of these countries.  
Taiwan was chosen as the focus of this research for two main reasons. In addition 
to providing a unique model as a developing state that has successfully transitioned to an 
information economy (similar to South Korea, as described above), Taiwan also plays a 
key role in the global information economy market. Taiwan is a small, rich, export-
oriented island country with a population of around 22.9 million. Its industrial and 
economic structures evolved from agriculture in the 1940’s to labor intensive light 
industry in the 1950’s and 1960’s, to capital intensive heavy industry in the 1970’s, and 
then to today’s information economy industry, which is based on information inte sive 
high technology and strategic service industries. The whole process is very similar to the 
that of developed countries, yet the stage transformation from labor intensive to 
information intensive took Taiwan only about fifteen years to accomplish, whereas it 
took Japan twenty-five years and Great Britain over fifty years to complete the transition 
(Wade, 1990). Accordingly, the socio-economic consequences of this condensed proc ss 
of informatizing the economy might be much more dramatic and acute than those 
experienced by developed countries1. In addition, owing to the extreme limitation of 
natural resources and its small domestic market, Taiwan has consistently relied strongly 
on global trade, especially on its own exports, to seek economic growth. It first started to 
develop export-orientated labor-intensive manufacturing such as apparel and 
miscellaneous manufacturing in the 1960’s and became known as the world’s production 
factory for this type of labor intensive manufacturing, along with South Korea in the 
1960’s and 1970’s, continuing until the 1980’s. Thereafter, faced with the risingcost of 
labor and land and increasing competition from other developing countries with cheaper 
labor pools, Taiwan was forced to make some major adjustments to survive in the world 
                                                
1 Similar situations can also be observed in South Korea and China.  
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trading market. It then discarded and moved out of the labor-intensive manufacturing and 
upgraded its industrial production capabilities to pursue more high-technique and 
knowledge intensive industries. It took advantage of its solid experience in manufacturing 
and the well-educated working population in Taiwan to promote policies favoring the 
growth of information/high-tech industries2 and encourage greater adoption of IT and 
knowledge in production processes, aiming to finally and successfully accomplish 
Taiwan’s critical transition to a new economy, the information economy, in the 1990’s 
(Liang & Wang, 2002; Lin, 2004a; Ko, 2006). This transformation from a labor-intensive 
to an information-intensive economy (including both manufacturing and service 
industries such as information technology, microelectronic equipment, and finance; see 
Footnote 3) started in the 1980’s and was completed in the early 1990’s (Chu, 2003b). 
Since then, Taiwan has been consistently ranked among the top five in th world in IT 
production and has been one of the leading players worldwide in informatin nd 
communication technology (ICT) penetration (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004b; Mathews, 1996; 
Riedel, 1992). Moreover, the percentage of export of knowledge-intensive manufacturing 
compared with total manufacturing export reached 70.60% and 71.17% in 2003 and 2004 
respectively (S. W. Lin & Lin, 2005). The contributions of Taiwan’s information-
centered services and manufacturing industries were estimated to have jointly produced 
at least 45% in 2006, the largest portion of its total GDP,3 which again underscored the 
                                                
2 For example, in 1991, the Taiwanese government started to institute its most influential information-
economy policy, “Enforcement Rules of the Statute of Upgrading Industries,” in order to sustain Taiwan’s 
information economy and to enhance Taiwan’s information industries’ competitive advantages in the world 
market. 
3 According to OECD (OECD, 1996; 2001), knowledge/information intensive industries include mainly 
two sections—information intensive manufacturing and information intensive service. Information-
centered manufacturing includes high-tech industries such as aerospace and production of computer and 
data processing equipment, automation equipment, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications equipment, 
semiconductors, and scientific instruments; and middle-tech industries such as production of automobiles, 
electrical equipment, specialty chemicals, machinery and other transport equipment. Information-centered 
service industries include finance, insurance, real estate, commercial services (including computer software 
production, computer and data processing, research and development, and engineering services), 
professional, scientific and technical services, social and personal services, education, medical services, 
transport, storage, and communication. The final result is computed by the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development, R.O.C. (Taiwan Economic Statistics, 2007).  
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completion of Taiwan’s conversion to an information economy. To accurately 
characterize the economic and industrial shift, the Taiwanese gov rnment named the 
1990’s as the period of high-tech (mainly information technology) and the 2000’s as the 
period of the knowledge economy. 
The fact that Taiwan has witnessed a successful and quick economic transition to 
occupy a crucial position in the world’s information economy and that such a transition 
has been well documented suggests that Taiwan indeed makes an excellent case study for 
scholars seeking to better understand the information economy and its poss ble impact on 
the labor market. Such a study will prove all the more valuable in the sense that there 
have so far been few relevant empirical studies of NICs transitio ing to an information 
economy. Specifically, this dissertation will attempt to deepen our understanding of the 
forces that shape such transitions and the social and economic consequences of the 
transition.  By focusing on labor market changes, this dissertation will provide empirical 
evidence to contribute to one of the most contentious issues in the scholar hip of the 
information economy – how  such transitions change the occupational, employment and 
income patterns in societies. Therefore, the research goals of thi  dissertation include: 1) 
exploring the historical, political, economic and technological forces that have shaped the 
development of Taiwan’s information economy and labor market changes; 2) 
understanding the changing trends of occupation structure, employment, as well as 
income and wage disparity in the country’s evolving information economy; and 3) 
identifying and analyzing the sources of these labor market changes. 
This dissertation will employ multiple research methods. It will apply historical, 
policy, and political economic analyses to study Taiwan’s information economy 
transformation and the roles of government, policies, political elites, enterprises, experts, 
foreign businesses, foreign governments, as well as other domestic social groups in the 
information economy development and labor market changes. Such analyses will help 
reveal how informatization, state policies, global competition, pursuit of national 
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economic growth, industrial changes, labor market institutions, and other facto s might 
either reinforce or challenge each other and collectively affect labor market structure in 
Taiwan’s information economy age. The dissertation will document the ransformation of 
Taiwan to an information economy and through statistical analysis identify the changes 
that have taken place in the country’s occupational structure, employment levels and 
income distribution during the course of this transition.   
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter Two will review the concepts of informatization, information s ciety and 
economy and will explore the development and extent of Taiwan’s information economy. 
Chapter Three will chart Taiwan’s economic/industrial history, the developmental 
history of Taiwan’s information economy, and the policies of the information economy. 
Finally, it will offer a historical perspective on how factors such as the state and policies, 
political elites, technological experts, domestic enterprises, foreign capital and 
governments, domestic social groups, trade and globalization, and industrial 
transformation have interacted and worked together in shaping Taiwan’s information 
economy.  
Chapter Four will use statistical data and statistical analysis to examine 
occupational transformation and to explore the sources of these changes that occurred in 
Taiwan as it evolved into an information economy.  
Using statistical data and statistical analysis, Chapter Five will explore the 
changing employment trends and track the sources of the labor market changes that arose 
in Taiwan as an information economy evolved.  
Chapter Six will chart changing wage structure trends that developed during 
Taiwan’s evolution into an information economy. This will be accomplished by using 
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statistical data and statistical analysis such as the Theil’s statistics. Using the Theil’s 
statistics, we can also find the sources of inequality and determin  if they are related to 
information economy.  
Chapter Seven, the last chapter, will present the main conclusions of the research. 
It will summarize the reasons identified for the labor market changes in the age of 
information economy. In addition, the corresponding information economy theories will 
be reviewed and critiqued accordingly, and possible suggestions regarding labor market 
policies for countries having an information economy will also be provided.  
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Chapter 2: Information Economy: The Case of Taiwan  
This chapter reviews relevant literature that will first defin  and clarify the 
concepts of information technology, informatization, as well as information 
economy/information society and then will discuss various measures and indicators of 
information society and economy. In the last section, the chapter will chart the extent of 
Taiwan’s informatization.  
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATIZATION  
The main idea underlying the notion of an information economy is that, due to the 
information technology revolution and the extensive adoption of IT, the production, 
handling, distribution, monitoring, possessing, use, and application of informatin nd 
information technologies have become the most prominent feature of an economy. In 
other words, information and IT have impacted most of the major economic activities in 
some societies (1993; Hearn, 2004; Porat, 1977). 
Information technology refers to any technology that handles information in an 
electronic form which distributes, transforms, or processes information (Martin, 1997). 
According to Zuboff (1988), information technology (IT) is a label or term that reflects 
the convergence of several streams of technical developments, including 
microelectronics, computer science, telecommunications, software engine ring, storage 
devices, and any system analysis. It is a technology that dramatic lly increases the ability 
to record, store, analyze, and transmit information in ways that permit flexibility, 
accuracy, and complexity. Moreover, information technology has a unique capability to 
restructure operations that depend upon information for the purposes of transaction, 
record keeping, analysis, controls, or communication. The World Bank (2002) and the 
OECD (2002) use the term information technology to refer to the creation, storage, and 
processing of data, including hardware (computer network, servers, storage devices, and 
desktop computers), system software (operating systems, middleware, programming 
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languages), and software and applications. For purposes of the current research, 
“information technology” mainly refers to those digital devices and services derived from 
computers, the Internet, and telecommunications.  
Information technologies are unique, especially in contrast to previous 
technologies. Lievrouw and Livingstone (Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2002) summarize that 
the uniqueness of information and communication technologies (ICTs) includes their 
two-way capabilities of computing and telecommunications as well as the demassified, 
time-shifting and human-computer features. More specifically, Martin (1997) elaborates 
three fundamental differences between earlier technologies such a  books, filing cabinets, 
pens and paper, and more recent information technologies including computers, 
LANs/WANs, teleconferencing and on-line databases. First, the new technologies deal 
with information in an electronic form. Second, many of the new technologies are 
networkable, meaning they can be hooked together for the purpose of information 
sharing. Last but not least, they are completely programmable or semi-programmable, 
meaning these new technologies are capable of performing informati n handling within 
the limits of coded instructions. With a main emphasis on the work place, Zuboff (1988) 
characterizes information technologies as the technologies used to r produce, extend, and 
improve on the processes of substituting machines for human agency, and the devices 
that automate by translating information into action and register data about those 
automated activities, thus generating new streams of data.  
While information technology refers to the technologies themselves, 
informatization is a more dynamic term, referring to the process and the result of 
applying information technology to various social processes such as automation of 
production and office computerization. In this dissertation, I will mainly focus on 
informatization in the economic sphere and with respect to the macro and organizational 
levels. On the macro level, informatization refers to the process through which the main 
productive activity of the economy turns from material production to infrmation 
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production4  with the effective introduction of information technology. It has been 
suggested that informatization is a process of change that features: (1) the use of the 
information technologies to such an extent that they become the dominant forces in 
commanding economic, political, social, and cultural development; and (2) 
unprecedented growth in the speed, quality, and popularity of information production and 
distribution (G. Wang, 1994). 
More specifically, Dizard (1985) identifies a general development pat ern of 
informatization. In this pattern, there are three progressive stages of informatization and 
information economy: (1) the development of a primary information sector; (2) the 
increasing dependency upon and adaptation to information technologies, and (3) the mass 
consumerization of high-technology information services. All three stage  are well 
developed in the advanced industrialized countries, and NICs are in various stages of this 
trajectory as well.  Worldwide, industry is building the high-technology infrastructure 
that will form the basis for the information economy. Industries and organizations, both 
private and public, who are the primary users of the new information technology 
networks, are already very dependent on information technology, and such ependence is 
increasing exponentially. The third stage is the mass consumerization of information 
technologies and information services. Advanced information and communicatio s 
resources, earlier limited largely in use by big businesses and big governments, are now 
used extensively by individuals and small organizations, providing a wide range of 
computer-based information resources.  
Further, if we investigate the idea of informatization on the organizational level, 
there are four dimensions for business and industry informatization: first, informatization 
of production such as production automation or use of artificial intelligence; second, 
informatization of production factors (such as the use of techniques, skills, or 
                                                
4 Even though material production still plays a crucial part in this new economy, it is now also 
characterized as containing more knowledge/technique in the production processes.   
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knowledge), often achieved by promoting R&D and used to replace labor and capital as 
the main production factor to enhance productivity; third, informatization of management 
such as improving managing efficiency through harnessing the information technology to 
control or monitor production processes or workers; lastly, informatization of 
organization such as shortening communicating time and distance by the information 
technology in organizations, which often leads to the transformation of a  rganization 
structure such as flattening organizations (Ma, 2003).   
In this dissertation, informatization, refers to, from the macro-eonomic 
perspective, the transition to an economic system which focuses mainly on the 
production, application, and consumption of information/knowledge, IT and 
information/knowledge services; from the organization or production perspective,  this 
dissertation uses the term informatization to refer to the informatization of production 
processes and of production factors.  
INFORMATION SOCIETY AND ECONOMY  
An information society is a society in which the production, accumulation, 
extension, possession, distribution, use, and consumption of knowledge/information and 
information technologies are the driving forces for social change5 , and 
knowledge/information is the most significant factor, when substituting for capital or 
labor for most economic, political, and cultural activities (OECD, 1996; EC, 2000; 
APEC, 2000) without being subject to diminishing returns. Such a society is 
characterized by the growth of an information sector and information application in the 
economy, whereby wealth is created through the economic exploitation of understanding 
and knowledge, which is the center of economic production (Dordick & Wang, 1993; 
Hearn, 2004; Porat, 1977). Thus, information economy, or its synonyms “knowledge 
                                                
5 The observed changes cover many aspects of society, including changes in economy, in the work place, in 
politics, in culture, in education, in social networks, as well as in family and daily life.   
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economy” and “new economy,” is not restricted only to high technology or information 
technology industries but also spreads out to almost all industrial sectors (Wei, 2002).  
Information/knowledge economy can be traced at the earliest to economist Adam 
Smith (1776),who pointed out the big contribution of technique progress (knowledge 
accumulation) on economic growth in his “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations.” Alfred Marshall (1890) further explained that the application and 
progress of knowledge always lead to the invention and adoption of new production 
means and new production machines, which enhance the production efficiency of labor 
and capital; thus, knowledge is the most powerful engine of economic and production 
growth. As to the 20th century economists such as J. A. Schumpeter (1912) and Simon 
Kuznets (1966), both put the importance of knowledge innovation on technique progress, 
production enhancement, and economic growth.  
Bell (1980) introduced the idea of post-industrial society, which he claimed as a 
synonym of information society. Through this idea, Bell considered information and 
information technologies’ revolutionary influence on the whole society system. 
According to him, in an information society/economy, the source of productivity and 
economic growth lies in the generation of knowledge, extended to all realms of economic 
activities through information processing. The new economy increases the importance of 
occupations with a high information and knowledge content in their activities. Likewise, 
the codification of theoretical knowledge for innovation in technology also plays a crucial 
role. Finally, the creation of a new intellectual technology (such as the technology of 
artificial intelligence) is the key tool of system analysis and decision theory.  
Schement (1990) believed that we were entering an information economy age, 
which could be observed by following the course of developments in the information 
economy, information technology, and information work. Interactions among these t ree 
events have led to a profound socio-economic shift. First, information-orie ted activities 
continue to grow as the primary sector of the economy, with information becoming a 
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major commodity of exchange. Second, computers and other information tech ologies 
are shaping the production and distribution of information as well as reframing the 
context of everyday life. Third, information work has become the primary form of 
employment and is necessary to produce new devices and transmit the primary 
commodities. It is from this convergence of economic forces that an information society 
begins to emerge. 
Observing and comparing different cases of the information economy in different 
countries, Hearn (2004) found three common characteristics in most of the various kinds 
of formulations of an information economy: increasing numbers and proportins of 
workers in organizations specializing in information production, handling, distribution, 
monitoring, and use; increasing numbers of organizations specializing in information 
production, handling, distribution, monitoring, and use; and finally, people and 
organizations increasingly affected by information production, handling, distribution, 
monitoring, and use in more spheres of life.  
More specifically, Masuda (1990) clarified the idea of an information ecomy by 
comparing the industrial society with the information society. He concluded that an 
information economy is different in five aspects: (1) The production center: In the 
industrial society, the modern factory, consisting of machines and equipment, was the 
production center for goods. In the information society, the information utility (a 
computer-based infrastructure), consisting of information networks and d ta banks, will 
replace the factory and become the production and distribution center. (2) The market: In 
the industrial society, the increase in consumption purchasing power was the main factor 
in the expansion of the market. In the information society, the knowledge frontier will 
become the potential market, and the increase in the possibilities of problem solving and 
the development of opportunities in a society that is constantly and dyamically 
developing will be the primary factor behind the expansion of the information market. (3) 
The industry: In the industrial society, the leading industries in economic development 
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were machinery and chemicals, and the total structure comprised prmary, secondary, and 
tertiary industries. In the information society, the leading industries will be the 
intellectual or knowledge industries. (4) Economic structure: The economic structure of 
the industrial society was characterized by: (a) a sales-ori nted commodity economy, (b) 
specialization of production utilizing, (c) divisions of labor, and (d) a complete division 
of production and consumption between enterprise and household. In the information 
society, information, the axis of socioeconomic development, will be produced by the 
information utility; self-production of information by users will increase an information 
will accumulate. This accumulated information will expand through synergetic 
production and shared utilization, and the economy will change structurally from an 
exchange economy to a synergetic economy. (5)The most advanced stag : In the 
industrial society, it was a highly developed mass-consumption stage, centering on 
durable goods. In the information society, it will be a highly developed mass-knowledge 
creation society, in which computerization will make it possible for each person to create 
knowledge and to go on to self-fulfillment. 
Overall, in this dissertation, the information-intensive industries, information 
economy, and relevant activities refer to four perspectives: fir t, application of 
information and information technologies in business and production processes such as 
production technique improvement or digitalized management, which will lower 
production cost and improve production efficiency; second, selling or usinginformation 
directly as commodities such as database services or education; third, production of 
information technologies such as computer or telecommunication technology industries; 
and fourth, making profits by circulating or processing information such as portal site 
services or data handling. 
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MEASURING INFORMATION SOCIETY AND ECONOMY  
There has been much debate and discussion about the many standards  indices 
used to measure an information society and economy since the two terms were first 
proposed. Different indices focus on different aspects of informatization. For example, 
the New Economy Index6 from the Progressive Policy Institute primarily stresses the 
economic conversions in information society, with its underlying indicators covering the 
amount of knowledge jobs, economic dynamism, the digital economy, innovation 
capacity, economic development strategies, and the magnitude of globalization. In 
comparison, another representative index, the International Telecommunication Union’s 
(ITU) “Digital Access Index7,” underscores access to information and communication 
technologies such as infrastructure, affordability, quality, usage, and knowledge. 
If we elect to adopt a more comprehensive approach by combining these indices 
together8, we can group their sub-indicators into the following categories: 
Information infrastructure (or availability)  
Including indicators such as telephone mainlines per 100 (inhabitants), cell phone 
per 100, Internet servers per 100, Internet/web sites per 1000, PCs per 100, broadband per 
100, student –to-computer ratio, government online services, cable per household, etc.  
Readiness (or skill and knowledge) 
Including adult literacy rate, tertiary or college enrollment rate, ability to use 
computers, etc.  
                                                
6 An index used to measure the impact of informatization on industrial structure, market, and economy. 
Please refer to http://www.neweconomyindex.org/ 
7 Please refer to http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2003/30.html 
8 The indices applied in this research contain World Economic Forum’s the “Networked Readiness Index,” 
ITU’s the “Digital Access Index,” the Progress Policy Institute’s “New Economy Index,” the UNESCO’s 
“Monitoring the Digital Divide,” McConell International’s “e-Readiness,” the Economist’s “e-Business 
Readiness Index,” The Human Development Report’s “Technology Achievement Index,” IDC’s 
“Information Society Index,” the Japanese Information Study Group’s information flow measurement, and 
Vere (2005).  
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Affordability 
Including Internet access price, cost of local phone calls per 3 minutes (both peak 
and off-peak hours), cost of international phone calls per 3 minutes (both peak and off-
peak hours), cell phone monthly subscription charges, cost of cell phone calls per 3 
minutes (both peak and off-peak hours), Internet service provider charges, etc. 
Quality 
Mainly including Internet upload and download speeds and access, waiting time 
for telephone lines, telephone faults per 100 main lines, and the overall 
telecommunication quality. 
Usage (reach) 
The measurement of usage in some indices sometimes has indicators similar to 
the measurement of the infrastructure. This index might incorporate indicators such as 
personal computers, ISDN subscribers, cable television subscribers, cell phone 
subscribers, total telephone lines, average time spent per month on the Intern t (hours), 
Internet use (percentage of the population who have used the Internet at least once in the 
three months prior to the survey), purchase of products or services online (perc ntage of 
the population), music (MP3) downloads (as a percentage of the population), onli e
banking with a financial institution (percentage of the population), etc. 
Information flow 
Incoming and outgoing telephone traffic, domestic long distance telephon traffic, 
domestic local telephone traffic, information supply (the amount of information 
transmitted by various sources through media), information consumption (the amount of 
information consumed by audience), etc. 
Information economy measurement 
The most common measuring indicators for information economy include the 
percentage of information-intensive industries’ contribution to the total GDP and the 
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percentage of information industries’ employment in the economy. Other indicators also 
include the numbers of computers installed in businesses, the number of utility pa ents, 
the percentage of expenditure on R&D in the total GDP, the E-commerce r venues (as a 
percentage of the GDP), the percentage of businesses that provide information on goods 
and services online, the percentage of businesses that allow customers  order goods and 
services online, the percentage of businesses that allow customer to make payments 
online, the percentage of employees using the Internet at least once a month, the 
percentage of businesses that use online banking or investment services, the density of 
businesses’ automation equipment, the density of businesses’ informatization equipment, 
the export and import of ICT equipment, telecommunication service revenues, th  
amount of commercial Internet domain names, and capital-labor ratio (or labor 
productivity index), etc. 
MEASURE AND INDICATORS FOR INFORMATIZATION AND INFOR MATION ECONOMY IN 
THIS DISSERTATION  
Drawing from the literature review, the concept of informatization can be divided 
into three perspectives. From the macro-economic perspective,  informatization refers to 
the transition to an economic system that focuses mainly on the production of 
information/knowledge, IT, and information/knowledge services; from the production or 
business/organization perspective, informatization refers to informatization of production 
processes and production factors; and from a general perspective, informatization refers 
to the increasing usage and application of information/knowledge, IT, and 
telecommunication services in our society. This dissertation will mainly adopt these three 
perspectives as the three main dimensions of the concept of informatization. For the 
macro-economic perspective regarding informatization, the two princi al and most 
commonly used indicators of informatization are the percentage of information-intensive 
industries’ contribution to the total GDP and the percentage of information industries’ 
employment in the economy. Production or an organization/business perspective on 
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informatization incorporates two aspects: informatization of production and 
informatization of production factors. For informatization of production, the only 
indicator that is supported by statistical surveys and data in Taiwan 9 is the density of 
businesses’ automation equipment.  With regard to informatization of production factors, 
according to Ma (2003), the most direct indicator, and the one supported by he greatest 
amount of data, is the measure of expenditure on R & D to the total GDP. With respect to 
the infrastructure and usage of information technology, this refers to the digital devices 
and services derived from computers, the Internet, and telecommunications. Thus, this 
dissertation will mainly use such relevant indicators as personal computers per 100 
inhabitants, Internet users per 100 inhabitants, main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, 
and mobile cellular telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants. 
 
TAIWAN ’S INFORMATIZATION  
Some scholars assert that over the past two decades, Newly Industrialized 
Countries such as Taiwan have transformed from an industrial economy t  an 
information/knowledge economy (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004b; Y. X. Chen, 2002; Katz,
1988; Y. S. Ko, 2006). As we can see from Taiwan’s history, the priority f its economy 
shifted from agriculture to labor-intensive manufacturing in the 50s and 60s, to heavy 
chemical industry in the 70s, and then to an information economy started in he 80s and 
completed in the early 90s (Chu, 2003b; Ho & Lo, 2002; Y. S. Ko, 2006; C. F. Lin, 
2004b; H. M. Tsai, 1999). Most scholars who study Taiwan’s economy arguethat the 
transformation to an information economy has become necessary for Taiwan under the 
mounting pressure of a continual loss of competitiveness in labor-intens ve industries 
because of increasing production costs, especially due to the upsurge in wages and land 
prices (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004b). Indeed, its annual growth fell to 6.42% in the 1990s; in 
                                                
9 Relevant indicators such as computer and Internet us  rates in businesses are lacking. 
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2001 Taiwan even experienced some negative growth, which sharply contrasted with the 
previously phenomenal average growth of 9.15% between 1960 and 1990. The declin  in 
the economy and industrial competitive capacity created a strong case for a paradigm 
shift from a labor-intensive economy to an information-intensive economy in Taiwan, as 
an information and knowledge economy is believed to be much less vulnerable to the 
increasing cost of material resources and land and will face less competition from other 
developing countries (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004b). 
To understand Taiwan’s economic evolution to an information economy, we can 
observe the data comparing the sectoral percentage to the total GDP over time. Table 1 
and Figure 1 provide these data. As we can see, there has been a consistent icrease n the 
role of information-intensive industries in the total GDP; the prcentage of the 
information-intensive industry to the total GDP has grown from 1981 when it r presented 
30.59% to 2006, when information-intensive industries composed 52.45% of the total. It 
surpassed labor-intensive industries in 1994 (42.27% V.S. 42.10%). In contrast, the 
percentage of labor-intensive industries dropped from 55.15% to 33.42%, and capital- 
intensive industries remained at almost the same level, dropping only slightly from 
14.25% to 14.12% between 1981 and 2006. The industrial and economic transition to 
information intensive industries was generally acknowledged to have been initiated in the  
middle of the 1980s but not completed until the 1990s (Chu, 2003d); from Table 1 and 
Figure 1, we can also see these relative changes clearly. 
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1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2006 
Information-Intensive 30.59 31.28 33.86 39.20 41.20 44.16 47.02 49.76 51.9 52.45 
Labor-Intensive 55.15 53.17 49.67 45.56 43.25 40.48 37.87 35.34 33.6 33.42 
















Knowledge intensive industries 
Labor intensive industries
Source: W. C. Wang (2008) 10 
                                                
10 This calculation was based on OECD’s (OECD, 1996; 2001) definition of 
knowledge/information intensive industries. They include mainly two sections: information 
intensive manufacturing and information intensive services. Information-centered manufacturing 
includes high-tech industries such as aerospace, computer and data processing equipment, 
automation equipment, pharmaceuticals, telecommunication, semiconductors, scientific 
instruments, and mid-tech industries such as automobiles, electrical equipm nt, specialty 
chemicals, machinery and other transport equipment. The information-centered service industries 
include finance, insurance, real estate, commercial services (including computer software, 
computer and data processing, research and development, engineering services), p ofes ional, 
scientific and technical services, social and personal services, education, medical services, 




Figure 1. Sectoral percentage of the total GDP 
Figure 2 shows the growing importance of the information and electronis 
industry in manufacturing.  Before 1995, the production value of the informati n nd 
electronics industry was the lowest among the four main manufacturing industries. 
However, after 1995, it first surpassed the commodity industry, then in 1996, surpassed 
the chemical industry, and in 1997, surpassed the metal mechanical industry, becoming 
the primary industry of the four main manufacturing sectors. As for the labor intensive 
commodity industry, it experienced a dramatically declining trend, dropping from 35% in 
1986 to around 10% in 2005. The chemical industry is closely related to theintegrated 
circuit (IC) industry and had clear growth after 2000 when more and more mature 
electronic industries immigrated to China for lower production costs, leaving IC as 
playing the main role in Taiwan’s manufacturing production.  
 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Figure 2. Percentage changes in the four main sectors of manufacturing  
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Figure 3 presents the changing importance of industries at different technical 
levels. As seen in this figure, the production value percentage of the low technology/ 
technique industries among the three technical levels showed a continued declining trend, 
from 25% in 1986 to less than 10% in 2005.  Medium-level technology/technique 
industries also show a declining rate from 51% in 1994 to 41% in 2005. In contrast to 
these two industries, the high technology/technique intensive industry shows amazing 
growth. It grew from 25% in 1986 to 44% around 1999, for the first time surpa sing the 
percentage held by medium-technology industries in the same year, and then began to 
comprise more than 50% of total industries in the year 2000.   
 
 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs 
Figure 3. Percentage changes of different technology intensive industries 
These data all show us that Taiwan’s economic production model underwent an 
obvious change from lower-skilled, less knowledge-based, lower technology, labor 
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intensive manufacturing to information-intensive and high-technology economic 
production.  
To what extent has Taiwan’s informatization reached in recent years? According 
to the ITU database (2007), the percentage of homes with a personal computer was 66% 
in 2005, with Internet service was 65% in 2005 (among them, broadband  accounted f r 
78%), with a telephone was 98% (in 2003), and with a television was 94% (in 2003). 
There were 102 mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants in 2006. As for 
business informatization, according to the Department of Industrial Technology, R.O.C. 
(2006), the production automation rate in Taiwan was 75% in 2006, and the use of
computers in all business sectors was 93.50% in 2004. The average percentage of Internet 
use in all companies was 86.10% in 2005, and in 2002 the business website con truction 
rate was 35.7% and was 76.9% for big companies. As for introducing electronic systems 
into businesses, in big companies, the introduction rate was 100% in 2004, in medium 
companies the rate was 38.9%, and in small companies it was 18.7%.  
Some worldwide indices of information economies can also help indicate 
Taiwan’s level of informatization. According to the 2008 Information Technology 
Industry Competitiveness Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2008), 
Taiwan’s overall scores ranked  second in the world for IT competitiveness just after the 
USA. Its R & D environment was ranked first, human capital ranked seventh, and IT 
infrastructure ranked 20th. Furthermore in 2005, Taiwan’s electronic industry ranking was 
ninth, its electronic government ranking was fourth, and its information society ranking 
was seventh (Science and Technology Advisory Group of Executive Yuan, 2008). 
Another important indicator, the World Economic Forum’s (2007) Networked Readiness 
Index 2006-2007, ranked Taiwan 13th in the world, one place behind Hong Kong but one 
place before Japan, and three places before Germany. Similarly, on the International 
Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) “Digital Opportunity Index” (DOI) in 2005, Taiwan 
ranked sixth in the world; and in ITU’s 2004 “Digital Access Index” (DAI), Taiwan 
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ranked ninth ("Telecommunications statistics," 2007). According to the ITU data, Taiwan 
scored high across the board on all measures of the deployment of ICTs. Taiwan’s global 
rankings for ICT service penetration rate in 2003 were as follows: mobile telephony, 
second; Internet access, fifth; broadband access, fifth; and local telephony, 17th 
("Telecommunications statistics," 2007).  Taiwan placed in the top tw  or three NICs for 
the extent of informatization and compared very favorably to even very high-income 
countries. As measured by the contribution of information intensive industries to the total 
GDP, by the penetration of ICTs, and by information economy indices, Taiwan has 
clearly made the transition to an information economy. The penetration of ICTs and 
information is broad across the economy and deep within most industries and 
corporations. 
In fact, Taiwan consistently ranks among the top five countries in IT-related 
product or technique production. For instance, in 2005, Taiwan ranked number two in the 
world in IT hardware production. It claims the largest market share in the world for 
laptop (86.2%, 2006), motherboard (99.0%), liquid crystal display (LCD) (76.5%), and 
monitor (52.0%) production. Other competitive products also include desktop com uters 
(30.2%), servers (34.8%), CD-ROM drives (33.1%), and digital cameras (42.3%).   Some 
of other leading products without sufficient statistic data include semiconductors, IC 
(integrated circuit) designs and wafers (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2008).  
As for the informatization of labor, according to a 2005 survey of the Directorate-
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, R.O.C. (the DGBAS) (2005), the average 
percentage of employees’ use of computers at work in Taiwan was 75.6%. The highest 
use rate was for professional workers (93.60%), and the second and third highest were for 
clerks (91.40%) and managers (83.8%); among service workers, 54.8% used computers. 
Workers in agriculture, forestry, and fishing had the lowest rate (25.10%); and the second 
lowest ranking was held by elementary workers (labor workers) and machine operators 
(37.40% and 37.60%, respectively). If we analyze these data by industry, public 
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administration was the highest, with a usage percentage of 95.80%, and fin ce and 
insurance was second with a rate of 95.20%. The lowest rate was in the field of 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing, at 32.90%; and the field of food and lodging services 
had the second lowest rate, 41.40%.  
The rates for Internet use at work were quite similar to those for computer use. 
The average rate of use for all workers was 59.50%. Professional wrkers and clerks 
remained the two groups with the highest rate of use (79.10% and 73.90%, respectively). 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing workers, machine operators, and elementary workers 
(labor workers) were again the groups with the lowest rate of use (14.00%, 15.30%, and 
21.10%, respectively). Analyzing the data by industry, we see that the three groups of 
public administration, finance and insurance, and education are again the sectors with the 
greatest use of Internet at work, with Internet use rates of 83.20%, 81.20%, and 79.60%, 
respectively. Additionally, the groups of agriculture, forestry and fishing along with the 
accommodation and food service group were again the sectors with the lowest use rates, 
which were 23.10% and 26.20%, respectively.  
The completion of Taiwan’s transition to an information economy is also obvious 
from the impact of information technologies and informatization on its economy in areas 
such as improving efficiency, inducing innovation, enhancing labor productivity, 
expanding new markets, shortening products’ production and circulation processes, and 
accelerating and expanding the flow of capital and ideas. Furthermor , information 
technologies are by themselves a crucial product market, contributing remarkably to the 
whole world’s GDP growth (Castells, 1996a; Harvey, 2005; McKenzie, 2003). As some 
researchers have pointed out (2006 Electronic Business White Paper in Taiwan, 2006; Y. 
X. Chen, 2002), IT has not only contributed greatly to many aspects of Taiwan’s 
economic development (such as integrating domestic companies’ resources and inducing 
their cooperation, breaking geographic limitations and thereby enabling domestic 
companies to gain transnational cooperation, and helping domestic companies to design 
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products of internationally competitive capacity), but it has also become the most 
profitable industry in Taiwan’s economic development since 1990. 
Consequently, macro level data suggest that it is appropriate to classify Taiwan’s 
economy as an information economy, based on sectoral level comparisons, on company 
application of technology (according to worldwide indices) on its global market share of 
high technology products and services, and on the informatization of labor.    
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Chapter 3:  History, Policy, Development, and Social Forces of 
Taiwan’s Information Economy 
By applying policy, historical, and also political economic analysis, this chapter 
will mainly discuss and outline Taiwan’s economic and industrial history, the 
development of its information economy, information economy policy, and also the 
different social forces that are in the process of influencing the growth of Taiwan’s 
information economy.  
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TAIWAN ’S ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT  
Taiwan’s contemporary economic development can be roughly divided into seven 
different phases from a historical perspective (Liang & Wang, 2002; C. F. Lin, 2004a). 
The period from 1945 to 1952 was the recovery period from World War II and from the 
civil war between the Kuomintang Party and the Chinese Communist Party. This period 
of time was characterized by high inflation and economic inequality. In response, the 
Kuomintang government pushed currency and land reform in order to stimulate 
agricultural production and also to redistribute income out of a concern for social tability 
(Amsden, 1985).  The Kuomintang also worked to develop the electronic, fert lizer, and 
textile industries to meet the needs of the domestic market, with agriculture playing a 
leading role in economic development at that time (Amsden, 1985). Economic inequality 
at this time was relatively high due to unstable economic conditions (Cornia, 2000).  
From 1953 to 1960, economic aid from the U.S. due to the Korean War and the 
Cold War helped Taiwan build its economic and industrial foundation. During that time, 
the government used the exportation of fertilizers to funnel profits from agriculture into 
industries to promote industrial development. The central industries supported by the 
government were light industries mainly developed to meet various domestic needs such 
as textiles, food, electric appliances, and chemical products. It was during this period that 
Taiwan began to export textile products; nevertheless, agriculture remained a leading 
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player in Taiwan’s exports and a major contributor to the GDP.  Economic policies of 
this time included focusing on land reform, encouraging foreign investment,  devaluating 
the new Taiwanese dollar, adopting a bi-exchange rate to control foreign exchange, 
limiting imports, and using high custom duties to protect domestic industries (R. L. Chen, 
2006).  Thanks to the rapid expansion of employment for both well-educated and low-
skilled workers, economic inequality declined little by little. 
 The period from 1961 to 1972 was considered the golden age of economic 
development (the highest growth rate in Taiwan’s history) and also the heyday of labor- 
intensive manufacturing in Taiwan, during which time the country completed its export-
oriented industrialization and successfully emerged as one of the most important 
production sites (labor intensive products) for the American and Japanese markets (Ho & 
Lo, 2002; C. F. Lin, 2004b). This stage also marked an important turning point as 
Taiwan’s economy changed its main focus from agriculture to manufacturing. Main 
industries in this stage were light industries such as textile, leather and fur, foodstuff and 
glass industries. In addition to the export of labor-intensive products, the government of 
Taiwan also began to help expand heavy and capital-intensive industres uch as 
petroleum, chemicals, steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, and plastics manufacturing, in 
order to advance Taiwan’s industry structure. The attraction of American and Japanese 
capital investments to Taiwan was one of the principal economic strategies at this time. 
Thanks to the mass employment offered by the labor-intensive manufacturing industries, 
economic inequality and the Gini coefficient11 were sharply reduced from 0.321 to 0.291 
(Cornia, 2000; "Directorate for General Budget, Accounting, and Statistics "). Important 
economic policies included: promoting investment incentives, setting up export 
                                                
11 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion most prominently used as a measure of 
inequality of income distribution or inequality of wealth distribution. It is defined as a ratio with values 
between 0 and 1: A low Gini coefficient indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, while a high 
Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution. 0 corresponds to perfect equality (everyone having 
exactly the same income) and 1 corresponds to perfect in quality (where one person has all the income, 
while everyone else has zero income). 
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processing zones, reforming the financial system, carrying out a national science 
development plan, enacting statutes for cooperation with other countries, and announcing 
development plans for the growth of manufacturing industries (R. L. Chen, 2006).   
From 1973 to 1983 was the age of Taiwan’s developing heavy chemical 
industries. In the previous stage, the Taiwanese government had found that labor- 
intensive industries would one day lose competitiveness because of increasi g labor costs 
and also because of competition from other NICs or developing countries. Th y believed 
Taiwan should promote heavy industry because heavy industry holds the key to 
industrialization as it produces capital goods and can support the long-term steady growth 
of the economy (Wade, 1990). Therefore, the government made plans to help enlarge the 
mid-stream and upstream industries, especially heavy chemical industries, which are 
more capital intensive, in order to reduce the cost of basic production materials for 
Taiwan’s exports (Chu, 2003a). Thus, the representative industries of thi stage included 
petrifaction and steel.  Unfortunately, like many other countries, Taiwan suffered harshly 
from the dual oil crises in 1973 and 1975, which delivered a huge blow to Taiwan’s 
heavy chemical industry and certainly for other export industries as well. Moreover, with 
Taiwan’s withdrawal from the United Nations and the ceasing of diplomatic relations 
with the U.S., foreign investment in Taiwan decreased, exports declined, and the 
country’s economic growth suddenly slowed. Due to the shock of the oil crises, the 
government realized that it would be difficult for Taiwan to develop industries that need 
intense natural resources and energy and, therefore, switched from developing capital-
intensive heavy chemical industries to developing industries with high inter-sectoral 
linkages, high technology-intensiveness, high value added, low energy consumption, 
capacity for increased use of locally produced raw materials, and good marketability. 
These industries tended to be technique/knowledge-intensive industries, including 
electronics, information technology, and high-tech industries (Pang, 1992; C. L.  Tsay, 
1999). To facilitate this, the government set up the Industrial Technology Research 
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Institute (ITRI) and the Electronics Research Laboratories in 1974 and the Institute for 
Information Industry in 1979. All three of these institutes played a crucial role in the later 
development of Taiwan’s information technology, high-tech industries and information 
economy (Cheng, 2002; Zhang & Wang, 1994). In 1976, economic inequality also 
reached a historical low in 1976 at a Gini coefficient of 0.280, and then gradually 
increased to 0.287 (Cornia, 2000; "Directorate for General Budget, Accounting, and 
Statistics "). The representative economic policies in this stage included: establishing the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute of Taiwan, promoting the Ten Projects to 
advance national infrastructure, establishing the National Development Fund to help the 
industries to start new businesses, lowering the custom tariffs to help with production 
material imports, making financial plans to support Taiwan’s small and middle-sized 
enterprises, and enacting the Technology Development Program.   
The period between 1984 and 1990 is known as the “economic liberalization 
stage,” sometimes also recognized as an early-stage in Taiwan’s transition to an 
information economy (Ho & Lo, 2002; C. F. Lin, 2004b). During this time, Taiwan’s 
labor-intensive manufacturing confronted increasing international competition from other 
NICs and other developing countries (Ranis, 1992). Moreover, enormous pressure came 
from the U.S. seeking the liberalization of Taiwan’s domestic market. At this stage, the 
New Taiwanese Dollar appreciated sharply due to Taiwan’s huge trad  surplus and 
foreign exchange reserves. Coupled with the increasing labor costs, Taiwan quickly lost 
its competitive advantage in its traditional labor-intensive manufacturing, which had to  
immigrate for survival, first to Southeast Asia and then to China (T. J. Chen & Ku,1995). 
Not surprisingly, industrial production dropped greatly at this time, and unemployment 
became a serious problem (Chu, 2003d). To sustain Taiwan’s economy, the government 
began promoting high tech and information-intensive industries to replace tr ditional 
labor-intensive industries. The strategic industries initiated by the government included 
information technology, telecommunication, machinery, electrical machinery, electronic 
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parts, transport equipment, etc. The country thus experienced a dramatic industrial 
transformation from labor-intensive manufacturing to information-intensive 
manufacturing and services (C. F. Lin, 2004b). Electronic and electronic g od industries 
replaced textiles as the leading export in 1984 (Wade, 1990), marking the end of the labor 
intensive manufacturing age in Taiwan.  
Also at around the same time, Taiwan’s service industry, for the first time, 
surpassed manufacturing to become the largest contributor to the GDP and to the 
employment of the labor force ("National Statistics Database," 2007). Moreover, 
liberalization of the finance and telecommunication industries created big markets, 
thereby highly increasing employment in the information-intensive ervice industries 
(Chu, 2003d). This paradigm shift to an information economy was accompanied by a 
striking increase in wage inequality. The Gini coefficient rose from 0.287 to 0.312 
(Cornia, 2000; "Directorate for General Budget, Accounting, and Statistics "), which is 
generally attributed to the dramatic industrial transformation from labor-intensive 
manufacturing toward information-intensive industries and the consequent increasing 
unemployment as well as to the increase in globalization and libera  market policies.
 The key economic policies of this time period included assigning strategy 
industries, building the Twelve Projects, establishing the Science Park, lowering the 
nominal tariff rate to less than 10%, loosening the restrictions on outward investment, 
and pushing for the privatization of state-owned companies. (R. L. Chen, 2006).  
The 1990s, “the age of high-tech industry,” witnessed the rapid developm nt of 
Taiwan’s informatization and information-based industries. By placing the production 
sites in China, the products of Taiwanese IT companies enjoyed low production cost and 
high competitiveness and, consequently, became the world’s IT factory, producing 
outsourced IT products for international name brands. Since then, Taiwan’s IT 
production has continued to claim a lion’s share of the world market.   The industry most 
representative of this stage has been the semiconductor industry.  In 1990, under pressure 
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from domestic businesses, the Taiwanese government started to allow companies to 
invest in China, which produced a second wave of the relocation of domestic plants (the 
first wave was the relocation to Southeast Asia) (T. J. Chen & Ku, 1995; Gong, 2005). In 
response to this trend, the government decided to speed up the changes to a more 
information and technique-intensive economy that were already taking place. It 
announced and executed the influential “Enforcement Rules of the Statute for Upgrading 
Industries” to invite investment in information-intensive industries. Meanwhile, the 
government itself also invested heavily in its “National Information Infrastructure” and in 
R&D to create a better environment for an information economy (Y. S. Ko, 2006). To 
encourage more investment and to avoid the continued moving out of industries, the 
government removed restrictions on immigrant workers in 1991 in order to lower labor 
costs. As a result of the industrial transformation and immigrant worker policies, 
Taiwan’s unemployment rate surged, and the inequality of its income distribution 
deepened. Its unemployment rose from 1.67 to 2.99% and the Gini coefficient grew from 
0.312 to 0.326 ("Directorate for General Budget, Accounting, and Statistics "). 
Particularly noticeable was that high unemployment kept setting historical records 
("National Statistics Database," 2007). The representative economic p licies in this stage 
included the Statute for Upgrading Industry, the Six Year Plan for National Development, 
the Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Development Statute, the Asia-Pacific Regional 
Operations Center Development Plan, and White Paper on Science and Technology.   
From 2000 until the present, the Taiwanese government has been engaged in 
“developing knowledge-intensive industries” (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004b), with Taiwan’s 
IT industry maintaining its crucial position in the world’s IT production. At this stage, the 
government and businesses have continued investing heavily in technological R&D and a 
knowledge economy. The government has set  specific goals that the national R & D 
budget should reach 3% of the GDP, that technological enhancement should contribute to 
at least 75% of total economic growth, and that knowledge-intensive industries should 
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account for at least 60% of the total GDP by 2010. However, in 2001, the world’s 
economy, especially related to the IT industry, suffered from a severe recession; Taiwan 
had its first historical economic negative growth (-2%), and the unemployment rate and 
inequality of wages both hit an all-time high. Since 2003, while economic growth has 
gradually climbed back to normal rates of 4-5%, the unemployment rate and wage 
inequality still remain at a much higher level than before. During this period, 
unemployment hit the highest point in Taiwan’s history at 5.17% in 2002 and the Gini 
coefficient also set a historical record at 0.35 in 2001. Therefore, this knowledge 
economy is also characterized by the highest unemployment rate and highest income 
inequality in Taiwan’s history ("National Statistics Database," 2007). The representative 
economic policies of this period included the Knowledge-Based Economies, the National 
Development Plan, the Master Industrial R & D Professional Supply Plan, and the 
Branding Taiwan Development Plan.  
THE DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY OF TAIWAN ’S INFORMATION ECONOMY  
Now we are going to draw our attention to the developmental history of Taiwan’s 
information economy, which can be broadly grouped into three stages: The tage of being 
initiated by foreign capital (1954-1984), the stage of being incorporated in o the global 
production system (1985-1992), and the stage of global production and extension (1993-
the present).  
The Initiation Stage by Foreign Capital (1954-1984) 
The earliest development of Taiwan’s information industry was initiated by 
foreign businesses, mainly from the U.S., and Japan, but also including some fr  
Europe. At the beginning of the 1960s, U.S. electrical and electronics firm  began to 
examine opportunities for relocating production to cheaper labor sites. Th  objective was 
to cut costs by getting the labor-intensive part of semiconductor manufacturing—
connecting the wire leads and packaging—done more cheaply than was possible at home. 
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The year 1961 thus represents a landmark in the history of East Asia. It is the beginning 
of the corporate strategy that came to be called global manufacturing or purchasing 
around the world wherever components could be obtained at the lowest cost. Of all the 
regions of the world, East Asia benefited most from this strategy (Wade, 1990).  
NCR, IBM, and Phillips all set up factories, branch companies, or inte national 
purchasing offices (IPO) in Taiwan at this time, to take advantage of Taiwan’s cheap, 
high quality labor. The main players in the industry at this time were almost all foreign 
firms, and Taiwanese companies could only do the very low level and labor intensive 
peripheral parts. Around the same time, there were also some small Taiwanese companies 
that started sub-outsourcing integrated circuit (IC) packaging, which is very labor 
intensive and does not require high level skills (M. S. Chen, 2005).      
Nevertheless, as more and more companies funded by foreign capital came to 
Taiwan to establish their factories, starting from the 1970s, some of these foreign 
companies began to practice technological cooperation with local Taiwanese companies 
such as Tatung, Sampo, TECO, and Panasonic. This cooperation fired the growth of these
local companies and also Taiwan’s consuming electronic industry, by producing items 
such as television sets and radios. Moreover, instead of producing only low-ski led parts, 
these transnational IT companies also started to produce more critical parts with higher 
need for knowledge and technique in Taiwan, which helped train numerous profe sional 
personnel for Taiwan’s later upgrade to information industries. At this point, local 
Taiwanese computer companies such as Acer and MiTAC started to appear even though 
they were very small. However, these local computer companies produced only low level 
computer parts and IT. Therefore, although Taiwan had created some information 
hardware companies at this stage, they were mainly labor intensive and low technique 
orientated companies that provided such things as IC packaging and low level IT parts.   
As for the international context, several events at this stage influ nced the growth 
of Taiwan’s information economy. In the 1970s, some Japanese corporations transferred 
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some medium value-added production processes to Japan’s East Asian neighbors, 
enhancing the industrial upgrading of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, 
and elevating them into Newly Industrialized Economies (Lai & So, 1997).  
In the computer industry, the transistor replaced the vacuum tube, which 
expanded the IC industry, enhanced computer performance, and thus promptly expanded 
the market demand for information products (Hsu, 1999). Later in 1982, IBM started to 
sell high performance but inexpensive personal computers (PCs) and adopted an open 
system for computer parts, which gave other countries opportunities to get involved in 
computer part production (M. S. Chen, 2005).    
As for the government and its role during this period, due to the political and 
economic impact of the oil crisis and Taiwan’s difficult political situation as it was 
withdrawing from United Nations and also breaking off diplomatic relation with the U.S., 
plus the U.S. adopted quotas on Taiwanese importation products to the U.S. market, 
Taiwan not only faced serious economic hardship but also a political challenge for the 
Kuomintaung’s (The Chinese Nationalist Party) governance. The succesor and also the 
son of Taiwan’s dictator (Chiang, Kai-Shek), Chiang, Ching-Kuo, faced a very difficult 
political economic situation. In order to maintain and strengthen his political power and 
the legitimacy of his government, he had to maintain economic stability and economic 
growth to win people’s support of his governance. Knowing that  labor intensive 
manufacturing would sooner or later lose competitiveness because of the mounting labor 
costs in Taiwan, he quickly decided that promoting technology in the  economy, 
upgrading Taiwan’s industries, and developing information industries were three 
important ways to help Taiwan’s economy survive the international a d political 
economic hardships.  
In addition to making plans for Taiwan to acquire semiconductor design and 
production capabilities as early as 1972, the government also convened the first Scientific 
Technical Conference, and at the conference, a Scientific Technique Development Plan 
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was proposed, which included: developing technologies for energy, materials, 
information, and automation； constructing the Hsinchu Science Park for information 
industry development；inviting overseas technological professionals to come back to 
Taiwan to help with the establishment of Taiwan’s information economy； and 
constructing the Technical Advisory Committee that would include both foreign and 
domestic experts to help develop information economy policies. Furthermor , the Ten 
Year Economic Development Plan was also determined at this conference and 
information, electronics, electronic machine, machine, and transport equipment were 
assigned as strategic industries, which could thus enjoy tax rebates, low interest rates on 
loans, and also technical support from the government. These strategic industries were 
believed to have more added value, to use less energy, and to require more skill and 
technique, which better fit the desired direction of Taiwan’s future economic 
development (M. S. Chen, 2005).  
Moreover, in order to deepen the R & D capacity for these strategic industries, the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute of Taiwan, R.O.C. (ITRI) was established in 
1973, which later played a crucial role in offering technical support to the information 
companies, making important contributions to the growth of Taiwan’s information 
economy (Wade, 1990).  
The Taiwanese government also tried to upgrade the quality of workers to meet 
the needs of new industrial development. The government started advocating vocational 
skill training education and technological education as well as establishing the vocational 
education system at this time (Day, 2005).  
Generally speaking, by the late 1970s, government officials had begun to envision 
an integrated information industry for Taiwan, linking semiconductors, computers, 
computer software, and telecommunications. They gave it very high priority. A newly 
formed information industry task force headed by two senior cabinet ministers reported 
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directly to the premier. A comprehensive approach to the information industry was 
spelled out in the Information Industry Development Plan for 1980-89 (Wade, 1990).  
In 1980, as designated in the Scientific Technique Development Plan, the Hsinchu 
Science Park was established. Companies in this park could enjoy tax rebates, technical 
support from the government, preferential interest rates for loans, and also subsidies for R 
& D costs. The Hsinchu Science Park thus became the most significant site that attracted 
a considerable amount of domestic and also foreign investment in the information 
industry (R. L. Chen, 2006). In addition to the policy benefits the governm nt offered to 
encourage investment in the Hsinchu Science Park, the learning and networking effects 
of this geographic gathering were also important factors in the growth of Taiwan’s 
information economy (M. C. Tsai, 2005). First of all, through having a comm n location 
in the Hsinchu Science Park, companies can have closer interactions, which speeds new 
technique and knowledge diffusion among different companies. Second, IT technicians 
and professionals in the Hsinchu Science Park have also built an informal technical 
knowledge interchange network, which is recognized as a kind of technical community 
where IT professionals can share their working knowledge. Third, becaus  many of the 
IT professionals that were hired to work in the Hsinchu Science Park had been working 
in the Silicon Valley and had close relationships and collaboration with the Silicon 
Valley,  a Hsinchu-Silicon Valley connection was established. Through this connection, 
Taiwan can follow or even keep step with new and advanced IT production tech iques 
and knowledge and also have more opportunities to have technical cooperation with the 
U.S. IT companies (M. C. Tsai, 2005). These three reasons have all contributed to the 
quick success of Taiwan’s information economy. Later in 1997 and then in 2003, the 
government built the second and the third Science Parks—the Tainan Science Park and 
the Taichung Science Park respectively, which, according to the government’s plan, will 
form a labor division of North-IC, middle-nano-scale technology, and South-
photoelectric for Taiwan’s information economy.   
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In 1982, the second Scientific Technique Conference was held, and in the 
conference, IC, machinery, electronics, and information, again, were assigned as the 
strategic industries that would receive the government’s support. In the next year, the 
government passed the Statute for Upgrading Industry to give thesenew strategic 
industries a 20% tax rebate, preferential interest rates for loans, and also subsidies for R 
& D, automation, and employee training. 
Overall, although the development of Taiwan’s information economy was 
initiated by foreign capital at this stage, after the 1970s, through the efforts of Taiwan‘s 
government, ITRI, Taiwanese enterprises, and domestic and overseas Taiwanese IT 
experts, Taiwan very quickly developed a strong information economy. Moreover, with 
its striking successes in the export of PCs and relevant parts, Tiwan came to hold third 
place in the world’s IT production in the early 1980s.  At this time, the IC industry also 
started to reveal its increasingly considerable importance to Taiwan’s economy. 
     
The Stage of Being Incorporated into the Global Production System (1985-1992) 
In the 1980s, the rapid globalization trend quickly influenced the whole world’s 
economic system, which also changed Taiwan’s competitive advantages in the global 
market. More and more NICs and developing countries, such as those in Southeast Asia, 
with their cheaper labor costs, challenged the status quo of Taiwan’s labor-intensive 
manufacturing industry. The Taiwanese government and companies in Taiwan had no 
choice but to look for new comparable advantages in the global market in order t  
maintain Taiwan’s economic growth and business profits (C. L.  Tsay, 1999). Also, 
within Taiwan, the economy faced the problem of the extensive appreciation of the new 
Taiwan dollar, the upsurge in land and labor prices, and also the questions and opposition 
from the environmental and labor movements. These all inevitably raised the production 
cost of manufacturing in Taiwan, particularly for labor-intensive manufacturing. To solve 
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these problems, the government at this time had already decided Taiwan should develop 
technique/information intensive industries instead of relying on labor -intensive or heavy 
industries, to maintain its previous striking economic performance (W.-H. Tsai, 2005).  
By this stage, after being tested by transnational IT name brands through 
outsourcing or technical cooperation, Taiwanese IT companies had already won 
transnational IT name brands’ trust in their production capacity and product quality, and 
thus began to receive original equipment manufactures (OEM) orders f om international 
IT companies. For example, in 1985, MiTAC first received the U.S. telephone and 
telecommunication company—ITT’s OEM orders for producing PCs, the first landmark 
partnership between Taiwan’s IT manufacturers and international IT name brands (Hsu, 
1999). Later on, more and more international IT name brands followed suit, placing OEM 
orders with Taiwanese IT manufacturers to produce PCs, IC, laptops, other IT products, 
and relevant parts. Through these outsourcing relationships, Taiwanese information 
industries were gradually incorporated into the global IT production network.  
Later, in addition to production, the R&D capacity of Taiwan’s IT manufacturers 
started to show their maturity and potential. Taiwan’s production capacity for PCs had 
caught up to the level of international brands and was also able to devel p its own brands 
to compete with other international name brands. Nevertheless, although Taiwanese IT 
companies had a stronger IT production ability, the very crucial partsof the PCs such as 
the microprocessors, the production knowledge, and techniques were still controlled by 
U.S. and Japanese companies, which meant that Taiwanese IT companies could only 
produce less profitable IT parts or products and had to face a very competitive market 
where its products were compared to those of the Japanese and American IT companies.   
Moreover, there were more and more companies entering IT production, resulting 
in severe competition for IT outsourcing and production, further lowering profits. Faced 
with this situation, Taiwanese IT companies had to pursue an economy of scale by 
extending production size, adopting automation, improving the production processes, and 
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using modulization to simplify the fabrication and reduce the amounts of parts used in 
order to lower production cost and maintain  price competitiveness.    
In the middle 1980s, the world market encountered a recession. Taiwanese IT 
companies, especially the hardware companies, faced withering markets, increased costs, 
and an even more deteriorated competitive situation. Many firms had to improve their 
marketing strategies, to begin integrating their high, middle, and low-stream industries, to 
change their organization structure, or even had to move their production si es to 
Southeast Asia for cheaper labor.  
In 1987, one of the most significant IC companies in Taiwan, the Taiwan 
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd., was established through investment by the 
Taiwanese government and technique and personnel transfer. The Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Company later contributed considerably to the growth of Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry by creating industrial diffusing effects, driving the development 
of  IC industries that could manage the entire process from upstream o downstream 
(from high to low in order as IC design, IC production, and IC packaging ) (M. S. Chen, 
2005; Chu, 2003a).  By the 1990s, the Taiwanese semiconductor industry had already
shown excellent performance in making profits and  could also produce high technique 
level IC products, under the government’s push and support for technique advancement, 
increased investment by entrepreneurs, many overseas IC professionals’ coming back 
with their techniques and knowledge, and the learned skills from the cooperation with the 
transnational IT companies (M. S. Chen, 2005).   
After 1989, there was a wave of overseas Taiwanese Americans who had worked 
in the Silicon Valley coming back to Taiwan to establish IT companies. With their years 
of experience working in U.S. IT companies, these professionals brought back important 
knowledge, experience, and also technique, contributing to Taiwanese IT companies’ 
operation, production, and management. They also helped form a close technique 
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connection and interaction with the Silicon Valley, which is also called the Silicon 
Valley-Hsinchu connection or reciprocal regional industrialization (M. S. Chen, 2005).     
Furthermore, the growth in information-intensive services after th  mid 1980s 
also played a role in the development of Taiwan’s information economy. Owing to the 
liberalization pushed by the Taiwanese government and also to the new dev lopment of 
telecommunication technologies such as cell phones, the finance and t lecommunication 
market had substantial growth, as well as the employment in these industries (Chu, 
2003d). Newly emerging information-intensive service activities provided numerous job 
opportunities, which more than offset the loss of jobs from the rapidly migrating labor- 
intensive manufacturing production lines (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004a).  
Toward the end of the 1980s, as the price of PCs continued dropping, the 
international IT name brands were less and less able to produce IT products in their 
homelands because of the much higher labor cost. Taiwan’s role in IT production in the 
global market consequently became more and more significant. Moreover, IT companies 
funded by foreign capital gradually withdrew from Taiwan because of the increasing 
labor cost and also because the cost of outsourcing was much cheaper than running a 
branch company. Thus, outsourcing strategies such as OEM and original brand 
manufactures (ODM) became the mainstream of Taiwan’s IT production at this time and 
also became the main cooperation mode with international IT name brands, especially the 
U.S. brands (Hsu, 1999).   
As for the Taiwanese government during this stage, it continued the policy of 
helping improve Taiwan’s information economy. For example, the government drafted a 
Ten Year Development Plan for the information industry sector, which pus ed the IT 
industry to grow in the direction of more high-tech and more technique-intensive 
development. Furthermore, in 1991, Taiwan’s government passed the Statute for 
Upgrading Industry to replace the Statute for Stimulating Investment to equally focus on 
encouraging industrial upgrading activities such as R & D and employee training and not 
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only on encouraging the establishment of new industries. However, the government still 
claimed telecommunication, information, semiconductors, consumer electonics, precise 
machinery and automation, aerospace, and so on as Taiwan’s ten high-tec strategic 
industries, which could still enjoy the investment rewards of tax rebates and preferential 
interest rates. The aim of the Statute for Upgrading Industry was to help accelerate the 
economic and industrial transformation to a technique and knowledge-intensive 
information economy. In the same year, the government also enacted a Six Year Plan for 
National Development, which also focused on the ten high-tech strategy industries, but it  
main purpose was to build and offer infrastructure resources for these industries (J. H. 
Wang, 2003).  
As for education policy, it was focused on training technological professionals. 
The government executed industrial personnel training programs and also established 
numerous institutes of technology to increase the supply of high level t chnology 
personnel (Day, 2005).  
In 1990, Taiwan’s government announced the administration rules for investment 
in and technical cooperation with China, allowing Taiwanese companies to invest in 
China.  This induced the second wave of immigration of Taiwan’s labor intensive 
industries (the first was when many relocated to Southeast Asia). In this wave, some 
labor intensive IT industries or labor intensive sectors of IT companies (such as lower 
level electronics and electronic machinery or IC packaging) moved out as well. The loss 
of these industries caused Taiwan to encounter the threat of industr al hollowness and 
economic stagnation. Luckily, in order to punish Japan for dumping computer memory 
chips in the American market, the U.S. taxed Japanese PCs with a 100% punishment tax, 
which gave Taiwanese IT companies great opportunities to receive more U.S. IT name 
brands’ outsourcing orders.  This timely opportunity made the production of PCs become 
the new pillar of Taiwan’s economy. Similarly, the U.S. government under President 
Clinton pushed the information infrastructure, causing a rise in the demand for computers 
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and Internet products, which also revived IC industries (IC industries had been in 
recession for a while at that time). Because of these policies, Taiwanese IT companies 
advanced to a even more crucial position in the global IT production network hrough 
OEM and ODM for the U.S. IT brands (M. S. Chen, 2005).   
Therefore, generally speaking, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Taiwan’s 
economy experienced a dramatic transformation. The labor intensive idustries declined, 
and instead, the information economy, which included information intensive 
manufacturing as well as information intensive service, came to hold the primary role in 
Taiwan’s economy. By this time, labor intensive exports had declined from 47% in 1986 
to 36% in 1995, and then remained stable (Chu, 2003a; Ranis, 1992). Thus, entering the 
1990s, Taiwan’s information industries held a significant position in the world’s IT 
market and production. 
The stage of Taiwanese companies’ global production and extension (1993- the 
present) 
After becoming an important player in the world’s IT production, especially in the 
production of PCs, monitors, IC, motherboards, graphics cards, keyboards, scanners, and 
computer mouses, more and more Taiwanese IT companies were seeking a more global 
role in production and management (M. S. Chen, 2005). There were two main reaso s for 
this: First, in order to offer products and services closer to the markets, companies have 
to build fabrication factories and also a global fabrication network. Second, the 
production cost in Taiwan had increased, especially due to increases in the price of land 
and labor, pushing the immigration of the labor intensive sectors of IT industries to other 
countries with lower labor costs. These reasons both accelerated the formation of a global 
production network of Taiwanese IT companies (Hsu, 1999).  
As for the new production sites, the major locations of Taiwanese IT companies 
factories abroad included not only traditional sites such as south-eas  Asia and China but 
also locations close to North America and Europe, such as Mexico and Scotland. Among 
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these new factories, there were two main kinds—production and fabrication. Although 
the labor intensive sectors had left Taiwan, the most technique intensive sectors still 
stayed for the higher quality labor and also for industrial reseach resources. The sectors 
or industries moving out were primarily mature products with a longer product life cycle 
that required simpler production techniques (Hsu, 1999).   
Moreover, Taiwanese IT companies were seeking to get involved in the 
production and development of key parts in order to have more stable sources f th e 
parts and also to lower the purchasing cost. At this time, because the Japanese yen 
appreciated to a very high extent, placing the Japanese IT brands’ at a competitive 
disadvantage, Japanese IT companies started to speed up the immigration of their 
domestic production and also reinforced their cooperation with Taiwanese IT companies 
to produce the key IT parts, which gave Taiwan a perfect chance to upgrade its IT 
industry again. 
The engine driving the growth of Taiwan’s information economy had also
changed. Since 1994, Taiwan’s IC industry had not only produced for the domstic 
market, but also for export, which largely raised the percent of IC products in Taiwan’s 
exports and also the amount they contributed to the total GDP (M. S. Chen, 2005). In 
contrast, after 1995, when computer industries became more mature and then started to 
move out from Taiwan, the computer industry’s economic significance steadily declined, 
and thus IC industries took the place of computers, playing the primary role in Taiwan’s 
economic growth at this stage (M. S. Chen, 2005).  
By the mid 1990s, Taiwanese IT industries already had the ability to do R & D 
and also to advance production techniques by themselves, breaking their past reliance on 
the government’s technical support and professional personnel transformation (M. S. 
Chen, 2005). Over the last few years, the government’s role in the iformation economy 
development has continued to decline.  
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While in recent years the government has still tried to promote economic growth 
through policy instruments, their industrial policies have changed to focus more on 
knowledge economy “activities” themselves (particularly R & D), not only on 
subsidizing the industry. According to the government’s plan, the industrial incentives 
should help the information-intensive manufacturing turning to technique/knowledge 
intensive high-tech industries, by increasing investment in R & D and by advancing 
production technique (H. M. Tsai, 1999).  
Thus, the government proposed a plan to develop Taiwan into a technology 
island— including the development of Taiwan as an R & D center, a high-tech 
production center for the Asia Pacific Zone, and also a technological so iety.  In 1999, 
Taiwan’s government passed the Science and Technology Basic Plan to help strengthen 
the knowledge economy industries (T. J. Chen, 2004). In addition, the New Century 
National Development Plan set forth a plan to change Taiwan into a green silicon island, 
to become the primary global high-tech manufacturing and service cent r. The detailed 
plans incorporated encouraging international and domestic companies to establish 
research centers in Taiwan, introducing new technology products into Taiwan, enhancing 
Taiwan’s hardware and software infrastructure for a knowledge economy, and 
developing advanced computer, semiconductor, and broadband industries and 
technology. The final goal was to set up a cooperation mode by which Taiwan is in 
charge of producing the IT key parts, then sending the orders to China for material 
processing, then exporting to the world market. The government hoped to push Taiwan to 
transform from OEM to ODM, then to original design logistics (ODL) and finally to 
reach the goal of having global logistics (GL).  
In August 2000, the Taiwanese government also passed the Knowledge Economy 
Development Plan, setting up economic goals for the next ten years which included 
making R & D investment over 3% of the total GDP, raising the contribution of 
technology advancement to economic growth to 75%, making knowledge and 
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information-intensive industries count for over 60% of the total GDP, and r ising the rate 
of broadband installation to be around the same as the U.S.. The detailed sub-plans 
contained provisions for helping to grow innovative industries and enterpris s, 
constructing an environment for Internet development and application, expanding the 
application of IT and Internet in production and also in daily life, such as the 
electricalization of small and middle-sized enterprises, constructing an electronic 
government, and improving the education system to give students more capacity to 
innovate.  
In 2002, the Six Year Plan for National Development, arranged to establish IC 
technical design schools and digital content colleges, attracted high-tech professionals to 
Taiwan, developed industrial technology schools for each strategic industry, and 
proposed a plan for high added value in traditional industries and for constructing more 
industrial science parks.  
After the industry upgrade of the 1990s, Taiwan has become the biggest 
production site of IT hardware products in the world (Hsia, 2003). The products that 
international IT name brands purchase from Taiwan have shifted from the original lower 
level products/parts to semi-finished PCs, laptops, liquid crystal disp ay monitors, and 
other higher-level products. Furthermore, the OEM relationship between Taiwanese 
companies and international name brands has also gradually transformed t  ODM, ODL, 
or even GL. Inevitably, more and more Taiwanese IT companies have also tried to create 
their own brand products to lower the risk of relying only on outsourcing orders (Hsu, 
1999).  
As Taiwan’s information industry has become more mature, companies hav  had 
to start developing new markets in other fields such as telecommunications or the 
Internet. In addition, more and more Taiwanese IT companies have moved their 
production sites to China. While Taiwan is and will still be one of the most important 
outsourcing sites for Euro-America’s high-tech products, the profits are not from 
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production as before, but from design, development, and testing and improvement of 
production processes.  
To face the challenges of more and more mature IT industries moving from 
Taiwan to China and also the increased competition as more and more NICs were joining 
the IT production markets, in 2002, the Ministry of Economic Affairs started planning to 
develop the ten new potential knowledge/high-tech industries such as t e nano-scale 
application industry, the digital content industry, the semiconductor precise equipment 
industry, LCD industry, technique trade services, the waste reuse industry, R & D 
services, and the technology design industry.  
 In summary, Taiwan’s information economy is successful due to five main 
reasons:  policy, financial, and technical support from the state (Amsden, 1985; Wade, 
1990), economics of scale production (through the model of global outsourcing) (A. 
Amsden & W. W. Chu, 2003), the learning effects from geographic gathering of  
companies such as can be found at the Hsinchu Science Park, the transnational technical 
networking and cooperation with transnational IT name brands, and the corporate 
synergy network among Taiwan’s big, medium, and small IT enterpris s (this will be 
discussed in later sections). Other important reasons also include the high quality of 
Taiwan’s human capital and the government’s investment in the informati n and 
telecommunication infrastructure. 
 
STATE AND INFORMATION ECONOMY DEVELOPMENT  
What are the typical functions of a government in the processes of informatization 
in a country? With a special focus on the developing countries, Katz (1988) examined the 
influence of the state on the speed of informatization and the social transformation to an 
information society. He argued that, unlike industrialized countries, where t  process of 
informatization is mainly determined by economic factors, informatization in other 
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countries is more likely determined by some political factors such as the countries’ 
internal patterns of power, influence, and resource allocation policies as well as by the 
their political interdependency at the worldwide level. He offered empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that in both the information workforce transition and the diffusion of 
information technologies processes, politics, or the state, repeatedly plays an important or 
even decisive role, especially in the case of developing countries. In his case study of 
governments’ role in influencing the diffusion of media-receiving equipment, he 
identified four mechanisms through which government influence is exerted. First, 
regulation can act to control access to the media and, in turn, their signals, thereby 
restricting the diffusion of receivers. Second, by implementing import controls, policy-
makers can restrict access to media-receiving equipment or computers. Third, import 
substitution policies that affect the pricing structure of hardware can greatly delay the 
computerization of local films. Finally, by controlling telecommunications agencies, the 
government can effectively control the supply of services to the population (Katz, 1988). 
Other means include control of market access, regulation of the electromagnetic spectrum 
and spectrum allocation policies, and industrial policy in its larger sense.  
Although information systems may react to the needs emerging from the 
economy, such reactions are oftentimes mediated by the political system (Katz, 1988). 
With the political influence as the foreground for his research, Katz did not overlook the 
role of economic factors. His analytical model indicates that economy, politics, and 
technology all interact and influence each other. The causal links among these three are 
all bi-directional. Katz (1988) pointed out the importance of the industrial sector on the 
process of informatization. According to him, parallel to the process in which some states 
were heavily invested in communications and information infrastructure in order to 
facilitate economic growth, the private sectors in these countries underwent structural 
changes and adopted information technologies with the view of improving productivity 
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on the part of workers. Thus, along with the state, the industrial and private sectors were 
also a major driving force behind the diffusion of information technologies. 
Katz’s viewpoint regarding the role of the state in using informatization to 
promote economic development and to pursue economic goals is valid in the case of 
Taiwan. Many scholars are convinced that the most striking featur  of Taiwan’s 
information economy development is the leading role that the state has played in the 
process of offering incentives for investment in IT industries, helping capital 
accumulation, stimulating or even directing R&D activities, helping professionals be 
trained, and most importantly , promoting industrial transformation toward information 
industries (Chou, 1998; Chu, 2000, 2003a; Y. S. Ko, 2006; van Hoesel, 1999). Thus, in 
the next section we are going to discuss the literature with respect to the influence of the 
developmental state—the Taiwan government and other interest groups on the processes 
of informational economy development. 
  
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE , THE TAIWANESE GOVERNMENT , AND OTHER INTEREST 
GROUPS 
When considering Taiwan’s information economy, we cannot ignore the crucial 
and active role that its government has played in this process. Throughout the post-war 
history, the government’s economic developmental policies have been viewed as having 
a determinant and far-reaching influence on Taiwan’s industrial developm nt, economic 
performance, capital accumulation, labor market structure, and income distributions (H. 
M. Tsai, 1999). For instance, according to Amsden (1985), the Taiwanese government  
positioned itself to prevail on key economic parameters such as the size of the surplus 
extracted from agriculture and the rate of profits in industry. Moreover, the success in 
export-oriented industrialization and the development of IT industries can also be largely 
attributed to government promotion (Chu, 2003a, 2003c). Some specific policy instances 
that the Taiwanese government has adopted range from land reform, import substitution 
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and export promotion, strategic industry promotion, industrial policy, technology policy, 
as well as education and human capital policy. Because of the governments’ decisive role 
in their economic development, Taiwan and several other East Asian countries such as 
Singapore and South Korea are viewed together as the models of developmental countries 
where a centralized state interacts with the private sectors from a pre-eminent position so 
as to secure national development objectives (Johnson, 1982; White, 1988).  
Wade’s research (1990) revealed that using incentives, control, mechanisms to 
spread risk, and instituting economic policies enabled the Taiwanese government to 
guide, or govern, the market processes of resource allocation. As a consequence, the 
country was engaged in different productions and investments than would have occurred 
if more of the resource allocation and production decisions were left to the free market. 
The Taiwan government in this particular case guided the market through: (1) 
redistributing agricultural land in the early postwar period; (2) controlling the financial 
system and making the private financial capital subordinate to industrial capital; (3) 
maintaining stability in some of the main economic parameters that affect the viability of 
long-term investment, especially the exchange rate, the interest rat , and the general price 
level; (4) modulating the impact of foreign competition in the domestic economy and 
prioritizing the use of scarce foreign exchange; (5) promoting exports; (6) promoting 
technology acquisition from multinational companies and building a national technology 
system; and (7) assisting particular industries (p.27-28). 
The existing research so far has not yet answered two very int resting questions: 
how were these powerful and effective industrial policies determined, and what were the 
relationships among different interest groups and states? At least b fore the mid-1980s, 
industrial policy-making in Taiwan took place merely within a narrow coalition, which at 
the core included the technocrats and ministers of the central economi  bureaucracy, plus 
the senior managers of the public enterprises and the public research organizations, with 
the ultimate veto power securely held by the Nationalist party leaders and military 
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leaders. At the margins of the decision-making process were some selected managers of 
large foreign and domestic firms. Small business people, workers, and peasants were 
effectively excluded. While formal mechanisms to solicit views from the private sectors 
on economic policies were almost nonexistent, informal contact was frequent. Business 
people were preoccupied with building up contacts in the government and the party. To 
do so, they might have had to rely on connections established through kinship, school, 
military service, or some demographic commonalities. Big companies generally 
employed several people who had certain connections with the government and the party. 
They might be called "the public relations managers” (Wade, 1990, p. 286). However, 
after the mid-1980s, with the democratization of Taiwan, the balance of influence 
between the state and the interest groups began to shift toward more equality. The 
preferences of the political leadership and bureaucrats have become less determinant of a 
factor in terms of policy decisions. The government deliberately started to make the 
policy decision-making network more inclusive, with a view to include more input from 
industrialists, financiers, and other groups. For example, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs has been making efforts since the 1980s to seek feedback from various private 
sector groups on draft legislations before they were submitted to the cabinet. In many 
ways, the policy decision-making process has been significantly strengthened.  
As far as worker groups are concerned, before the 1980s, labor union 
organizations and activities were tightly controlled. Most unions were based on the 
company rather than on the occupation, with the occasional exception of a few 
countywide unions for specialized workers such as the welders. Unions' f nancial 
resources were restricted by law, and the union leaders were usually paid by the company 
by which they were employed. The right to strike was explicitly prohibited by martial 
law. All unions within the county were organized into a country federation, tightly under 
strictures imposed by the party. There were also several inactive provincial associations 
of county federations, staffed by some life-long party-appointed officials with no contact 
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with the rank and file. The availability of private safety nets such as the retail trade and 
family income-pooling, together with the long-standing shortage of many kinds of skills, 
further weakened the power of labor unions (Wade, 1990). However, along with the 
development of globalization and the rapid rise of labor cost, the relationships among the 
government, businessmen, and workers seem to have changed. In the past when 
businesses were less internationally mobile, they saw the economic ationalism of the 
developmental state as supportive of their interests; whereas now as they have become 
more mobile, they start to see it increasingly as an impediment to their worldwide quest 
for profits. Moreover, globalization and free trade doctrines have also neutralized the 
effectiveness of many developmental policy instruments. With the policies of industry 
assistance gradually scaled back over time, the Taiwanese government has focused more 
on the build-up of the technological capacities, in particular those related to information 
technologies, within the country. On the other hand, those big and internationally mobile 
firms may have become less willing to make major and long-term investments 
themselves in the technological capacities at home, and therefore t nd to refrain from the 
provision of support from the government.  
Workers, however, cannot be relocated nearly as easily as capital. Thus it has 
become a matter of crucial importance to them that the government and the firms make 
long-term investments to expand the technological capacity as well as the domestic 
demand for labor within Taiwan. From this perspective, the government and he labor 
force seem to share more common interests in building a consensus of pport for long-
term and nationally focused means in order to counter-balance oppositions from those 
owners and managers of internally mobile capital (Wade, 1990). 
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POLICIES OF TAIWAN ’S INFORMATION ECONOMY  
Overall speaking, Taiwan, on the one hand, advanced its IT production capacity 
and learned advanced techniques by participating in the international market and 
cooperating with transnational IT name brands. On the other hand, Taiwan’s government 
also adopted different kinds of policies to help promote information economy 
development and industrial upgrading. Thus, the government policies, especially the 
industrial policies, did play a crucial role in the history of Taiwan’s information 
economy.  
Taiwan’s state policy and intervention has relied on organizational and 
institutional links between politically insulated state agencies and major private sector 
firms. The effectiveness of state intervention has been amplified through the fostering of 
state-linked private sector conglomerates, banks, and general trading companies that 
dominate strategic sectors of the economy. Underlying these political and institutional 
requirements for effective state intervention in the form of policy are two central features, 
namely, the unusual degree of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation. 
The coexistence of these two conditions has allowed the Taiwanese government and the 
bureaucratic elites to fulfill independent national goals and, in the subsequent stage, to 
translate these broad national goals into effective policy action (Onis, 1991). 
In this section, we are going to draw attention to the policies relevant to the 
development of the information economy to further understand how the government 
functioned during this process.    
Economic policies can be generally grouped into the following categories: 
industrial policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, trade policy, 
investment policy, wage and price policy, market and competition policy, energy policy, 
and environmental protection policy. However, in addition to the above economic 
policies, others such as technology policy, education and human capital policy, 
immigrant worker policy, industrial automation, and electronic business policy could also 
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have had considerable influence on the development of Taiwan’s informati n economy. 
This section will explore these relevant polices to further understand how the government 
(the developmental state) functioned in the process of supporting Taiwan’s information 
economy.   
 
Industrial Policies for an Information Economy  
Industrial policies can also be further categorized into four different kinds of 
perspectives: Industrial development policy, industrial competition policy, industrial 
support policy, and industrial infrastructure policy. Industrial development policy is 
concerned with the government’s choosing of which industries to support in coordination 
with national economic and industrial development goals. Industrial competition policy is 
using the government’s influence on taxes, wage rates, labor conditions, exchange rates 
and so on to affect the domestic industries’ international competitive capacity. Industrial 
support policy, on the other hand, includes government’s assistance for R& D, personnel 
training, and technique transfer. Finally, industrial infrastructure policy is the 
government’s assistance in constructing a sound industrial environment by building 
science parks, ports, highways, or a telecommunication infrastructure, for example.   
1. Industrial Development Policies  
In order to assist with the growth of Taiwan’s information economy, Taiwan’s 
government proposed the following industrial development policies: 
1.1. Strategic Industry policy: 
Assigning information industries as strategic industries and supporting them in 
various ways was a very powerful policy instrument that enabled th  government to 
channel domestic resources to the industries that the government planned to support. The 
basic criteria for the choice of strategic industries involved the high elasticity of demand 
in world markets plus the potential for rapid technological progress and labor 
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productivity growth (Onis, 1991). The detailed support plan included helping these 
industries get cheaper land; giving them tax rebates, offering them preferential loan 
agreements, offering them strategic industry funds or preferential financial funds; 
offering them technical support; transferring professional personnel; a d also, helping to 
create a sound infrastructure. The strategic industries were assigned by the national 
Scientific Technique Conference. For example, in 1979, four industries were chosen as 
the strategic industries—information, automation, energy, and materials; the next year 
biological technique, photodiode, and two other industries were added. In 1993, it was 
telecommunications, information, consumer electronics, semiconductors, precise 
machinery, automation, aerospace, advanced materials, specialty chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, medical services, and pollution prevention that were assigned as the ten 
strategic industries. Figure 4 shows us the changing amount of tariff rebate for the last 
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Figure 4. Tariff rebate for strategic industries 
1.2. The Development Plan for the Information Industry: 
In 1980, 1982, 1990, and 1992, Taiwan’s government executed four development 
plans for developing the information industry. In 1980, the ten year plan intended to build 
up the export oriented information industry. This plan detailed goals such as driving 
information industry development; promoting computerization in order to open u  the 
domestic market for the information industry; importing high-tech tenique; training IT 
professionals for industrial needs; constructing a sound research environment for IT 
industry growth; and building up the information infrastructure.  
The 1982 executive plan focused on improving the investment environment for 
information industry, picking promising IT products to which to give sp cific assistance, 
and enhancing the assistance for IT businesses.  
The 1990 ten-year plan had three main intentions: to develop the information 
software industry, to promote key/high-technique IT part industries, and to disseminate 
the application of information techniques in businesses and industries. The concrete plans 
included building IT software science parks, allocating funds for researching promising 
new information technologies, and striving to host the World Information Technology 
Fair.  
The 1992 five-year plan proposed to enhance Taiwanese IT products to higher
tech levels and to speed up industrial upgrading. Specific plans outlined government 
investment in crucial but high cost and risk product production, the support of 
products/industries which were promising but also fit Taiwan industrial goals;  and plans 
to develop new products that had the potential to dominate markets (Hsu, 1999).    
1.3. The Development of Critical Components and Products Act 
The government also passed the Development of Critical Components and 
Products Act in 1992 to select 66 products for import substitution in order to reduce a 
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persistent trade deficit with Japan. The government openly asked domestic companies for 
the development plans for these products and offered free funding for 50% of the product 
development cost and furthermore offered interest free loans for another 50% of the 
development cost (Chan, 2004). Despite a bias on the part of domestic users of high-tech 
components in favor of imports, scarcities of such components promised high prices and 
high profits for firms that could make them instead of import them. Users of such inputs 
had an added incentive to make them in-house in order to stabilize their supply. For its 
part, the government became committed to import substituting high-tech components to 
prevent hollowing out—the movement of manufacturing jobs overseas (A. Amsden & W. 
W. Chu, 2003).  
1.4. The Knowledge Economy Development Plan 
In the early 2000s, after more and more countries joined IT production markets, 
Taiwan’s government became more eager to seek higher level industres and economic 
modes to maintain economic growth, and they believed a knowledge economy would be 
the answer. The government proposed to encourage economic activities that were 
primarily related to knowledge or knowledge production. The government also tried hard 
to improve the business environment to better fit with investment in knowledge 
industries.  
In 2001, Executive Yuan passed the Knowledge Economy Development Plan, 
which had 57 sub-plans and was expected to be accomplished in five years. Some of the 
main objectives of this plan were to nurture new innovative industries and enterprises, 
develop new technology products, and put more emphasis on R & D for innovative 
techniques, technologies, and products. The qualified industries or enterprises could 
enjoy the same preferences as strategic industries did and in a d tion to that, the 
government also offered 30 hundred million NT dollars to help industries develop 
innovative and promising industrial techniques, technologies, and products.  The specific 
goals of this plan included: making R & D expenses count for 3% of the to al GDP in ten 
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years; working towards having technology account for 75% of economic growth; making 
investment in education account for 7 % of the total GDP; making knowledge-intensive 
industry production account for 60% of the total GDP; and working toward the use rate 
and installation rate of broadband being the same as the U.S. (Y.-S. Ko, 2006).      
1.5. The Challenge 2008 National Development Plan 
To make concrete progress toward realizing the vision of Taiwan's development 
into a "green silicon island,” the Council for Economic Planning and Development 
(CEPD) collaborated with other concerned government agencies to draw up the 
Challenge 2008 National Development Plan. This plan set out the framework and 
direction for carrying our political, financial and fiscal reforms and also mapped out four 
major themes and ten key projects for investment in Taiwan's future. It also made 
provisions for the introduction of supporting laws and regulations, the planning of 
funding sources, and the evaluation of performance results, as required for the 
achievement of its objectives. On the legal and regulatory fronts, after conducting 
consultations with all related government authorities, the CEPD identif ed 97 laws and 
administrative orders requiring enactment or amendment. These included 44 laws, of 
which 19 have already been enacted and 10 are under deliberation in the legislature, and 
53 administrative orders, of which 47 have already been announced and put into effect 
(Chang, 2004).  
2. Industrial Competition Policies  
2.1. The Statute for Upgrading Industry  
The Statute for Upgrading Industry is the most powerful industrial competition 
policy instrument Taiwan’s government has applied to increase the competitiveness of 
the industries the government plans to support. There are three important facets to this 
statute: First, all the industries that are assigned by the gov rnment as the strategic 
industries (primarily the information industries), can have a five-year tax holiday (tax 
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free) or the tax on the investment can be waived. Second, there is a 5 to 20% tax waiver 
on businesses’ investment costs for production automation or automation techniqu s. 
Third, the cost of business investment in R & D and employee training ca  enjoy as high 
as a 35% tax waiver. The tax incentives for strategic industries are believed to encourage 
companies to invest in the key, new, but risky industries that the government believes 
might be crucial or promising for Taiwan’s future economic growth. Thus, this 
instrument helps the government to funnel economic resources into industries that the 
government is hoping to cultivate. The tax waiver benefits on informatization, R & D, 
and employee training are also expected to enhance the entire production capacity and 
human capital quality in Taiwan and to encourage innovation with new techniques, new 
products, and new inventions, which are thought to contribute to Taiwan’s information 
economy (R. L. Chen, 2006).       
3. Industrial Support Polices 
3.1. Technology Development Program:  
From 1979 to the present, Taiwan’s government has employed the Tecnology 
Development Program to help develop new key products, industries, and production 
techniques. The purpose of this program is to help enterprises lower or even avoid the 
risk and cost of investment in R & D for new and uncertain products or echnologies. 
Through government funding, Technology Development Programs authorize research 
institutions, universities, and industrial research groups to research and develop these 
new techniques, products, and technologies, and then through technique transfer, patent 
authorization, or industrial services, to diffuse these new products, techniques, or 
knowledge to relevant industries for production or application. The effects of Technology 
Development Programs have included driving industries to further R & D, inducing 
business investment in further production (for instance, it has been claimed that the 
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programs brought in 9.4 hundred millions dollars for R & D and production investment in 
2004), or even establishing new industries or companies (R. L. Chen, 2006).   
3.2. Industrial Technology Research Institute of Taiwan: 
The Industrial Technology Research Institute of Taiwan (ITRI) was established in 
1973 by the government. ITRI was delegated the responsibility for developing new 
industrial techniques, technologies, and also new products, and of diffusing them into 
industries for production or application. ITRI is still one of the main institutes which 
produce the most patents each year in Taiwan. According to the Taiwanese government’s 
estimates, each dollar invested in ITRI can add 11 dollars of business value (or 2 dollars 
net profits). Furthermore, the technological professionals who were trained by ITRI and 
then transferred into the industries have already founded more than 55 companies, 
creating more than 2.2 million NT dollars of business value by the government’s 
estimation (R. L. Chen, 2006).     
3.3. National Applied Research Laboratory: 
The National Applied Research Laboratory was established in 1984, based on the 
Euro-American’s examples. The National Applied Research Laboratory was in charge to 
do more fundamental scientific academic research and to develop high tech products. It 
also helps industries in technological professional personnel training and transfers 
research results to industries for application (R. L. Chen, 2006).  
3.4. Technological Personnel Training and Foster Program: 
From the time that Executive Yuan announced the Science and Technology 
Development Program in 1979, the government started to guide the education and job 
training system to educate and train students according to the needs of domestic 
industries. With the same intention, in 1995, the Technology Personnel Training and 
Foster Program was announced. Its specific programs incorporated establishing a 
mechanism through which industry partners and academic institutes could cooperate in 
personnel training; authorizing research and business sectors to do the worker training; 
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encouraging academic researchers to participate in industries and in industrial research; 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the job training system, through policies 
such as establishing an effective evaluation system; increasing the invitation of overseas 
professionals to come to Taiwan to contribute their professional knowledge; and setting 
up a personnel database of overseas professionals and helping domestic IT companies to 
find fit employees through this system (Science and Technology Advisory Group of 
Executive Yuan, 2008).  
3.5. National Development Fund: 
The National Development Fund was set up in 1973 for the purpose of helping the 
new enterprises in those strategic industries assigned by the government to initiate their 
businesses. However, in order to obtain loans from this fund, except for the purpose of  
founding  new companies in strategic industries, businesses also had tmeet the policy 
prescriptions the government asked for such as using loans on business upgrading, 
production automation, business electronicalization, and new product development 
(Science and Technology Advisory Group of Executive Yuan, 2008).  
3.6. Preferential Loans: 
A very important source of financial support from the government for the 
strategic industries was the offering of preferential loans. Unlike other capitalist 
countries’ that had private bank systems, Taiwan’s bank system was controlled and 
owned by the government for a very long time until the 1990s. In the 1990s, the KMT 
government started to allow the establishment of new private banks, but the government 
still owns and controls the government-owned banks. These public banks have the very 
important responsibility of accomplishing the government’s policy goals, especially the 
strategic industry policy and industrial upgrading policy. Therefore, under th  
government’s supervision, the public banks offer a variety of preferential loans to 
industries, enterprises, or R &D activities that government is willing to support or 
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encourage. In addition to the preferential loans, the Taiwanese government also harnesses 
venture capital to help innovative industries and enterprises (J. H. Wang, 2003).  
3.7. Venture Capital: 
Venture capitalism has flourished in Taiwan and has played a major role in 
supporting Taiwan's information industry. In this process, the government was the 
catalyst. It began promoting venture capital funds to finance start-ups in 1983, at the 
instigation of K. T. Li, the statesman mentioned earlier who wasbehind the rise of 
Taiwan's high-tech industries in general (Li 1988). In cases where an outside agent 
developed a start-up, typically that agent was the government rather than a venture 
capitalist (in fact the government started one of Taiwan's earliest venture capital firms). 
Sometimes the government did this directly, as in its founding of Taiwan's two world-
class, state-owned semiconductor foundries, UMC and TSMC. Usually the government 
supported indirectly, by providing start-ups with the finances, facilities, and access to de-
bugged technologies that were necessary for them to grow (A. Amsden & W. W. Chu, 
2003). Anther policy also included giving the information industries preferential 
treatment such as shorter observation time to be qualified to enter the stock market to 
collect funds (Chan, 2004)。 
3.8. The Corporate Synergy Development Center: 
The government also contributed to networking a Corporate Synergy 
Development Center (originally called the Core-Satellite Development Center). The idea, 
promoted by the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
was to germinate a center-satellite factory system in appropriate Taiwan industries. The 
system was designed to strengthen small firms by incorporating them into the orbit of a 
large enterprise. It was hoped that the small firm would thereby face more stable demand 
so that it could concentrate on upgrading its operations. Better cooperati n between the 
center and the satellite was also expected to raise the level of productivity and efficiency 
throughout the economy.  
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Both center and satellite received financial inducements from the government to 
cooperate. Satellites obtained technical assistance from the center r lated to just-in-time 
inventory management, cost rationalization, quality assurance, and other upgrading 
programs. Centers enjoyed opportunities to invest in promising start-ups, better 
performance on the part of their suppliers, and subsidized management-consulting fees to 
install management systems in their suppliers that were in their own interests to install in 
any case.  
At first, the CSD focused on promoting center-satellite systems hat were vertical. 
Vertical systems were of two types. In one, the center bought parts from the periphery. In 
the other, the periphery further processed inputs from the center (in-processing). Then in 
1995, the IDB required the CSD to offer additional services to facilitate horizontal 
cooperation among different types of firms within an industry such as sh ring marketing 
channels or at least sharing global market intelligence (as in the case of the IT industry's 
Marketing Intelligence Center). Thus a third type of system emerged-- the horizontal 
system.  
The CSD helped to build, maintain and monitor a common C-S framework for 
each industry. It also helped to coordinate and upgrade technological capabilities, 
managerial expertise, and e-commerce for registered firms. Those firms participating in 
the program found assistance related to total quality management, total c st 
rationalization, and satellite quality assurance most helpful. By 2000, the CSD had 
registered 192  C-S systems that involved 3,115 firms (A. Amsden & W. W. Chu, 2003). 
4. Industrial Infrastructure Policies   
4.1. Science Parks: 
As mentioned in the previous section, the establishment of Science Parks, 
especially the Hsinchu Science Park, was also an important policy contributing to 
Taiwan’s information economy.  In 1980, the Hsinchu Science Park was established after 
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the model of the Silicon Valley in the U.S., in order to encourage information-intensive 
manufacturing to invest in production in Taiwan. IT companies in this park could enjoy 
tax rebates, technical support from the government, preferential interest rates for loans, 
and also subsidies for R & D costs, thus making it a site that attr cted a considerable 
amount of domestic and also foreign investment from the high-tech industry (R. L. Chen, 
2006). In addition to the policy benefits the government offered to encourage investment 
in the Hsinchu Science Park, the learning and networking effects from this geographic 
gathering have also been an important factor in the development of  Taiwan’s 
information economy (M. C. Tsai, 2005). Later, in 1997 and 2003, the government also 
built the second and the third Science Parks—the Tainan Science Park and the Taichung 
Science Park respectively, to expand the scope of Taiwan’s information-intensive 
manufacturing. 
4.2. National Information Infrastructure:  
The National Information Infrastructure (NII) Plan was announced in 1997. 
According to this plan, information and Internet infrastructure would be the centers of the 
new economy, and the spirit of innovation would penetrate most of the acivities in the 
information society, including economic, technological, educational, cultural, or social 
aspects. Its detailed plans included four objectives.  The first was improving information 
infrastructure–copyright and electronic signature law, improving the safety of on-line 
transactions, increasing the Internet population, and increasing Internet construction. The 
second was constructing the electronic government. The third was promoting industrial 
electronicalization. The last was preventing problems caused by an information society, 
such as lowering the digital divide and also improving Internet content (Science and 
Technology Advisory Group of Executive Yuan, 2008).   
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Technology Policies  
Technology policy has also been closely related to the construction of Taiwan’s 
information economy. Before 1970, Taiwan’s technology policy focused more on 
academic and scientific research considerations such as improving scientific education 
and strengthening scientific research. However, after 1970, under Chiang, Ching-Kuo’s 
plan to utilize technology to help advance economic growth and development, Taiwan’s 
technology policy started to align itself with the needs of industrial development (Chou, 
1998) and also began to become a policy tool to support the information economy. Two 
representative technology policies are as follows:   
1.1. Science and Technology Development Program:  
The Science and Technology Development Program announced in 1979 was 
derived from the previous year’s National Scientific Technique Confere c . There were 
three primary goals of this program: applying technology to help economic development, 
advancing national welfare, and building an independent national defense system. Four 
industries were chosen as the technology development focus—information, aut mation, 
energy, and materials; the next year biological technique, photodiode, and another two 
industries were also added.   
1.2. White Paper on Science and Technology: 
In the late 1980s, Taiwan faced the threat of deindustrialization because of the rise 
of other NICs’ participation in labor-intensive manufacturing. Thus, how t  speed up 
Taiwan’s industrial upgrading and restructure the industries to maintain a competitive 
advantage became the new goals of the new technology policies. In 1997, the fifth 
National Scientific Technique Conference announced the White Paper on Scie ce and 
Technology, which assigned industries with high intersectoral linkages, high technology-
intensiveness, highly value added, and low energy consuming as the ten strategic 
industries. These industries included telecommunication, information, consumer 
electronics, semiconductors, precise machinery, automation, aerospace, advanced 
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materials, specialty chemicals, pharmaceuticals, medical services, and pollution 
prevention. The detailed objectives of this White Paper outlined: increasing R & D input, 
improving human capital quality, enhancing universities’ research capacity, promoting 
new technology research plans and national technology programs, developing and 
researching key techniques for industrial development, accelerating the technique transfer 
from research institutes to industries, and constructing a national information 
infrastructure. The overall goals of this White Paper were to develop Taiwan as an Asia 
Pacific research center, high-tech production center, and finally as a technology island 
and country (Chou, 1998).   
   
Industrial Automation & Electronic Business Policy  
To accelerate industrial upgrading through rough production automation and IT 
application has also been a critical strategy of Taiwan’s information economy policy. 
Two representative policies here are—the Industrial Automation & Electronic Business 
Program and the National Information & Communication Initiative.  
1.1. Industrial Automation & Electronic Business Program: 
Since 1980, Taiwan’s government has continued to promote the Production 
Automation Ten Year Plan and the Industrial Automation Ten Year Plan, in order to 
assist industries to execute standardized production and to automate production lines in a 
planned way. In 1999, the Executive Yuan extended these original plans into the 
Industrial Automation & Electronic Business Program. The new plan, in addition to 
continuing to  promote the automation of production, storage, delivery, and magement, 
also chose a number of focal industries for which to set up electronic business 
management for their supply and demand chains’ (2004 Electronic business white paper 
in Taiwan, 2005). In order to offer industries incentives to implement automation and 
electronic business, the government applied the Statute for Upgradin  Industry to give 
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businesses preferential loans and tax rebates for purchasing automation equipment. 
Moreover, the government cooperated with research institutes and universities to assist 
industries in setting up standardized automation production processes (2004 Electronic 
business white paper in Taiwan, 2005). Figure 5 presents the rapidly growing trend of 



























Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. 
 
Figure 5. Automation equipment density 
1.2. National Information & Communication Initiative Plan (NICI): 
This NICI incorporated numerous programs. One of them, Industrial 
Electronization, planned to promote electronization for not only manufacturing and 
service industries but also for most industries in Taiwan and also for small and middle 
sized enterprises. For bigger enterprises, the NICI group helped to build up a complete 
information system which could manage every action and point in the business process 
                                                
12 Automation equipment density, according to the Department of Statistics, ministry of Economic Affairs, 
R.O.C. (2006), is measured by the sum of money of automation equipment (including hardware or 
software) divide by the total amount of workers employed in each year. 
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(2004 Electronic business white paper in Taiwan, 2005). Another plan—the 
Development Plan for Global Logistics in the Manufacturing Sector which was approved 
in December 2001 and based on the NICI Plan--listed e-industry as one of its main 
infrastructures. This plan is also based on an operation headquarter proposal found in the 
Challenge 2008:  6-Year National Development Plan. The plan aims to construct a sound 
industry e-business infrastructure that would bring about a highly efficient e-supply chain 
management network for a global logistics operation system. The plan is for these visions 
to be achieved through using a center-satellite systems strategy in e-industry and helping 
each operation headquarters build e-nerve center systems. There are two major directives 
under this plan. The first is researching the business model, operati n model, and IT 
model of each operation headquarters, and the second is creating an e-Business 
Assessment Scheme for each enterprise (Industrial Development Bureau, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 2008). 
1.3. The Challenge 2008 National Plan: 
The Planning and Implementation for the challenge 2008 National Plan was a 
comprehensive program for Taiwan’s informatization and economic growth. Among 
them, the e-Business project focused on helping industries construct an e-supply and e-
demand chain management network, which can integrate and further control the fl w of 
information, money, and goods. The industrial electronization plan projected to stablish 
an informatized system of technology design to facilitate the sharing of technology 
design information and knowledge among high-tech industries  (2004 Electronic business 
white paper in Taiwan, 2005).   
 
Other Policies for Information Economy 
In addition to the industrial policy, technology policy, and industrial automation 
and electronic business policy, Taiwan’s government has also employed other economic 
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or education policies to support its information industries, in order to lower their 
production costs or to increase their competitiveness.   
Exchange Rate   
Keeping a comparatively undervalued real exchange rate is also a powerful 
instrument that has helped the Taiwan government to spur its IT product exports. One 
estimate puts the magnitude of undervaluation for Taiwan at around 25 percent in the 
mid-1980s (Wade, 1990) (also see Figure 6). Over the 1980s, the exchange rate was fixed 
at close to NT$ 40=US$ 1. However, under pressure from the U.S. government, the NT 
exchange rate appreciated per dollar from NT $35 in 1986 to NT $29 in 1987 and then to 
NT $ 25 in 1992.   After 1993, it devaluated again to NT $28 =US$ 1in 1997 and to 34.5 
in 2002; it maintained the rate of around NT $30-$32 per US dollar from 2005 to 2008. 
The devaluation of NT at this period was because the value of the US dollar rose again as 
a result of America’s economic prosperity. This devaluation helped sur Taiwanese IT 














































Source: The Central Bank, R.O.C. 
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Figure 6. Exchange rate 
Wage and Labor Policy 
The wage policy was also an instrument that  helped maintain the competiveness 
of Taiwan’s domestic companies. The minimum wage was kept very low in order to 
maintain Taiwan’s low labor cost advantage in international trade. With the exception of 
setting the minimum wage, the government did not intervene in the wag determination 
in the labor market; however, it still managed through suppressing labor unions and 
limiting labor movement to indirectly keep Taiwan’s wage rate at a comparatively low 
level. Labor unions were tightly circumscribed. Most were based on the company rather 
than on the occupational category, with the exception of some countywide unions for 
specialized workers such as welders. Unions’ financial resources were restricted by law, 
and the head of the union was paid by the company for which he worked. Th  right to 
strike was prohibited by martial law. All unions within a county were grouped into a 
county federation, tightly controlled by the KMT party. There have also  been several 
inactive provincial associations of county federations, staffed by life-long party-
appointed officials. The availability of private safety-nets, such as retail trade and family 
income-pooling, together with the long-standing shortage of many kinds of skills, have 
further reinforced the powerlessness of labor unions (Wade, 1990).  
The Taiwanese government could practice this kind of labor control becaus  the 
KMT government was the only dominant political power for a very long time. However, 
after the 1980’s with the blooming of labor consciousness and the labor movement, it 
became harder for the government to continue to ignore worker benefits in favor of 
industrial advantage. In 1984, the government proposed the Labor Standards Law under 
pressure from both the U.S. government and from Taiwanese voters.  In 1987, the 
government also established the Council of Labor Affairs to handle labor issues (N. C. 
Wang, 2002).  Later, the minimum wage was raised in the first half of the 1990s, about 
6% to 10%, but from 1998 to 2006, the government did not raise the minimum wage due 
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to the fact that Taiwan was experiencing low economic growth compared to the previous 
years (The Council of Labor Affairs, R.O.C., 2008).  Figure 7 demonstrate  a gradual 
declining trend of labor unions in Taiwan after 1990, which was believed to be highly 
related to the globalization trend—also to the emigration of Taiwanese manufacturing 




























































Source: The Council of Labor Affairs, R.O.C. 
 
Figure 7. Labor unions 
Interest Rates 
Interest rates are believed to be very closely related to investment, saving, 
industrial development, and certainly economic growth. Taiwan was one of the first, if 
not the first developing country to adopt a high real interest rate policy. The real rate on 
savings deposits was 6 percent or more in virtually all the years between 1955 and 1980, 
except for the high inflation years of 1973-74 and 1979-80 when it turned negative. It 
averaged about 9 percent between 1955 and 1964, and about 8 percent between 1965 and
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1972. The high interest rate policy came in response to the hyperinflation of 1946-50, 
when prices rose by thousands of percent (Wade, 1990). Taiwan’s government retained 
this high interest rate policy for around thirty years, which contributed to Taiwan’s 
savings and economic growth. However, after 1984 (also see Figure 8), the Taiwanese 
government began to push for economic liberalization and internationalization, which 
included a market-determined interest rate. Nominal interest rates were maintained at 
around 8 percent in the 1980s and 1990s; however,  it dropped by about 7 percent to 3.31 
percent in 2006, representing a zero or even negative interest rate age (The Central Bank 














































Source: The Central Bank, R.O.C. 
 
Figure 8. Loan interest rate 
Immigrant Worker Policy 
Another important and relevant policy was the introduction of immigrant workers 
for the purpose of lowering firms’ labor costs. In 1991, Taiwan’s government announced 
the opening of the borders for immigrant workers to come to Taiwan to work in order to 
 74
solve the problems of insufficient workers and increasingly higher labor costs, which 
resulted in the moving out of Taiwanese firms and the creation of a h llowing out of 
industries. Immigrant workers are believed to have a very high replacement effect on 
low- skilled level (labor intensive) workers, especially the senior ones, but they also have 
a complementary effect on higher level professional workers (Q. L. Tsai, 1999). Figure 9 

























Source: The Council of Labor Affairs, R.O.C.  
Figure 9. Immigrant workers 
Education and Human Capital Policy 
The high education level and good quality of Taiwan’s labor also contributed 
considerably to the development of Taiwan’s information economy.  The quality of 
human capital and the technological R & D capacity of Taiwan is cla med to be second 
only to Japan in Asia (F.-Y. Lin & Liu, 2002). According to the 2008 Information 
Technology Industry Competitiveness Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
(2008), Taiwan’s R & D environment ranked  first and human capital ranked seventh  in 
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the world. Looking back on Taiwan’s human capital policy, we can find that it was pretty 
closely related to or even led by the government’s industrial or ec nomic objectives. 
Along with the industrial transformation, Taiwan’s human capital policy can be grouped 
into five different phases.  
First, in the 1950s, in order to be in alignment with the economic policy, the 
human capital policy focused on Import Substitution, which planned to promote Taiwan’s 
domestic light industries in order to avoid importing too many basic commodities from 
abroad. Taiwan’s government decided to require six years of compulsory education in 
order to universalize basic education so that there would be sufficient labor of a certain 
quality for the domestic light labor-intensive industries.  
In the second phase during the 1960s, Taiwan started to develop an orientation 
toward expanding exports. In order to solve the problem that industries had already 
upgraded and needed higher quality workers, the government extended the compulsory 
education to nine years, and in the meantime developed vocational schools and 
encouraged the founding of junior colleges, to enhance the quality of human capital and 
increase the labor supply for industrial development (Day, 2005).  
In the 1970s, the Taiwanese government was hoping to upgrade Taiwan’s 
industries to be more capital intensive with more middle and higher str am heavy 
industries such as petrifaction, but later turned to machinery, information and electronics, 
due to the oil crisis. In order to face the problem of the surging needs for technicians and 
professionals, the government started to advocate vocational skill training education, 
technological education, and in this stage, Taiwan also established the vocational 
education system.    
In the 1980s, Taiwan’s economy faced another round of industrial upgrading 
pressure—transforming it from a labor intensive to an information intensive economy. To 
solve the related human capital problem, the education policy began to focus on training 
technological professionals. The government executed industrial personnel trai ing 
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programs and also established numerous institutes of technology (having the same four 
year education program as universities and having the same rank). It also offered further 
education opportunities for vocational school graduates, hoping through these s rategies 
to increase the supply of Taiwan’s high-level technology personnel. 
In the 1990s, Taiwan’s government adopted an open policy for domestic 
investment in China, and thus Taiwan’s labor intensive industries started the second 
round of immigration and thus further pushed toward the completeness of Taiwan’s 
industrial transformation. By the 1990s, Taiwan’s industries had almost transformed to 
being completely information intensive and, therefore, needed a great number of 
professional and technological personnel. Consequently, the government founded and 
encouraged the establishment of universities. The number of universities surged in a very 
short time after 1990. In addition to this, Taiwan’s government also strongly pushed for 
the invitation and training of professional and technological personnel and also arranged 
lifelong learning plans to place stress on workers’ re-training and further education (Day, 
2005). Figure 10 shows the uneven but generally growing trend of the Taiwan 









































Source: Ministry of Education, Department of Statistics, R.O.C. 
 
Figure 10. Government’s education investment per citizen  
 
DIFFERENT FORCES IN THE PROCESS OF TAIWAN ’S INFORMATIZATION  
In the process of informatization of Taiwan’s economy, various social forces 
played different roles in influencing this development. The main actors in this process 
consisted of the state and government elite (including the political leader, Chiang, Ching-
Kuo), the technological elite, the industrial elite, the small and middle-sized enterprises, 
as well as the foreign capital and the international political and economic situations.   
State and Government Elite  
One of the most important reasons why Taiwan’s model was able to succeed in 
the global information market was because the state successfully led the direction of 
industrial development. On the one hand, Taiwan improved its productivity and learned 
advanced techniques and skills by participating in international markets and cooperating 
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with large, transnational companies. On the other hand, Taiwan continued its in ustrial 
upgrading and developing of new industries by following the lead of the government’s 
industrial and related policies, all of which we discussed in the last section. Therefore, the 
state did have a weighty influence in the development of Taiwan’s information economy. 
However, the power of the state in deciding or influencing the information industry’s 
development has changed and may even be considered to have weakened over time. We 
can roughly divide the government’s involvement into three stages.  
In the first stage, during the 60s and 70s, the government bureaucrats had almost 
full power in directing the development of Taiwan’s information economy under the 
authorization and trust of Taiwan’s top political leadership13. While they held strong 
political and military power, the KMT elites had no intimate ties with the dominant social 
classes. The full-blown state bureaucracy, on the other hand, penetratd its society down 
to the residential neighborhoods, village, schools, and larger work units. There were no 
native or foreign forces in the society which were strong enough to manipulate the 
formulation of or resist the execution of state policies. The only force outside the state 
apparatus that could exert significant weight upon the policy-making was that of the 
American advisers. Nevertheless, the economic policy makers still maintained certain 
links with leading businessmen through a couple of informal channels such as the 
Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce (Pang, 1992). Industrial policy-
making in this stage took place within a narrow coalition which included, at the core, the 
technocrats and ministers of the central economic bureaucracy plus the senior managers 
of public enterprises and public research organizations, with Nationalist p rty leaders and 
military leaders having veto power. At the edges of this process were the selected 
managers of large foreign and domestic firms. Small businesspeople, workers, and 
                                                
13 After the KMT had withdrawn from mainland China, the party’s leader had recognized that economic 
affairs should be handled by real economic experts, not politicians, and thus decided to give the economic 
bureaucrats more power and authority to determine economic and industrial policies (Tuan, 2000).  
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peasants were excluded from participating in the establishment of economic policy 
(Wade, 1990). 
In the second stage, spanning the 1980s, some information sectors had been built, 
and more technological elites had been incorporated into the operation and decision-
making processes as consultants, sharing the power with bureaucrat elites.  
In the third phase, by the end of the 1980s, Taiwan’s political and economic 
situation had changed dramatically and had become more liberal. Industrial forces had 
progressively more ability to influence the policy making through lobbying the 
Legislative Yuan and law makers. Especially after the 1990s, the economic scope and 
power of these IT companies had become too large to be dismissed. The expansion of the 
private sector and the emergence of big enterprises had gradually undercut the autonomy 
of the KMT state in formulating and executing economic policy. B this stage, the 
industrial elites had become more crucial or even determinant in deciding the direction of 
the development of the information industry (Tuan, 2000).  
Nevertheless, generally speaking, the local capitalists did not play a decisive role 
in the state's economic policymaking. The state consistently acted relatively 
autonomously from the new dominant class. Unlike the examples of Japan and Korea, 
state business relations were relatively distant and cool in Taiwan (Pang, 1992). 
Exchanges between the state and the bourgeoisie were not very frequent. No local 
capitalist was recruited to be a member of the Executive Yuan Council or the economic 
bureaucracy until 1981. The economic policy makers and bureaucrats usually did not 
consult social groups prior to policy shifts. They analyzed problems and options and then 
devised incentives, based on what they believed the local and transnatio al capitalists 
would respond to (Gold, 1986: 127). Although in some cases the local capitalists were 
solicited for opinions, the economic policy makers still played the role of final judge.      
Now we want to go back to overview the state’s role in Taiwan’s industrial 
progress. Before the 1970s, the Kuomintang (KMT) state was given American assistance 
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and had more range to determine its economic relations with the outside world. The KM  
state, on the one hand, dominated the economy and accounted for a sizable portion of the 
industrial production. On the other hand, it fostered the supply of consumer goods 
through various measures of encouragement and protection of local capit ists. The result 
was that when U.S. aid stopped and Taiwan had to incorporate itself into the world 
capitalist system, it had already developed a prospering local b urgeoisie and a strong 
state which played the most significant role among the three partners of the "triple 
alliance" (Wade, 1990, p. 259). At this time, the internal structuring of Taiwan’s 
government, the KMT state, for economic policymaking was composed of an 
impregnable top political leadership and a group of competent economic policy makers 
assisted by a company of hardworking bureaucrats. It employed a variety of measures 
concerning foreign exchange and trade to extract agricultural surplu , to guide 
consumption patterns, to conserve foreign exchange, and to protect domestic firm  so as 
to promote import substitution in light industry. Although it progressively loosened up its 
control over the economy to include the operation of market forces, it did not just set 
price controls. It still intervened directly in the economy by channeling funds for 
investment, devising indicative plans, improving the physical and psychological 
investment climate, and guiding Taiwan's incorporation into the world capitalist system 
(Gold, 1986: 122). 256-2 
As Onis (1991) pointed out, within the Taiwanese bureaucracy, a pilot agency 
plays a key role in policy formulation and implementation. Close institutionalized links 
are established between the elite bureaucracy and private busin sses for consultation and 
cooperation. The organizational and institutional links between the bureaucratic elites and 
major private sector firms are crucial in generating a consensus on goals, as well as in 
exchanging information, both of which constitute essential components of the process of 
policy formulation and implementation. Yet another crucial component is a political 
system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient scope to take initiatives effectively. 
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The politicians "reign" while the bureaucrats "rule." The objectiv  of the political elite is 
to legitimize the actions of the elite bureaucratic agencies and make room for the latter's 
actions (Onis, 1991, p. 111). 
Focusing more specifically on information industry policies, for example, the 
government’s determining and operating system in these areas was centered on the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, which was authorized by the president. Above the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs was the Technical Advisory Committee, which was 
responsible for giving suggestions to guide Taiwan’s policies oncerning the information 
industry. In addition, under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, there were the Industrial 
Development Bureau, the Bureau of Foreign Trade, the National Science Council, and 
the Industrial Technology Research Institute, which together helped to carry out policies 
related to the information economy. The assistance that the government bureaucrats 
provided for information industries has been mainly twofold: to assist the information 
industries’ growth through economic and industrial policies; and to let Taiwanese 
companies learn advanced skills and technologies by networking or connecting 
international and domestic companies through foreign investment or technical 
cooperation (Tuan, 2000).    
The personality and will of Taiwan’s political leader in the early stages of the 
development of the information economy was a much weightier determinant than in the 
later stages. As mentioned earlier, in the 1970s Taiwan faced a sries of political and 
economic blows such as its withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971, the breaking of 
diplomatic relation with the U.S. in 1972, and the oil crisis of 1973.  The successor and 
also the son of Taiwan’s dictator (Chiang, Kai-Shek,), Chiang, Ching-Kuo, faced a very 
harsh situation and had to struggle to maintain his political power and the legitimacy of 
his government. He needed to maintain economic stability and growth to win people’s 
support for his governance. From his staff members’ advice, he quickly came to the 
conclusion that promoting technology as a pillar of the economy, upgrading Taiwan’s 
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manufacturing industries, and developing information industries were feasibl  ways to 
reinforce Taiwan’s economy and help the island recover from its international, political 
and economic hardships. Chiang, Ching-Kuo’s experience living in Russia a  a socialist 
also led him to deeply believe in the state’s power, plan, and policy as the way to lead 
economic development14. Thus, with his support, Taiwan’s integrated circuit industries, 
computer industries, and many other IT industries were built up and many pl s for 
developing the information industry were carried out. He authorized a group of 
competent economic bureaucrats he trusted to implement his “planned economy” 
programs and his ideas for Taiwan’s economic growth (W.-H. Tsai, 2005, pp. 92-94). 
Therefore, when the international context of U.S.-Japan competition induced IT 
production deconstruction and the trend towards outsourcing, Taiwan caught this 
historical opportunity at exactly the right time.  The fact that T iwan was able to take 
advantage of this opportunity was largely due to the political leader’s intense sense of 
urgency about the country’s survival and economic growth and his investment of a huge 
amount of government money in the development of the information industry.  
In sum, in the course of Taiwan's economic transformation, the state, esp cially in 
the KMT age, acted as a relatively autonomous apparatus pursuing developmental goals 
defined by itself rather than as an instrument of domination manipulted by certain social 
classes or groups. 
 
The Technological Elite  
When entering the high-tech sphere, the government bureaucrats can play only a 
supporting role and the technological elite become the main players. In Taiwan’s 
                                                
14 Socialism and communism was popular in China since the 1920s and in 1925, Chiang, Ching-Kuo went 
to Russia to study communism in Sun Yat-sen Universty in Russia and also joined the Russia Communist 
Party. He stayed in Russia for twelve years total and the socialist thoughts became strongly rooted in his 
thinking (Wikipedia, 2009).  
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information economy development, the technological elites have consisted of overseas 
technological experts and domestic experts. The overseas technological experts were 
largely overseas Taiwanese technological professionals with whom the KMT government 
officials continued to maintain close connections due to the high respect the KMT 
government had for these overseas Taiwanese technological elites.  These connections 
became a crucial contributor to the planning and growth of Taiwan’s information 
economy later on in the 1980s. The KMT government invited overseas IT experts to form 
a Technical Advisory Committee, responsible for giving policy suggestions for Taiwan’s 
information economy development.   The domestic technological elites were mainly the 
professional employees of the Electronics Research Laboratories in ITRI.  They were the 
main force used to execute the policies upon which the government and the Tec nical 
Advisory Committee had decided. Some of them were later sent to the U.S. by the 
government to acquire more IT knowledge, and many of them later on became the 
founders, CEOs, or senior managers of Taiwanese IT companies as thegovernment 




The industrial elite obtained the decisive power to guide the direction of 
information economic development after 1988 when the main planner of Taiwan’s early 
information economy development, K. T. Lee, retired from the position of government 
administrator.  Along with Lee’s retirement, the importance of the Technical Advisory 
Committee also waned. The other landmark event in the industrial elites’ takeover of 
economic power was in 1993, when the government proposed a new plan for establishing 
a new advanced technology semiconductor company but confronted severe opposition 
from existing semiconductor companies because of potential competitive relationships. 
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The result of this controversy turned out to be the victory of the industrial elite—the 
Legislative Tuan turned down the Executive Yuan’s budget request under pressure from 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. After that, the industrial elites and market 
considerations  replaced the government elites as the main force deciding the direction of 
the development of Taiwan’s information economy (W.-H. Tsai, 2005; Tuan, 2000).  
The industrial elites consist mainly of two groups in Taiwanese society: the 
original technological elites and the professionals/managers from foreign or transnational 
IT companies. The latter now have become the majority of Taiwan’s industrial elites. It 
can be found that these industrial elites usually share common backgrounds or social 
networking. First, many of them were from ITRI. Second, many of them graduated from 
Taiwan University, Chiao Tung University, or Tsing Hua University, the hree main IT 
research universities in Taiwan. Third, most of them have similar social networking 
experiences through working in the Hsinchu Science Park. Fourth, manyof them have 
connections with professionals (particularly the Taiwanese IT professionals) in Silicon 
Valley that they maintain in order to stay updated on technique and advanced knowledge 
(W.-H. Tsai, 2005; Tuan, 2000).  
 
Small and Medium Enterprises  
The small and medium enterprises, even though they did not have as much power 
as government, technological, and industrial elites in influencing Taiwan’s information 
economy development, actually have contributed significantly to Taiwan’s information 
economy and also mark an important characteristic which has distingui hed Taiwan from 
other information economy systems.  
Taiwan’s information industries, as mentioned earlier, consist of a complicated 
network of corporate synergy, which incorporates large IT companies as well as small 
and medium ones. The large Taiwanese IT companies are mainly the ones that can 
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receive outsourcing contracts from international IT brands. They buy parts, let periphery 
companies further process inputs (in-processing) on their products, or subcontract their 
production to the periphery companies when they cannot handle the production in rush 
seasons. Each large IT company has several cooperative companies, and their cooperative 
companies also have sub-cooperative companies.  These sub-cooperative companies 
might also have relationships with other large IT companies. All the relationships among 
big, medium, and small IT companies make up a complex and delicate network, which 
covers the complete process of IT production from the upstream to middle stream and 
then to downstream production (T. J. Chen & Ku, 1995; Gong, 2005).  
Although these small and medium enterprises have more difficulty building up 
their own brands and marketing channels and can only earn meager profits by doing 
outsourcing for transnational companies, this delicate network of cooperati n enables the 
whole of Taiwan’s information product production to be highly flexible, competitive, 
energetic, variable, efficient, and powerful (T. J. Chen & Ku, 1995; Hsia, 2003; Hsu, 
1999).  
 
Transnational Capital and the Global Political and Economic context 
Taiwan’s information economy development has been subject to the influ nce of 
international political or economic context and power, especially the political and 
economic influence of the U.S. and the development and framework of world trade, 
global sourcing, and the global market. Without the global sourcing tred hat started in 
the 1960s and  commenced by transnational corporations looking for cheaper labor and 
production sites to lower production cost, Taiwan would not have had the opportunity to 
become a major exporter and to successfully cultivate its information industries and 
economy (Chou, 1998). Moreover, as a worldwide phenomenon, job redistribution has 
extended beyond national borders. The increasing capacity and standardization of 
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national and international telecommunication networks can support geographically- 
distributed labor division.  
In the global labor division age, most transnational corporations establish their 
headquarters which hire many professionals and white-collar workers in industrialized 
countries; while at the same time, they export an incredible number of manual jobs to 
developing countries (Burris, 1999).  For instance, the use of ICTs has enabled many 
communication industries in the First World to export their studios and f ctories to the 
Third World, where the average wage of the workforce is relatively low (Sussman & 
Lent, 1998).  Castells (1996, pp. 265)  described an example where the introduction of 
ICTs in the garment industry has led to a “bipolar labor force” on a global scale: the high-
skilled designers and telecommunicating sales managers usually work in American cities, 
while the low-skilled and low-paid manufacturing workers usually locate in offshore 
sweatshops or rural areas in the First World.  Thus, Sussman and Lent (1998) asserted a 
new international division of labor sharing a production platform but dispersed into 
segmented zones of industrial, semi-industrial, and Third World societies. This 
geographical integration of labor processes, especially in such high tech industries as 
electronics and communication, represents the latest stage in the accumulation and flow 
of capital on a global scale.  Thus, as Kung (2005) pointed out, in this trend of global 
labor division, by doing outsourcing for the centric developed countries, Taiwan 
established its information economy and industries as the semi-periphery of the world 
production system. 
Within the country, the goals formulated specifically in terms of growth and 
global competitiveness are rendered concrete by comparison with external reference 
economies, especially the economies of the U.S. and Japan, which have provided the 
state elites with models and development tracks for emulation, all of which shaped the 
face of Taiwan’s information economy. Now we want to take a chronological look at the 
global political economic influence on Taiwan. 
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Before the 1970s, the most important feature of the wider political-economic 
environment within which Taiwan's economy evolved was a particular international geo-
political context dominated by the United States. Taiwan was incorporated into the 
American hegemonic system for the purpose of containing the communist expansion 
soon after the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, far earlier than its incorporation 
into the world capitalist system in the mid-1960s. For the entire decade of the 1950s and 
the first half of the 1960s, Taiwan was cocooned within American hegemony both 
geopolitically and economically. One of the main effects of this situation on Taiwan's 
economic transformation was, of course, the enormous U.S. aid to the island. It not only 
helped Taiwan alleviate its defense burden, balance the government budget, arrest 
inflation, and accumulate capital, but it also enhanced the confidence and willingness of  
investors to invest in the island. Another effect of this particular geo-political context on 
Taiwan's economic transformation was the influence of the American advisors on the 
KMT state's economic policy-making. The U.S. AID Mission to China played a weighty 
role in Taiwan's earlier development as it controlled resources that were critical to the 
KMT state,  (Pang, 1992).  
The second noticeable feature of the wider political-economic environment was 
the favorable timing of the world economy. U.S. aid had insulated Taiwan's economy 
from external forces during the 1950s. American financial and commodity assistance 
alleviated the necessity for Taiwan to rush into the capitalist world system. In the 
meantime, there was little TNC interest in the island. By the early 1960s, however, the 
market in the advanced industrial societies, especially in the Unitd S ates, after having 
experienced high growth, increase of wage rates, and the loss of competitiveness n labor-
intensive manufactured goods, was readily accessible to manufactured exports from the 
LDCs. The switch of the KMT state's development strategy from import substitution to 
export expansion and its efforts to improve Taiwan's investment climate eshed with this 
favorable timing somewhat by coincidence. The product cycle brought foreign capital 
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from Japan and the U.S. to the island. The timely arrival of this foreign private capital 
made up for the phasing out of U.S. aid. All the while, the CCP was obsessed with the 
Cultural Revolution on the mainland. Taiwan's export-led industrialization thus started in 
a good external environment. The favorable international economic situation l sted for 
about a decade. Facilitated by the prosperous world economy and enjoying preferential 
tariff rates in American markets, Taiwan's foreign trade and light industries that 
manufactured consumer goods grew rapidly and steadily. The boom of trade brought 
about unprecedented prosperity to the island but also brought in the influence of other 
economies, especially tile influence of the two major trading partners, namely, the United 
States and Japan. As a result, the involvement in the world economy deepened Taiwan's 
trade dependency and exposed Taiwan to the competition with other countries i  the 
international market. At the same time, the change of the global political situation, 
particularly the change of U .S. diplomatic policy, constituted another major factor 
influencing the KMT state's development strategies. From the early 1970s onward, the 
KMT state's economic policy-making, to a certain degree, has actually been a response to 
the challenges from the international political-economic environment (Pang, 1992).  
Taiwan first initiated its information industry at a time when the global IT 
industry began to deconstruct its IT production due to the severe competition between 
Japan and the U.S. IT companies. They divided and moved out the labor-intensive sectors 
or industries, such as IC packaging, to cheaper labor sites for enhanci g the price 
competitiveness. Taiwan and other East Asian NICs  were ready and more qualified due 
to their years of excellent experience and ability in manufactring, and, consequently, 
successfully attracted U.S. and Japanese IT companies by their cheap and quality labor 
(W.-H. Tsai, 2005).  
In the 1970s, several severe politically-driven economic challenges from the 
international environment changed Taiwan’s economic development track. These 
challenges included the oil crisis, coupled with the intensified competition from other 
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LDCs in the international market and the loss of diplomatic relations with the United 
States.  It was these international events that brought the KMT state to revise its 
economic plan to pay more attention to information-intensive industries (Pang, 1992).  
In the 1980s, the rapid trend towards globalization and the increasing pressure 
from the U.S. government to liberalize Taiwan’s market made it harder for the 
government to apply economic or industrial policies to increase Taiwanese enterprises’ 
competitiveness. By this time, most of the policy instruments of the developmental state-
protections or incentives had been more marginalized (Wade, 1990).  
In 1982, IBM started to sell low price personal computers (PCs) and adopted an 
open system for computer parts, which gave other countries the opportunity to get 
involved in the production of computer parts (M. S. Chen, 2005). Under this opportunity, 
Taiwan’s government kept pushing information and technique-intensive industries as the 
industrial development focus (W.-H. Tsai, 2005). By the end of the 1980s, the price of 
PCs was continuing to drop, the international big IT brands were less and less able to 
produce IT products in their homelands due to the much higher labor cost, and Taiwan’s 
role in IT production in the global market consequently had become moreand more 
irreplaceable. 
Entering the 1990s, the trade relationship between Taiwan and China had grown 
substantially; most labor intensive and also some lower-level skilled electronics and 
electronic machinery industries were moving from Taiwan to China. The loss of these 
industries made Taiwan encounter the problem of economic stagnation and industrial 
hollow, but luckily, to punish Japan for dumping memory, the U.S. taxed the import of 
Japanese PCs with a punishment tax, which gave the Taiwanese IT companies great 
opportunities to win over the U.S. big brands’ outsourcing orders, making the production 
of PCs the new pillar of Taiwan’s economy at this time.  
Following this, the U.S. government under President Clinton pushed the growth 
of information infrastructure, creating a greater demand for computers and Internet 
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products, thus reviving IC industries. Under these U.S. policies, Taiwanese IT companies 
advanced to a more crucial position in the global IT production network throug  
producing OEM and ODM for the U.S. IT name brands, which formed a global 
production chain of design, manufacturing, and also marketing IT products (M. S. Chen, 
2005). Thus, in this stage, Taiwanese IT companies have become more and more global 
in their production and production locations. The major factory locations of Taiwanese IT 
companies abroad includes not only the south-east Asia countries and China (especially 
in the last two decades), but also incorporate sites near North America and Europe such 
as Mexico and Scotland.  
In the 1990s, the Japanese yen appreciated to a very high extent, disadvantaging 
the Japanese IT brands’ competitiveness, so Japanese IT companies started to speed the 
emigration of their domestic production and also increased their cooperati n with Taiwan 
to extend to the production of crucial IT parts, which gave Taiwanese IT industries a 
perfect chance to upgrade the industry again for production of key parts. Following the 
industry upgrading of Taiwan’s IT industries after 1990s, Taiwan thus became the 
biggest production site of IT hardware products in the world (Hsia, 2003). The products 
that international brands purchase has changed from lower level parts or products to 
semi-finished PCs, laptops, liquid crystal display screens, and other higher level products. 
Entering the 2000s, due to the increasing emigration of mature IT industries from 
Taiwan to China, the Taiwanese government has continued to make progress n higher 
technology or new IT production fields such as IC design (becoming among the first two 
or three countries in IC design) and biotechnology or nano-scale technology in order to 
avoid the industrial hollow problem (M. S. Chen, 2005). In addition, Taiwan still 
dominates in the production of laptops, motherboards, LCDs, monitors, and IC 
outsourcing and is quite competitive in desktop, server, CD-ROM drive, and also digital 
camera production. The world’s information industry recession in 2001-2003 hit 
Taiwan’s economy badly, and the island had its first period of negative economic growth 
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(-2%) in its history, which also revealed that Taiwan’s economy has been deeply 
connected to or even determined by the situation of the world’s information economy.  
 
The Middle Class and the Workers 
The middle class and the workers showed very little influence in the policy 
making for information development, although they definitely were important 
participants and also contributors to Taiwan’s information economy growth. The middle 
class and the workers’ strength showed only after the 1980s. The emergence of social 
movements for consumerism, environmental conservation, and the labor movement sinc  
the early 1980s followed the growth of the middle class. The enactment of the Labor 
Standard Law reflected the increasing influence of the workers. Consequently, the rise of 
various social forces in Taiwan  undermined the KMT state's chara ter as a corporate 
actor and made it more like an arena of social conflict when deciding economic or 
information economic policies (Pang, 1992).  
 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter first reviewed Taiwan’s economic and industrial history and 
described the transformation of Taiwan’s economic production models, which shifted 
from agriculture (1945-1960), to labor-intensive manufacturing (1961-1972), to heavy 
chemical industries (1973-1983), and finally to information-intensive industries (1984-
the present). This section also reviewed the political and economic contexts in which 
these economic transformations took place.  
The next two sections presented the developmental history of Taiwan’s 
information economy, which gave a comprehensive view of how Taiwan’s information 
economy was developed and what kinds of social, political, and economic forces 
interacted and functioned in this process. This section grouped this process into three 
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different stages by the defining characteristics of the information economy in different 
times: the initiation stage by foreign capital (1954-1984), the stage of being incorporated 
into the global production system (1985-1992), and the stage of global production and 
extension (1993-the present). Generally speaking, foreign capital played the most 
important role in the first half of the first stage— the initiation stage by foreign capital 
(1954-1984), but in the second half, the government stepped in and led the information 
economy’s development toward the purpose of political and economic growth. However, 
after the late 1980s, the government’s power was gradually replaced by the industry’s as 
Taiwan’s democracy developed and also as the industries themselves b came large in 
scope and economically powerful. However, in all of these stages, the international 
political economy, the international IT market, and also the transnational IT name brands 
always played contextual and determinant roles, circumscribing and determining 
Taiwan’s information industrial development. In addition, goals formulated specifically 
in terms of growth and competitiveness was rendered concrete by comparison with 
external reference economies, especially those of the U.S. and Japan, which provided the 
state elites with models for emulation. 
The fourth section focused more on the state, exploring what kinds of policy 
instruments the government employed to help encourage Taiwan’s information 
development and maintain its growth. In addition to the most important instrument—the 
industrial policies (including industrial development policy, industrial competition policy, 
industrial support policy, and industrial infrastructure policy), Taiwan’s government also 
utilized technology policy, exchange rates, interest rates, wage and labor policy, 
immigrant policy, and also education and human capital policy to help pursue the 
expansion of Taiwan’s information economy.  
The final section identified and also summarized different social forces’ functions 
in Taiwan’s information economy development. In these processes, government and 
political leaders, technological elites, industrial elites, small and medium enterprises, 
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transnational capital, the international political and economic powers and also the 
international context, all had very significant effects. However, other social groups such 
as labor unions or other social forces had comparatively little power in influencing the 
development of Taiwan’s information economy.   
In summary, Taiwan’s information economy has been successful due to fiv  main 
reasons:  policy, financial, and technical support from the state (Amsden, 1985; Wade, 
1990), economics of scale production (through the model of global outsourcing) (A. 
Amsden & W. W. Chu, 2003), the learning effects from geographic gathering of  
companies such as can be found at the Hsinchu Science Park, the transnational technical 
networking and cooperation with transnational IT name brands, and the corporate 
synergy network among Taiwan’s large, medium, and small IT enterpris s (this will be 
discussed in later sections). Other important reasons also include the high quality of 
Taiwan’s human capital and the government’s investment in the informati n and 
telecommunication infrastructures. 
 
Overall speaking, different from the information economy development models of 
developed countries  which most information society studies address, the development of 
information economy in a NIC such as Taiwan, government, instead of market logic, 
played  the most considerable role in shaping the developmental direction that Taiwan 
would take to transform from labor intensive manufacturing toward an information- 
intensive economy. Moreover, the state also contributed significantly to upgrading 
Taiwan’s information industries from labor -intensive information industries such as IC 
packages (the age dominated by foreign capital) to a real informati n economy, which 
applies more and higher level production knowledge and information. Unlike many 
information society studies, which often stress  the determining power f information 
technology and of information but overlook the importance of the long existing political 
economic reasons such as the state’s choices and policies, industrial transformation, and 
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also globalization as well as international political economic development and structure, 
this dissertation, by using Taiwan as an example, points out that these are also among the 
most important factors shaping a NIC, Taiwan’s information economy.   
 95
Chapter 4:  The Information Economy and Occupational 
Transformation 
INFORMATION ECONOMY AND OCCUPATIONAL TRANSFORMATION  
Existing literature has linked some occupational transitions to the pervasive 
application of ICTs and, in turn, to the information economy. For example, such changes 
have been found to include the decline of blue-collar and manual workers, th  increase of 
white-collar, knowledge, professional, and non-routine workers, as well as the 
inconsequentiality of middle managers15.  
The increasing importance of knowledge, professional, and white-collar workers 
(The decline of blue-collar and manual workers) 
The emergence of information/knowledge occupations is arguably the most
observable labor market transition in an information economy (Dordick & Wang, 1993; 
Katz, 1988; Porat, 1977), which has been repeatedly identified and examined in many 
empirical studies. While reasons for and paths leading to the emerg nc  of information 
occupations might be dissimilar, such a transition has taken place in both developed and 
developing countries (Katz, 1988). Machlup (1962) was among the first to observe a 
fundamental shift from majority employment in manual work (primarily blue-collar and 
agricultural) to majority employment in knowledge work (primarily white-collar). Bell 
(1980) followed this line of research and argued that the new economy will progressively 
give more importance to occupations with a high level of information and knowledge 
                                                
15 According to Camarata and Krikorian (1999), white collar is the sum of managerial and professional 
specialty and technical, sales, and administrative support occupations and blue collar is the sum of 
precision production, craft, and repair occupations. With regarding to the categorizing of white-collar and 
blue-collar workers of the directorate for General budget, Accounting, and Statistics, R.O.C., the white 
collar workers include: business executives and managers, professionals, technicians & associate 
professionals, clerks, and service workers and sales. As to blue-collar workers, they incorporate labor 
workers and production machine operators.  
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content in their activities. He predicted that people would see a growing percentage of 
white-collar workers in the work force and that the most significant occupational 
categories would be the professionals, engineers, technicians, and cientists. The shift in 
employment patterns in the U.S. was also privileged in Martin’s (1998) research, where 
she mapped out a transition from a majority employment in manual work (primarily blue-
collar and agricultural) to a majority employment in knowledge work (primarily white-
collar). Castells (2004a) also stressed the future trends of increasing jobs in professional 
fields such as R&D, innovation, design, marketing, and high volume, customized flexible 
production.  
In Taiwan’s case, Taiwan’s economy has shifted from agriculture to labor- 
intensive light manufacturing industry, to petrochemical heavy industry, and then to an 
information-intensive economy. Corresponding to these industrial transitions, the labor 
structure has also experienced changes from primarily low-skilled occupations, to 
middle- skilled, and then to higher-skilled, knowledge-intensive occupations (Wei, 2002). 
Liou (2001) studied the influence of industrial structure transformation on employment 
and income distribution from 1991-1996 and found the labor structure was actually 
determined by industrial structure transformation, for example, the shift to an information 
economy. Not only did the labor in the agriculture and in the traditional manufacturing 
industries decrease significantly and that in information industries surged, but also with 
the development of more technique/information intensive industries, the employ ent of 
professionals and technicians grew remarkably while that of manual workers and 
machine operators dropped considerably. 
 
The decline of mid-level managerial occupations or polarization  
Another crucial component in the occupational transformation is the decline of 
mid-level managerial positions, which may arguably lead to the decline of the middle 
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class and the increase of social polarization (Martin, 1998). Some scholars of the 
information economy claim that ICTs are facilitating the narrowing and flattening of the 
managerial structure at the same time. The improved ICTs have reduced the advantages 
of intrafirm management and performance of professional staff activities and reduced the 
need for middle managers as conduits for information (Winter & Taylor, 1999). ICTs, as 
they argue, render information more controllable, on the one hand, and make wor  
processes more visible on the other. In combination, this means that the coordination and 
control function of the middle management (to progressively analyze and distill 
information from the shop and pass it up the managerial chain) can largely be replaced by 
ICTs (Dawson, 1988; Fulk & DeSanctis, 1999; Martin, 1998; Winter & Taylor, 1999; 
Zuboff, 1988). Such changes in the managerial hierarchies indicate that the ratios among 
types of workers may change (Martin, 1998). 
However, by observing the trends of managers in Taiwan, researchers have made 
somewhat dissimilar arguments. Tseng (Tseng, 2001a, 2001b) believed that along with 
the development of Taiwan’s information economy, the middle class in Taiwan, unlike in 
most developed countries, has not declined yet. In sharp contrast, Amsden and Chu (A. 
H. Amsden & W. W. Chu, 2003) believed that the middle-level managers, engine rs, and 
workers have invariably been subjected to the process of gradual structural 
unemployment, which will eventually give rise to a shrinking middle class in Ta wan. 
In order to figure out the relationship of an information economy and 
occupational structure transformation in Taiwan, this chapter is going to take a look at the 
extent of the informatization of different occupations and also the relationship between 
informatization and income; the occupation structure changes in Taiwan’s information 
economy; and the influential factors of these occupational structure changes.   
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INFORMATIZATION , OCCUPATION , AND INCOME IN TAIWAN  
According to a 2007 survey investigating the digital divide among workers (the 
Department of Statistics, Council of Labor Affairs, R.O.C., 2008), the occupations who 
use computers at work from most often to least often ranked in order are: professionals 
(93.4%), clerks (91.3%), technicians & associate professionals (72.7%), executives & 
managers (69%), sales & service workers (24.4%), mechanic workers (17.9%), machine 
operators & assemblers (17.1%), and elementary/labor workers (10.3%). As for Internet 
use at work, the ranking in order is as follows: professionals (83.3%), clerks (73.8%), 
executives & managers (60.4%), technicians & associate professionals (56.6%), sales & 
service workers (15.7%), mechanic workers (10.7%), machine operators & assemblers 
(6.7%), and elementary/labor workers (2.6%). 
The purposes for which computers are utilized at work include the following 
(multiple choices possible on the survey): document and word processing (81.7%), 
implementing professional software for job needs (70.2%), collecting needed information 
(67.4%), contacting customers (54.0%), and product research and design (21.7%).  
Next, we will explore the correlation between income and informatization of 
work, based on a 2005 survey (the Directorate for General Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, R.O.C, 2006) (see Table X). If we analyze the computer use rate at work by 
monthly income, there is a positive relationship; that is to say, the higher the income, the 
higher the rate of computer use at work. A correlation reveals th t income level and 
computer use are significantly related, with r =+0.935, n=10,177, p<.01, two tails. The 
only exception was the group with the highest income (monthly income>$3030) whose 
computer use rate (83.20%) was lower than that of the second highest income group 
(monthly income between $2424 and $3030), whose computer use rate was the highest 
(90.10%). The lowest use rate was found in the group with the lowest monthly income 
(<$480), whose average rate was 49.80%.  
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Analyzing by income, the results for Internet use were identical to thosefor 
general computer use: the higher the income, the greater the use of the Internet at work. A 
correlation for the data revealed that the level of income and Internet use were 
significantly related, with r = +0.965, n=9,942, p<.01, two tails. Again, the only 
exception was that the group with the second highest income had the highest use rate 
(79.00%), while the group with the highest income had the second highest rate. Thus, 
according to the statistical data, the extent of informatization is significa tly related to 
workers’ income.   
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Table 2. Use of computers and Internet at work 
         
Use of Computers and Internet at Work－by Industry, Occupation and Average Monthly Income 
 2005 April Unit: persons ; % 
Items Persons 
Using computers at work 
Persons 
Using Internet at work 
Ever Never Ever Never Don't know 
Total 10,177  75.6  24.4  9,942  59.5  40.4    
Industry           
 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 177  32.9  67.1  171  23.1 76.9  － 
 Mining & quarrying 19  79.9  20.1  17  52.0  48.0  － 
 Manufacturing 2,738  73.0  26.6  2,659  53.4  46.6  － 
 Electricity, gas & water 112  74.3  25.7  97  51.8  4 .2  － 
 Construction 557  61.1  38.9  544  48.8  51.2  － 
 Trade 1,422  72.5  27.5  1,381  53.6  4 .4  － 
 Accommodation & eating 387  41.4  58.6  386  26.2  73.8  － 
 Transport & communication 463  67.8  32.2  452  51.0  49.0  － 
 Finance & insurance 699  95.2  4.8  694  81.2  8.8  － 
 Real estate 68  78.6  21.4  66  60.1  39.9  － 
 Professional & technical 485  89.7  10.3  477  78.8  21.2  － 
 Education 969  91.3  8.7  693  79.6  20.3  0.0  
 Healthcare 446  83.0  17.0  435  59.2  40.8  － 
 Culture, sports & entertainment 282  77.2  22.8  291  68.9 31.1  － 
 Other services 651  59.2  40.8  634  46.8  53.2  － 
 Public administration 692  95.8  4.2  677  83.2  16.7  0.1  
Occupation           
 Executives & managers 1,398  83.8  16.2  1,365  71.0  29.0  － 
 Professionals 2,094  93.6  6.4  2,079  79.1  20.8  0.0  
 Associate professionals 1,404  80.2  19.8  1,382  64.7  35.3  － 
 Clerks 2,123  91.4  8.6  2,075  73.9  26.0  0.0  
 Service workers 1,124  54.8  45.2  1,095  35.4  64.6  － 
 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 134  25.1  74.9  128  14.0 86.0  － 
 Mechanic workers 914  43.9  56.1  877  25.2  74.8  － 
 Machine operators 309  37.6  62.4  297  15.3  84.7  － 
 Elementary workers 521  37.4  62.6  495  21.1  78.9  － 
 Others 36  82.3  17.7  36  63.8  36.2  － 
 Unknown 121  85.2  14.8  110  69.7  30.3  － 
Monthly income $ (dollars)           
 <480 355  49.8  50.2  348  33.9  66.1  － 
 480-606 441  52.3  47.4  422  33.5  56.5  － 
 606-757 1,015  66.6  33.4  990  44.8  55.1  0.0  
 757-909 1,133  71.0  29.0  1,111  51.8  4 .2  － 
 909-1212 2,194  77.1  22.9  2,151  61.2  38.8  0.0  
 1212-1818 2,473  81.8  18.2  2,447  68.4  31.6  － 
 1818-2424 840  87.4  12.6  828  72.9  27.1  － 
 2424-3030 234  90.1  9.9  233  79.0  21.0  － 
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Use of Computers and Internet at Work－by Industry, Occupation and Average Monthly Income 
 2005 April Unit: persons ; % 
Items Persons 
Using computers at work 
Persons 
Using Internet at work 
Ever Never Ever Never Don't know 
 >3030 451  83.2  16.8  432  73.3  26.7  － 
 Unknown 1,043  74.0  26.0  980  55.6  44.4  － 
Source: Data from the Directorate for General Budget, Accounting and Statistics, R.O.C 
 
THE OCCUPATION TRANSFORMATION IN TAIWAN ’S INFORMATION ECONOMY  
Now we want to look into the changing trends of Taiwan’s occupational structure 
after the information economy evolution. We will discuss this from fur perspectives: the 
blue-collar to white-collar employment ratio; the percentage of pr essional occupations 
in the total employment; the changing trends in all occupations; and the employment ratio 
of managers to other occupations.  
First of all, Figure 11 shows a decreasing trend in the blue/white-collar 
employment ratio. The ratio has continued to steadily decline, for example, from 14.4 in 
1987 to 0.636 in 2005. The trend displays a continued and steady decline, revealing that, 
compared to white-collar worker employment, blue-collar employment has continued to 





















Source: The author’s calculations according to GBAS data 
 
Figure 11. Employment ratio, blue-collar workers to white-collar workers, 1987-2005 
Figure 12 demonstrates the growing percentage of professional occupations 
(professionals, technicians, business executive & managers) in the total mployment.  For 
example, in 1981, the percentage of professional occupations counted for only 15.71%, 
but by 1990, it had become 21.5%, and by 2000, 27.54%.  Finally by 2006, it increased to 
31.77%. The trend in the employment percentage of professional occupations reveals a 





















































Figure 12. Percentage ofprofessional occupations in total employment, 1981-2006  
Figure 13 displays the percentage of each occupational type in the total 
employment. For example, declining occupations include elementary (labor) workers and 
machine operators. From 1978 to 2006, the percentage of elementary worker positions in 
the total employment fell considerably from 24.6% to 5.4%, and the percentage of 
machine operator positions declined from 42.0% to 32.6%. As predicted in the literature 
on information economies, the occupations of professionals and technicians increased; 
professional occupations as a percentage of total occupations increased from 3.7% in 
1978 to 8.2% in 2006, and technician and associate professionals increased greatly from 
6.6% in 1991to 19.1% in 2006. As for managers and business executives, the percentag  
of total positions filled by managers and executives in all occupations first increased from 
3.1% in 1978 to 5.0% (the highest) in 1993 and then declined to 4.5% in 2006. Overall, 
the percentage of lower level, less skilled employees (including clerks, service workers, 
elementary workers, and machine operators) declined from 77.9% to 68.2% and that of 
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higher level, more skilled employees grew from 22.1% to 31.8%. Neverthel ss, the 
population of lower level workers is still comparatively larger than the number of higher 




























Business executives and managers Professionals
Technicians & associate professionals Clerks
Service workers & sales workers Elementary occupations
Production machine operators
Source: The author’s calculations based on GBAS data 
 
Figure 13. Employment percentages of all occupations, 1978-2006 
Another crucial aspect of occupational transformation is the decline of managerial 
occupations. Information economy scholars claim that informatization and ICTs are 
facilitating the narrowing and flattening of managerial structures; ICTs render 
information more controllable, on the one hand, and work processes more visibl , on the 
other. In combination, this means that the function of middle management (to 
progressively analyze and distill information from the shop and pass it up the managerial 
chain) is largely taken over by ICTs (Dawson, 1988; Fulk & DeSanctis, 1999; Zuboff, 
1988). Moreover, not only are managerial hierarchies flattening, but they are narrowing 
at the same time, which means the ratios among types of workers may change (Martin, 
1998). 
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Figure 14 reveals the change in the importance of managerial occupations. We 
can first see a climbing trend in the ratio of management to other occupations from 1987 
to 1992. Later, during the time of increasing informatization, the ratio did gradually 
decline from the peak in 1992 at 0.050 to 0.045 in 2005; however, the movement was 





















Source: Author’s calculations and GBAS data 
 
Figure 14. Employment ratio of managers to other occupations 
 
DETERMINANTS OF OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN TAIWAN ’S 
INFORMATION ECONOMY : ESTIMATION AND RESULTS  
The analysis of changes in the occupational structure suggests that as the 
economy of Taiwan has transitioned to an information economy, there hav  been 
significant changes in the occupational structure of the economy.  The question that is 
raised is whether the changes in the occupational structure are relted to the increasing 
informatization of the economy and, if so, to which components of the informatization 
process.  In addition, can we isolate the impact of informatization fr m the broader 
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growth of the economy as a whole?  The section attempts to investigat  these questions 
statistically.  
A review of the literature shows that there are three important components of the 
occupational structure of Taiwan’s economy that are relevant to the investigation of the 
impact of informatization: first, the ratio of blue-collar to white-collar employment; 
second, the proportion of professional occupations in total employment; and third, the 
ratio of managers to other occupations in the labor force.  
With respect to informatization, relevant studies apply three measur s to the 
assessment of changes in the occupational structure (please refer to Chapter 2).  The first 
measure identifies the extent of the informatization of the economy, measured by the 
percentage contribution of information intensive industries to the total GDP. Secondly, 
the informatization of production is measured by the extent of automation in the economy 
(the automation equipment density in businesses)16 and the informatization of production, 
as measured by percentage of R & D in the total GDP. Finally, information infrastructure 
and IT usage is quantified by calculating personal computers per 100 inhabitants, Internet 
users per 100 inhabitants, main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, and mobile cellular 
phone subscribers per 100 inhabitants.   
Because changes to occupational structure could be an outcome of general 
economic trends in the economy as a whole, in order to isolate the impact of 
informatization from co-existing general economic trends, Taiwan’s gross domestic 
product is used as a control variable in the current analysis. Moreover, all the variables 
are calculated by their first difference ( 1−− tt aa  , tb - 1−tb …..) to avoid the possibility of 
suspicious correlation.  
                                                
16 Relevant indicators such as computer ownership and Internet use rates in Taiwan businesses are lacking. 
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Table 3. Correlations for imformatization and occupation changes controlling for GDP, 












Informatization of the 
economy 
.971** .997** .003 
Percentage of R & D in 
the total GDP 
.982** .995** -.022 
Automation equipment 
density 
.971** .970** -.089 
Personal computers per 
100 inhabitants 
.977** .963** -.0.091 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants 
.979** .984** -.111 
Main telephone lines per 
100 inhabitants 
.972** .995** -.013 
Mobile cellular telephone 
subscribers per 100 
inhabitants  
.907** .911** -.213 
N 15 13 16 
Note 1:Control variable: GDP  
Note 2: ** denotes that the value is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 From the statistical data shown in Table 3, we see that all the informatization 
indicators reveal strong and statistically significant correlations with blue-collar to white-
collar employment ratio, thereby supporting most of the information society studies that 
as the extent of informatization increases, the number of blue-collar workers might 
decrease, as compared to white-collar workers. Similarly, all the informatization 
indicators demonstrate strong and statistically significant correlations with professional 
 108
employment percentages in the total employment, conforming to the argument that a rise 
in information economy would correlate to a growing need for professional occupations.   
As for managerial occupations, none of the informatization indicators reach 
statistically significant levels and they demonstrate a weak correlation with changes in 
managerial occupations. This result demonstrates that Taiwan has experienced a different 
situation from that observed in other developed countries, where the development of IT 
tends to lessen the importance of middle level managers.  
In summary, when the economic growth factor (GDP) is controlled, we still find 
that informatization is highly correlated to the declining trend of blue-collar occupation, 
as compared to white-collar workers, and to an increase in professional occupations.  As 
for informatization indicators and managerial occupations, none of the indicators reach 
statistically significant levels and thus cannot support the supposition that informatization 
contributes to the waning importance of managerial occupations in Taiwan. 
  
CONCLUSION  
The empirical analysis of changes in Taiwan’s occupational structure in its 
transition to an information economy reveals several important findings. First of all, both 
the computer use rate and the Internet use rate are positively related to income. Second, 
compared to white-collar workers, the employment of blue-collar worker has continually 
fallen since the 1980s along with the development of information economy in Taiwan. 
Third, the percentage of professional occupations (professionals, technicians, and 
business executive & managers) in the total employment has continually grown since 
1981. Fourth, related to the changing trends in all categories of occupations, elementary 
(labor) workers and machine operators obviously declined. In contrast, the percentage of 
professionals and technicians, especially that of technicians, kept growing. The 
percentage of service workers & sales and clerks also grew but to a smaller extent. 
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Finally the percentage of managers increased at first, but then declined a slight extent 
after 1993.  
The correlation analysis shows that the advent of informatization did highly 
correlate to the decline of blue-collar jobs and the growth of professional occupations, but 
this was not consistent with the case of most developed countries, whre there is a 
declining trend in the number of middle level managers as the informati n economy 
develops.  
Based on the findings in this chapter, we can conclude that with the development 
of an information economy, Taiwan has undergone changes similar to those of developed 
countries in its occupation structure. These similarities include a rise in number of 
professional and white-collar occupations such as professionals, technicians, service 
workers, and sales, as well as a decline in the number of blue-collar and manual workers, 
such as labor workers and machine operators. However, the occupation th t has grown 
most quickly in Taiwan is that of technicians, which, to be accurate, should be recogniz d 
as a semi-professional/skill occupation rather than a high-tech or igh knowledge 
occupation. This phenomenon reveals that, as an NIC, Taiwan has an information 
economy that is mainly the semi- periphery of developed countries, by outsourcing for 
international name brands that control the highest level of R & D and also the most 
crucial production knowledge.  
Moreover, unlike what the literature review points out, Taiwan has not exhibited 
an obvious decline in the importance of middle managers. One possible reason for this 
may be, as Jonscher’s argument goes, that “when industrial technology develops, the 
process of production leading to the final output of goods and services in the economy 
would become more complex and the organizational or informational task of 
coordinating the diverse steps in the production chain grows ” (Jonscher, 1983, p.15). 
Jonscher argued that, although technical progress increases individual worker’s 
production efficiency, the consequences for the economy as a whole are an increase in 
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complexity. The number of transactions among business units and of internal transfers on 
intermediate goods and services within business units grows, which brings about an 
increase in the informational tasks of managing and coordinating the economy. 
Overall speaking, the changing trends of occupation structure under the 
transformation to an information economy has made Taiwan’s labor market more 
unbalanced, benefiting workers more skilled with information, more professi nal, and 
having a higher level of education, which inevitably deteriorates the labor market 
inequality and bias.   
 
 111
 Chapter 5:  The Information Economy and Employment 
INFORMATION ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT  
When considering the dynamic relationship between information economies and 
employment, scholars have diverse observations, viewpoints, and explanations. The 
relevant arguments can be generally categorized into four different groups: 1) 
informatization will enhance employment; 2) informatization will reduce employment; 3) 
long-term balance will be reached between employment and unemployent; and 4) the 
situation will be different depending on the industry and country. 
Enhancement of employment and international competitiveness  
Some scholars argue that the adoption of new production technologies such as 
ICTs improves productivity and stimulates market demand, which in turn generates 
higher output and provides more employment opportunities (Campbell, 2001; Freeman et 
al, 1995). A related explanation transforms this idea by incorporating a lobal 
competitive perspective i.e., the rapid acceptance of new technologies will increase 
productivity in traditional industries and thereby provide an international competitive 
edge, which will translate into market growth and, in turn, more employent (Jennie, 
1983). Furthermore, the emergence of ICT industries such as hardware and software 
industries, Internet service providers (ISPs), and the online-game industry, has also 
created a great number of jobs (OECD, 2002). Additionally, Soete (2001) indicated that 
the increased number of jobs created by the development of ICTs in the service sector is 
more than able to absorb the jobs lost in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, 
resulting in an overall increase in employment within the society. 
Reduction of employment  
Although in agreement with the positive technological effects on productivity, 
some scholars take exception to the idea of employment enhancement due to ICT 
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adoption. They report that there is a correspondence between technological use 
(improved productivity) and an increase in unemployment (Aghion & Howitt, 1998; 
Cyert & Mowery, 1989; Mills, 1938). For example, Webster and Robins (1986) 
concluded that ICTs will only create further unemployment because: (a) ven in areas of 
economic growth, employment does not necessarily need to expand with increased 
productivity; (b) the motivation of the extensive application of the ICTs is to save on 
expenditures rather than to increase employment; (c) in all advanced capitalist societies, 
new technologies are being introduced to counter the threat of higher productivities from 
other nations, which very likely will lead to cheaper production, less employment, and 
little overall economic change; (d) employment within the servic  sector is barely 
increasing at the moment and is likely to decline in significant areas in the future because 
of the application of ICTs; and (e) demographic trends further exacerbate the 
unemployment problem brought on by ICTs. 
Long-term balance of employment and unemployment  
Some scholars take a quite different approach toward the relationship between an 
information economy and employment. Rather than focusing on the specificity of new 
technologies’ impact on employment in the short-term, they maintain th t an employment 
equilibrium will be achieved in the long term (Sleigh et al., 1979). It is the market price 
mechanism, they argue, that will ensure that demand and supply of labor will adjust to 
one another. As a consequence, long-term unemployment caused by technologies is 
impossible. Moreover, the impact on employment from ICTs will be lik  swings and 
roundabouts, with some job loss over here and some gains over there; yet some sort of 
equilibrium will be reached ultimately (Sleigh et al., 1979).  
Differences by region, industry, or occupation 
Some scholars such as Castells (1996b), argue that there is no systematic 
structural relationship between the diffusion of ICTs and the evolution of employment 
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levels in the economy as a whole. He indicated that the impact of ICTs on employment 
varies by country, region, and industry because of the mediation of different macro-
economic factors such as economic systems or the nature of industries (labor-intensive or 
technique-intensive). Using another approach, Galbraith (2000a) conducted his analy is 
by dividing the economy into different sectors. He first pointed out that the 
technology/worker relationship in the capital sector is a relativ ly more complementary 
and interdependent one. In other words, it is more difficult to replace workers with 
machines in the capital sector. However, in the consumer goods sector, t hnology and 
machines can take the place of workers because their relationship is better characterized 
as interchangeable. And finally, the hardest hit by technologies w ll be sustained by the 
service sector, where workers are mostly lower-skilled and are the easiest to replace with 
technology (Galbraith, 2000). 
 
Relevant Research in Taiwan 
When considering the dynamic relationships between the information ec omy 
and employment, some researchers (Economic yearbook of the Republic of China, 2006; 
M. C. Tsai, 2005; Wei, 2002) subscribe to the idea that Taiwan’s informati n economy 
should be held responsible for Taiwan’s deteriorating employment. As Wei (2002) 
observed, the information economy has made Taiwan’s industrial structure experience 
considerable changes. Some industries, especially the traditional industries, confronted 
recession and laid off a huge amount of workers; however, these workers did not transfer 
successfully to the new blooming industries, mainly the information-intensive industries, 
which resulted in a serious unemployment problem in Taiwan. Information-intensive 
industries, compared with traditional industries, have created fewer job opportunities. In 
fact, they are believed to have hired significantly fewer workers because their 
productivity is almost already highly automated (Tsai, 2005). Another res arch study also 
supported this viewpoint (Hsin, 2004). According to Hsin, among the four primary 
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manufacturing sectors (mechanical, metal mechanical, chemical, commodity, as well as 
information & electronics), information & electronics had a negative labor cost growth 
rate, and the falling rate was the greatest. Drawing from Hsin’s research, the main reason 
for this was the large extent to which information & electronics adopted labor-saving 
production automation. Yu (2004) shared similar observations, pointing out that the high 
speed of the information technology such as the Internet creates higher productivity, 
which can ultimately lead to significant reductions in labor costs. Failures to create more 
job opportunities will necessarily lead to a profusion of unemployment.  
 In order to look into this issue, this chapter will discuss recent employment trends 
in representative industries, such as labor intensive industries, and information intensive 
industries, and will track the determinants of unemployment and the enlarging informal 
sector17 in Taiwan. 
 
THE EMPLOYMENT TRENDS OF INFORMATION INTENSIVE INDUS TRIES IN TAIWAN  
 Now we want to first take a look at the employment trends of Taiwan’s industries 
in the last three decades. We see in Figure 15, just as expected, that employment in 
traditional and labor-intensive industries did continue to decline along with the economic 
transformation from labor-intensive to information-intensive/high-tech industry.  Some 
representative examples of industries that have declining unemployment trends are 
clothing, textiles, electronic machinery, plastic, and transportation & storage. For 
instance, the percentage of the clothing employment in total employ ent dropped from 
13% in 1973 to 9% in 1980 and to less than 1% in 2006. As for the textile industry, the 
percentage of the total employment represented by this industry dropped from 18% in 
                                                
17 Informal sector, according to the DGAS, R.O.C., refers to the percentage of people who are 
older than 15 years old but do not work and or look for a job for all kind of reasons in the entire 




1973, to 10%, in 1980, and then to a mere 2% in 2006. In contrast, the service and 
information-intensive industries began to account for a greater and greater share of the 
total employment. Some representative examples include trade, electronic parts, finance 
& insurance, professional services, and health services. For instance, the percentage of 
the total employment represented by the electronic parts industry was 3% in 1973, stayed 
relatively constant through 1980, and grew to 7% in 2006. The trade employment grew 
from 21% in 1980 to about 25% in 2006. Financial employment increased unevenly from 
3.5% in 1975 (the earliest year of data available) dropped slightly in 1980 to around 2%, 
and then rose to 8.5% by 2006.   Employment in professional fields was around 1% of the 
total employment in 1975, stayed around the same in 1980, and increased slightly to 
about 3% in 2006. The big employment loss in labor-intensive industries has not seemed 
to be absorbed to a great enough extent by information-intensive industries’ we will 
discuss this further later in this chapter. As to the industries hat have maintained a 
similar level of employment, they include computer & telecommunication, machinery 
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Source: GBAS data  
Figure 15. Employment trends of different industries, 1973-2006 
If we compare the employment percentage to the GDP percentage, Figure 16 
shows us the percentage of each industry in the total GDP.  For exampl , the GDP 
percentage of electronic parts increased 10.5% from 1981 to 2006; however, its 
employment percentage grew only 4% during the same time period. As for the computer 
and telecommunication products industry, its GDP percentage increased about 2.5%, but 
its employment percentage did not grow at all.  
In contrast, the GDP percentage of the trade industry did not grow; however, it 
contributed to a 4% increase in the total employment. Similarly, finance did not increase 
very much in its percentage of the total GDP, but it contributed to a 5% increase in the 
total employment. The GDP percentage of professional and technician services grew only 
0.5%, but its employment percentage increased 2%. The percentage of theGDP 
represented by health services grew only 1.5%, but employment in this sector grew by 
3%.  
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As to the traditional labor-intensive industries, its percentage of total GDP 
dropped 8%, and its employment percentage dropped 7.5%. Textiles dropped 7.5% in 
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Source: GBAS data  
Figure 16. GDP trends of different industries, 1981-2005 
Overall speaking, we can observe that, compared to its increase as a percentage of 
the total GDP, information-intensive manufacturing actually did not cntribute a 
corresponding increase to the total employment. The centers for job c eation and also the 
new shelters for workers who lost jobs in labor-intensive industries have been the 
common service sectors such as trade, and also the information-intensive service 
industries such as finance, professional services, and health services.  
Next, we want to combine all the information-intensive industries and all the 
labor-intensive industries together to understand the changes in employment trends. 
Figure 17 shows us the employment gap (or loss) that the information-intensive industries 
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caused. Around 1981, in the initial stage of Taiwan’s information economy, the 
proportions of information-intensive industries in the total GDP and in the total 
employment were fairly close: 30.6 % and 30.1% respectively. But in 1999, the 
contribution of information-intensive industries to the total GDP reach d 47.0% but only 
reached 40.1% with respect to the total employment. In 2006, the gap grew to 52.5% and 
42.2% respectively. The employment gap continues to grow, most likely due to 
production automation. In any case, the phenomenon of the widening employment gap 
shows us that the contribution of information-intensive industries to the to al employment 
does not equal its contribution to the total GDP. 
Another way to think about this problem is to compare the employment ratios of 
traditional labor-intensive manufacturing. This traditional industry offered Taiwan almost 
“full employment” during the 1960s and 1970s unlike the current situation w th the 
information intensive industries. After Taiwan’s industrial transition from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to an information-intensive economy, the employment ratio (of total 
employment) of the information-intensive sector (including both manufact ring and 
service sectors) rose from 33.6% in 1977 to only 42.2% in 2006, increasing only 8.6%. In 
contrast, for labor-intensive manufacturing alone (not including labor intensive service or 
other industries), the decline was as much as 32.7%, dropping from 41.3% to 8.6%. The 
increase in the employment ratio of the information-intensive sector (8.6%) lags far 
behind the employment decline in labor-intensive manufacturing (32.7%). Moreover, 
because the available statistical data were only from 1977, not from the peak period of 
labor-intensive manufacturing (1960-1970), the contribution of labor-intensive 
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Source: Calculated based on W. C. Wang (2008) 
 
Figure 17. Employment gap in the information economy, 1981-2005 
 
TAIWAN ’S UNEMPLOYMENT  
After understanding the employment loss that the economic transformati n (to an 
information economy) caused, we now want to pay attention to the actual sit tion of 
Taiwan’s employment trends, especially during and after the economic transition to an 
information economy.  
Figure 18 shows unemployment 18 trends in Taiwan from 1978 to 2006. If we 
consider Taiwan’s industrial history, we see that before the 1980s (especially in the 1960s 
and 1970s), Taiwan had a very low unemployment rate because of strong lab r-intensive 
industries such as clothing and textiles. In the 1980s, however, Taiwan underwe t a 
                                                
18 Unemployment rate, according to the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and 
Statistics, R.O.C., refers to the percentage of the unemployed in the entire labo  force. The entire 
labor force refers to people who are over 15 years old and have capacity to work. The 
unemployed refer to people who: (1) have no work; (2) can work right away; and (3) are now 
looking for a job. Moreover, people who have found jobs but are still at the stage of waiting to 
start working are also incorporated in the unemployed.  
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dramatic industrial transformation, shifting from labor-intensive manuf cturing to an 
information-intensive economy, which worsened the unemployment problem. B cause 
information-intensive industries, especially the information manufactring sector, are 
mainly technique/knowledge centered, not labor centered, and their production has 
become highly automated, they hire fewer workers, particularly fewer lower-skilled 
workers than traditional labor-intensive industries,  
Moreover, in the first half of the 1990s, Taiwan opened its doors to immigrant 
workers from Southeast Asia and also began to allow outward investment in China. This 
was done in order to help keep industries and investment in Taiwan and also to facilitate 
the industrial upgrade to information-intensive and hi-tech industries. However, these two 
policies resulted in both the replacement of lower-skilled domestic workers and the so-
called second wave of exportation of Taiwan’s industries (this timealso including the 
labor-intensive departments of the Taiwanese information industries). These two factors 
are also believed to have worsened Taiwan’s unemployment problem.  Likewise, some 
information-intensive service industries such as finance and telecommunications 
experienced labor saturation and were unable to absorb the redundant labor force f om 
manufacturing layoffs that occurred because of plant relocations  China, resulting in 
even greater unemployment. As a result, during the worldwide recession from 2000 to 
2003, Taiwan’s unemployment rate reached a historical high of 5.2% in 2001. After 
2003, although the economy gradually returned to normal and the unemployment rate 
gradually declined, the unemployment rate was still as high as 3.9% in 2006, much 
higher than in the 1980s, when the high was only around 1.2%.  Consequently, w  can 
observe that in Taiwan’s case, the information economy has not significantly contributed 
















































































Source: GBAS data 
 
Figure 18. Unemployment rate, Taiwan, 1978-2006 
Similarly, if we consider the information economy and acknowledge that it has 
less potential to offer mass employment from another aspect i.e., the informal sector (see 
Figure 19), we find that in the beginning stages of the information ec omy, the informal 
sector decreased due to the labor demand of new industries. But beginning in 1987, the 
scope of the informal sector gradually increased until it reached a historical high point 
around 2001 and 2002 when the worldwide IT industry was in a recession. 
Unemployment hit a historical high as well, and then after 2003, the scope of the 
informal sector slightly shrank, but, similar to the unemployment rate, it still maintained a 






























































Source: GBAS data 
 
Figure 19. The scope of informal sector, Taiwan. 1983-2007 
Overall we can see that actually Taiwan’s information economy, especially 
information-intensive manufacturing, has not contributed as much to employ ent as 
labor-intensive manufacturing did in the 1960s and 1970s. The employment gap this has 
caused continues to grow, and it is evident that the unemployment problem worsened 
after 1980, coinciding with the establishment of the information economy. For more 
evidence, this paper will also demonstrate the statistical rel tionship between the 
information economy and unemployment in the next section. 
 
DETERMINANTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN TAIWAN , 1990-2007: ESTIMATION AND 
RESULTS 
In order to further understand the role of informatization in the changing 
employment patterns in Taiwan, we need to evaluate the relationship between 
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information technology and unemployment and attempt to isolate the impact of 
informatization from the general economic trends of the economy.  
Here I use two variables to indicate the employment patterns in Taiwan: the 
unemployment rate and the size of the informal sector. With respect to informatization, as 
in Chapter 4, I will use the extent of the informatization of the economy, measured by the 
percentage contribution of information intensive industries to the total GDP; the 
informatization of production, measured by the extent of automation in the economy (the 
automation equipment density in businesses);19  the informatization of production, 
measured by percentage of R & D in the total GDP; and information infrastructure and IT 
usage, quantified by calculating personal computers per 100 inhabitants, Internet users 
per 100 inhabitants, main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants, and mobile cellu ar phone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants.  Likewise, changes in employment patterns could result 
from general economic trends in the economy as a whole; thus, we also need to control 
for Taiwan’s gross domestic product in the current analysis. 
                                                
19 Relevant indicators such as computer ownership and Internet use rates in Taiwan businesses are lacking. 
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Table 4. Correlations for informatization and unemployment controlling for GDP, 1990-





Informatization of the 
economy 
.858** .998** 
Percentage of R & D in 





Personal computers per 
100 inhabitants 
.863** .969** 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants 
.922** .983** 
Main telephone lines 




per 100 inhabitants  
.900** .921** 
N 15 13 
Note 1:Control variable: GDP  
 Note 2: ** denotes that the value is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The data from Table 4 show us that all the informatization indicators are both 
statistically significant and strongly correlated to the two unemployment variables: 
unemployment rate and the size of the informal sector. Moreover, in all cases, the 
direction of correlation between informatization indicators and the two unemployment 
patterns is strongly positive—the higher the degree of informatization, the greater the 
tendency toward unemployment. Thus, we can say that Taiwan’s increasing 
unemployment in the last two decades is highly correlated to the dev lopment of 
 125
informatization and information economy. This result supports those who argue that 
informatization and information economy would result in increasing unemployment. 
  
CONCLUSION  
In summary, Taiwan’s unemployment rate had grown steadily since 1980, hitting 
its highest point at 2002-2003 during an economic recession in global IT industries, and 
then dropped a little but still remained at a much higher level than before. Similarly, the 
scope of Taiwan’s informal sector started to grow around 1987-1988, hitting its highest 
point in 2003, then dropping a little and remaining at a high level just as the 
unemployment rate did. 
This chapter also tracked the sources of how this increased unemployment and 
enlarged informal sector were caused. It first looked into the individual industries and 
finding out that, compared to the increase in the total GDP, information-intensive 
manufacturing did not actually contribute as much to employment as it did to the total 
GDP. The industries making up for the employment loss in the transition from labor- 
intensive to information -intensive industries were mainly the common service industries 
such as trade, and also information-intensive services such as finance, professional 
services, and health services. In addition, many workers who failed to transfer to 
information manufacturing or to service sectors became unemployed and fell into the 
informal sector. 
I also combined all the information-intensive industries and all the labor-intensive 
industries together and then compared these two big sectors by their GDP and 
employment contribution. The results show that the increase in the employment ratio of 
the information-intensive sector lags far behind the employment dcline in labor 
intensive-manufacturing. Moreover, in the early 1980s, the proportions of information- 
intensive industries in the total GDP and in the total employment w re fairly similar. 
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However, in 1999, the contribution of information-intensive industries to the total GDP 
reached 47.0% while, with respect to the total employment, it only reached 40.1%. In 
2006, the gap reached 52.5% and 42.2% respectively. The employment gap continues to 
grow, which predicts a continuing problem of unemployment.  
This dissertation also offers a statistical examination of the relationship between 
informatization and unemployment patterns in Taiwan. The results indicate that the 
increasing unemployment trend that developed after 1990 is strongly and positively 
correlated to the development of informatization and information economy.  
Overall, this chapter reveals that the unemployment problem that arose after 
Taiwan’s transformation to an information economy is closely rlated to the inability of 
information-intensive industries (especially information manufactring) to absorb the 
labor released from labor-intensive industries. The most likely reason for this is that the 
high degree of automation of production in information-intensive manufacturing results 
in a reduced need for labor in the relevant businesses. Unlike other information societies, 
especially in developed countries such as the U.S. or the U.K., which have already 
outsourced most of their information-intensive manufacturing to other countries, Taiwan 
still greatly relies on IT manufacturing for economic growth and employment. The less 
developed information-intensive services and R & D activities in Taiwan and the inability 
of information-intensive manufacturing to create more jobs are two main reasons for 
Taiwan’s present unemployment situation.  
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Chapter 6: Taiwan’s Information Economy and Wage Inequality  
Information economies are often linked to increasing economic inequality 
because of a tendency toward growing wage disparity. This chapter will explore whether 
Taiwan experienced a similar phenomenon, will analyze the sources of this trend, and 
will also identify the reasons for this rise in wage disparity during the transition to an 
information economy.  
INFORMATION ECONOMY AND INEQUALITY   
When considering which exact factors contribute to an increasing tre d of wage 
disparity in an information economy, different approaches of thinking often imply 
different policy applications and also different political positions. These different reasons 
can be categorized into three main different approaches: informati n/informationalism, 
technology (skill-biased technological changes), and political economic reasons.   
Information, knowledge, education, and informationalism 
1. Information, knowledge, and informationalism 
Castells (1996) is arguably one of the most prominent scholars to point out the 
transformation in the labor forces taking place throughout the world during the rise of the 
information age, a process he calls “informationalism.” This term indicates a specific 
form of social organization in which information generation, processing, and 
transmission become fundamental sources of productivity and power (Castells, 1996a). 
According to him, the new dominant social and economic systems are ch acterized by 
informationalism, which creates a sharp divide between valuable and non-valuable 
people and locales, including and excluding segments of economies and societie  in and 
out of the networks of information, wealth, and power. The exclusion of certain people 
and territories from the perspective of informational capitalism forces them into a 
position of structural irrelevance. This social exclusion leads to what Castells calls “the 
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black holes of informational capitalism” (Castells, 1998, pp. 70-165). He further explains 
this increased inequality through analyses of the shifting occupation s ructure. Three-
fourths of the new occupations since the 1980s have been low-skilled work for wages in 
the U.S. This occupation transformation speeds up the decline of middle-leve  jobs and 
the middle class, which results in the polarization of work and wages, long with a clear 
increase in economic inequality (Castells, 1988).  
Prior to Castells’ research, Bell (1973) proposed that knowledge and information 
have become directly productive forces, and information is the crucial aw material from 
which most social processes and social organizations are made. Howver, unlike Castells, 
Bell did not think that information and IT would deepen inequalities in society; on the 
contrary, he was convinced that when knowledge production and knowledge workers 
become the primary share of economic activities and structure, society will become a 
more equal one and people will enjoy better welfare provided by IT’s pervasivene s. 
The above-mentioned argument highlights the importance of information and 
knowledge on dividing the labor force market. Nonetheless, there is little proof from 
empirical studies regarding the existence of a relationship between these two. This is 
partly due to the difficulty of measuring the actual quantity of information/knowledge 
input into the production processes. In addition, the observed tendency of the declining 
wage of less-skilled workers can also be easily ascribed to other technological, social, 
economic, or policy factors, which we will revisit in later sections. 
2. Information, IT, and education 
Another viewpoint differing from the previous one is focused on education and 
learning. This perspective claims that, for the crucial roleof knowledge and technique in 
the information society, education and continuous learning would become the main 
factors determining a worker’s rewards in the labor market. In other words, in this kind of 
view, there should be an observed increase in the relative wages of workers with better 
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education, which is called a “rise in the rate of return to skill” or an “increase in the skill 
premium” (cited fromGalbraith, 2000d, p. 24; Steelman & Weinberg, 2005, pp. 12-14). 
Expanding the idea of education to a boarder scope, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (Juhn, 
Murphy, & Pierce, 1993) categorized three different patterns of rising inequality 
regarding learning and education. (1) One is related to experienc— years in the labor 
force. (2) The second is associated with the years of education. (3) The third is 
unobserved skill—a residual to any measurable characteristic. Informati n technology is 
believed to play a crucial portion here because it turns information int  useful knowledge 
for production efficiently, and thus, the acquirement of information technology technique 
would be also emphasized in an information economy (Tseng, 2001b).  
Different from the above argument, for Steelman and Weinberg, education would 
narrow the gap in economic inequality for the labor force will respond to the premium on 
education by increasing the investment in education. From this viewpoint, investment in 
education could be an effective tool in reducing wage inequality and could yiel  
additional benefits to the economy such as increasing workers’ productivity (Steelman & 
Weinberg, 2005).  
However, scholars such as Galbraith (2000d) do not agree that education is the 
determining reason causing economic inequality or equality nowadays. For Galbraith, 
education systems do not determine economic structures; in contrast, education is the 
follower of economy—when economy becomes more dispersed, so does education. The 
structure of earnings for workers would not change only because of more work rs’ 
acquisition of higher education. Thus, it is possible that when more wokers get more 
education, the demand for even higher education will enhance as well.     
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Information technology and skill-biased technological changes 
When considering the trends of an increasing wage for the more skilled labor in 
many developed countries, some scholars (Autor, Levy, & Murnane, 2002; Krueger, 
1993; Steelman & Weinberg, 2005) tend to adopt a position of more direct technological 
determinism, arguing that IT, especially microcomputers, actually le ds to the growth of 
wages for more professional workers; they name this dynamic process “skill-biased 
technological change.” Such a change refers to the phenomenon that tecnological 
change improves the productivity of skilled workers more than that of less skilled 
workers, thus shifting the demand for labor toward more skilled workers and boosting 
their wages accordingly (Autor et al., 2002; Krueger, 1993; Steelman & Weinberg, 
2005). This school of thought claims that technology and automation are most easily 
applied as replacement for low-skill jobs; the operation of new technologies typically 
requires more skills, and cheapening labor is not the primary criterion in decisions to 
implement new technologies (Attewell, 1987; Welch, 1970).  
As explained by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (Autor et al., 2002), computer 
technology effectively substitutes for workers performing routine tasks that can be 
readily done with programmed rules, while complementing those workers ex cuting non-
routine tasks that involve flexibility, creativity, generalized problem-solving capabilities, 
and complex communications. These two mechanisms—substitution and 
complementarity—increase the relative demand for workers who hold a comparative 
advantage in non-routine tasks and further the wage disparities between them and other 
workers.  
Different from the skill-biased technological change approach, Galbraith (2000a) 
looked into this problem at a more macro economic level, pointing out the existence of a 
relationship among technological change, economic growth, unemployment, and wage 
inequalities. On the relationship between technology and wage inequalities, he observed 
that the technology-supplying industries can reasonably be described as something of a 
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transient monopoly. They extract income from purchasers of technologies and then 
redistribute the income to the sellers thereof. Since the buyers in these markets inevitably 
outnumber the sellers, and since income levels are higher among technology producers 
than among technology consumers, high levels of business investments in technological 
innovations generally unequalize the structure of the wage and income. 
In spite of some empirical case studies that demonstrate the rlationship between 
IT adoption and wage disparities, the skill-biased technological change pproach often 
fails to examine the issue at a macro level. The neglect of industrial causes at a higher 
level repeatedly tends to detract from the explanatory power of this approach, giving 
opportunities to its opponents to question such thinking as technological determinism.  
Researchers who take the above three approaches tend to believe that the most 
direct and effective way to reduce wage inequality would be to reduce the disparity in 
skills and knowledge between workers. Thus, increased investment in education, skills 
development, and working knowledge acquisition could not only make the labor market 
more equal but could also yield additional benefits to workers’ productivity and also a 
country’s competitiveness (Steelman & Weinberg, 2005).  
 
Macroeconomic and political economic factors 
In contrast to the approach described above, critical economic and political 
economic scholars point out that depending on education and skills investment to cure the
enlarging wage discrepancy in an information economy is in correspondence with the 
free market purists’ propensity to turn the responsibility from structural and power 
reasons to isolated individuals for education results in a mixture of p rsonal choice and 
capacity. Second, the idea that education could change the economic and labor market 
structure or cure the problems of an economic structure is impractical because the 
function direction is just the opposite.  And third, the empirical datashow that, although 
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the education gap between workers has been reduced through government efforts, the 
wage inequality continues to grow (Galbraith, 2000a). This approach asserts that political 
action, and the resulting government policy, is the actual determinant i fluencing the 
changing trend of wage distribution in an information economy. These political choices 
might influence and change economic institutions, structures, and policies. Some scholars 
attribute these political choices more precisely to Neo-liberalism20 and its related factors: 
deregulation, globalization, privatization, institutional and wage norm shifting, reduction 
in social welfare and stagnant minimum wages, liberal economic and mo etary policies 
(such as tolerating unemployment), and so on (Freeman, 1999; Galbraith, 2000a; Harvey, 
2005; Howell, 2002; Moran, 1999). They argue that the post-1980 ascendance of neo-
liberalist practices and doctrines in many developed countries marks a paradigm change 
in the world’s economic distribution, mainly through enlarging the earning gaps between 
the rich and the poor. According to this school of thinking, information echnologies, 
informatization, informationalism, and even a boom in information or knowledge, are 
viewed as tools or results of predominant and pervasive neo-liberalist pr ctices (Harvey, 
2005).  
Another point of view is that information industries, especially some high-tech 
industries, gained monopoly profits or tariff rebates and financial support from 
government policies (such was the case for some NICs) and thus enjoyed higher profits to 
share with their employees, which caused a biased wage distribution in the labor market 
(Galbraith, 2000a). For these scholars, political, economic, market, and industrial 
practices should play the principal role in influencing imformatization and thus the new 
labor market conditions, not the reverse. In the following section, we will discuss in more 
detail some of the political economic factors that impact wage distribution. 
                                                
20 Neoliberalism is a political economy movement that embraces economic liberalism, for example, the 
free market, as a means of promoting economic development. This movement is often described as an 
effort to revert the classical liberalism economic policies in the 18th and 19th Centuries (Portes, 1997) . 
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1. Politics and government’s influence on wage trends 
Focusing on politics, Hansen (2006), using the U.S. as an example, reported that 
since 1970, the major factors that reduced labor cost and deepened wage inequality were 
political, for instance, the increasing Republican and conservative influ nce in the state, 
the interstate competition in the American federal system, and American federalism. 
Galbraith’s research (2000a) notes how government support for R&D can be contributory 
to wage inequality. Government R&D and export assistance helps American companies 
penetrate foreign markets through increasing their market share, improving their 
technological competitiveness and enabling them to pay higher wages. Thu , the main 
beneficiaries of these policies in the technological revolution are the non-production 
workers in the technology-generating firms. Already comparatively w ll paid, they are in 
fact the primary direct beneficiaries of government support for technological change, 
which further reinforces the wage disparity.  
2. Macroeconomic policies and wage trends 
Focusing on macroeconomic policies, Galbraith’s research on the U.S. (2000c) 
suggests that the primary reasons for rising inequalities are unemployment, the foreign 
exchange rate, high interest rates, and debt peonage, all of which are linked to the 
structure of policy-making delegated to the Federal Reserve, which plays a particularly 
decisive role when it comes to policies of stabilization and inflation control. Furthermore, 
the retreat of state policy protections of low-wage, less educated, more vulnerable 
workers by a stable macroeconomic policy also changed the labor market conditions in 
the information economy age. From 1945 through 1970 in the U.S., the state maintained a 
wide range of protections for low-level workers. As a result, a broadly equal pattern of 
social progress was sustained despite rapid technological change in those years. These 
protections were held in place by a stable macroeconomic policy that helped avoid sharp 
or prolonged disruptions in economic growth and, in particular, was supported by a 
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monetary policy that was subordinated to these larger objectives. In those years, the 
government as a whole was committed to the pursuit of full employment, price stability, 
and high rates of economic growth. After 1970, the technological change co tinued, but 
the protections were withdrawn; meanwhile macroeconomic policy became much more 
unstable. The state shifted its support from the economy in general, that is, the macro 
economy, to certain leading sectors of the economy, and in particular, to some firms and 
industries most devoted to technological change. Moreover, the ever increasing 
acceleration of globalization and the relentless drive for effici ncy inherently tended to 
redistribute income only in favor of smaller numbers of workers (Galbraith, 2000a). 
Equally disconcerting is the policy on the minimum wage—Blanchflower and Slaughter 
(1999) pointed out that the fall in the inflation-adjusted minimum wage has led to rising 
inequalities in the U.S. and the U.K. since 1970.    
3. Trade union and wage trends 
Furthermore, the waning of trade unions has also deteriorated the wage disparity. 
Unions typically reduce income inequalities among their members throug  standardizing 
pay among workers within establishments and through equalizing pay across 
establishments. They reduce income inequalities between high- and low-paid workers by 
raising the pay and benefits of their largely blue-collar private sector members closer to 
that of higher-paid executives and professionals. They also reduce inequal ti s in non-
union firms by inducing those firms to raise pay or benefits to avoid unionization. Studies 
suggest that about one-fifth of the rise in inequalities is due to the decline of unions 
(Freeman, 1999).  Howell (2002) proposed a hypothesis about the shifting wage norms: a 
systematic and successful assault on the wage standard by business management, 
reinforced by public policies, leads to the decline of the unions, wage concessions, plant 
relocation, outsourcing, and greater reliance on contingent workers. For Howell, both 
traditional wage-setting institutions and middle-class jobs are in decline simultaneously. 
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Howell's hypothesis suggests a potentially unified, secular alten tive to the Kuznets 
hypothesis: variations in the structured wage setting arrangements l ad to income 
distribution changes. Likewise, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) demonstrated that one-third of 
the total increase in the U.S. wage inequality in the 1980s can be attri uted to declines in 
unionization and the real minimum wage along with economic deregulations.  
4. Globalization, trade, and wage trends 
Blanchflower and Slaughter (1999) further pointed to globalization as a vital 
influence on informatization and the labor market. First, firms adopt information 
technology in order to remain internationally competitive by cutting labor costs. Second, 
firms secure more power in bargaining against unions with threats to introduce foreign 
factors of production (via foreign direct investment or outsourcing to foreign suppliers) 
with the help of information technologies, which lend critical global mobility to 
production factors. 
A case study of the U.S., conducted by Bernard and Jensen (1997), found that 
there is a positive correlation between export, technology use, and the wage disparity. 
According to them, large plants are more capital-intensive and productive, and more 
likely to adopt advanced technologies, to export, and to pay higher wages. Unfortunately, 
which of these characteristics is the cause of the others is not clear from the study. 
Although their research results indicate that between-plant movement and wages to 
exporters play a significant role in increasing relative wages of non-production workers, 
Bernard and Jensen remind us that neither trade nor technology alone c n fully account 
for the observed changes in the dispersion of the wage. Similarly, Jensen and Troske 
(1999) also suggested that to make further progress in identifying the sources of 
increasing wage dispersion, a better understanding of the underlying relationships among 
technology, the composition of the workforce, and a firm’s marketing and export 
strategies is required.   
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With a more specific focus on trade, Moran (1999) indicated two ways in which 
trade (investment) might influence the trend in the change of wage. Th  first is 
sometimes known as the great-sucking-sound hypothesis: outward investment could 
hamstring the domestic economy by continuously shifting good jobs abroad and leaving 
behind only a few low-wage, low-benefit employment opportunities at home.  The 
second is sometimes referred to as the siphoning-off-the-good-jobs hypothesis: inward 
investment could significantly boost productive activities, disassembling/reassembling 
the resulting operations in a way that diverts high-wage, high-benefit jobs to the home 
countries of parent firms while consigning only a few low-wage, low benefit jobs to the 
host economy. For example, scholars compared the US and Swedish multinational 
companies, finding that the US multinational companies tended to invest and move their 
lower skill, labor intensive sectors to developing countries and NICs, which reduced the 
US blue-collar workers’ employment and enlarged the income disparity. In contrast, 
Swedish multinational companies tended to invest in both developed and developing 
countries. They moved the knowledge-intensive sectors to developed countries a d hired 
more blue-collar workers in the home country, thus dropping the wage disparity in the 
home country; as for investment in developing countries, surprisingly, it contributed to 
the employment of both blue-collar and white collar workers in Sweden, and no obvious 
deterioration for wage disparity was found (Blomstrom, Fors, & Lipsey, 1997).  
Using Taiwanese companies’ outward investment to China’s as an example, Liu 
(2006) pointed out that Taiwanese companies primarily moved out the lower skill, labor- 
intensive sectors to China, which lowered Taiwan’s total employment, especially that of 
the lower skill workers, thus deteriorating Taiwan’s wage inequality. 
5. Immigrant workers and wage trends 
As to immigrants or immigrant workers, it is commonly believed that they have 
skewed the income distribution toward the bottom of the labor market by nlarging the 
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number of workers in the lowest-paying jobs. For Camarata and Krikorian (1999), in the 
case of immigrant workers, the losers are more likely to be the working poor and those 
with less skills. These workers are the most negatively influe ced for they tend to be 
employed in the sections of the labor market where immigrant workers are highly 
concentrated. As for the winners, they are most likely those middle and upper class 
workers, whose skills tend to complement those of immigrant workers.  
However, there are still some doubts regarding the above viewpoint. Freeman 
(1999) argued that, according to the his research and that of his colleagues, the increased 
flow of low-skill immigrants is not the reason for declining wages for less skilled workers 
in the case of Americans. As he pointed out, the majority of immigrant workers have less 
than a grade school education and are more likely to complement the work of most 
Americans than to compete with them in the job market. In addition, the high proportion 
of the rise of wage-earning inequality in the U.S. is found among workers with similar 
skills, including those workers who should not be affected by less skilled immigrant 
workers such as mechanics or lawyers.  
Overall, this dissertation is based on the assumption that the labor mrket changes 
in an information economy should not result from one single powerful determinant; 
instead, they should be influenced by various and complicated interactions among 
numerous different political, economic, or technological factors, possibly including 
application of technologies (for instance, informatization), industrial characteristics, 
government policies, institutional reason (such as labor union), the role of interest and 
social groups, trade and globalization, as well as international political economy factors 
and structure. 
To summarize, among the arguments for reasons accounting for informati n 
economy’s role in increasing economic inequality, we can generally c tegorize them into 
three main approaches, information/knowledge/informationalism, information technology 
determinism, and also the political-economic perspective. These thr e different 
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approaches also tend to adopt different policy attitudes regarding the raised labor market 
problem such as unemployment or economic inequality. The first two appr ches tend to 
consider those labor market changes is an inevitable tendency along with humans’ social, 
technological, and production progresses. And they more often seek individuals to solve 
their own competitive ability problems by pursuing more education or job training. In 
contrast, the approach relying on political economic reasons tendso believe that the 
labor market changes are results of policy choices, which are determined by the political 
and economic power or the interaction between them. Thus, to fix the labor market 
problems raised by policy choices, people should certainly look back to the policies 
themselves. This dissertation wants to clarify these arguments and also to examine these 
issues outside the developed countries, which is still very rare so far in empirical 
research. 
 
THE HISTORY OF TAIWAN ’S ECONOMIC INEQUALITY  
Observing Taiwan’s economic inequality, we can see a mild U pattern, with fairly 
rapid decline in inequality until the late 1970s-early 1980s, followed by rises offsetting 
more than half of the earlier fall. Generally speaking, income inequality was very high 
between the end of World War II and 1950; then slowly decreased in the 1950s, dropped 
dramatically in the 1960s, and reached its historical bottom in the 1970s. After that, 
however, it went back up along with the economic transformation, namely the decline of 
labor-intensive manufacturing and the boom of information-intensive industries. 
If we go more specifically stage by stage, the period from 1945 to 1952 was a 
period when Taiwan was recovering from World War II and from the civil war between 
the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party. This period of time was 
characterized by high inflation and serious economic inequality, which was considerably 
high at this time due to the country’s unstable economic condition (Cornia, 2000). To 
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solve this problem and to maintain social and political stability, the KMT government 
emphasized the importance of taking care of the poor by adopting policies such as land 
reform to redistribute wealth and to lower the economic inequality (Yu, 2004).  
From 1953 to 1960, Taiwan’s government was devoted to light industrial 
development. The central industries were supported by the government in order to meet 
various domestic needs such as textiles, food, electric appliances, and chemical products. 
These light industries rapidly expanded employment to both well-educated and low-
skilled workers, effectively helping economic inequality decline little by little. 
 The period from 1961 to 1972 was the golden age for Taiwan’s labor-intensive 
manufacturing, during which the country completed its export-oriented industrialization 
and successfully emerged as one of the most important production sites for he American 
and Japanese markets (Ho & Lo, 2002; C. F. Lin, 2004b). This stage was also an 
important turning point for Taiwan’s economy as it changed from being based on 
agriculture to relying mainly on manufacturing. Representative industries at this stage 
included textiles, leather and fur, foodstuffs and the glass industry. Due to the mass 
employment offered by the labor-intensive manufacturing industries, economic inequality 
and the Gini coefficient were sharply reduced from 0.321 to 0.291 (Cornia, 2000; 
"Directorate for General Budget, Accounting, and Statistics ").  
The decade 1973 to 1983 was the period when Taiwan’s heavy chemical 
industries developed. Nevertheless, labor-intensive manufacturing still accounted for the 
lion’s share of the total GDP. Economic inequality at this time hit its historically lowest 
point in 1976 at a Gini coefficient of 0.280, and then gradually increased to 0.287 with 
the gradual decline of-labor intensive manufacturing (Cornia, 2000; "Directorate for 
General Budget, Accounting, and Statistics ").  
The period between 1984 and 1990, the economic liberalization stage, has also 
been recognized as an early-stage in Taiwan’s transition to a information economy (Ho 
& Lo, 2002; C. F. Lin, 2004b). During this time, Taiwan’s labor-intensive manufacturing 
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confronted increasing international competition from other NICs and  developing 
countries (Ranis, 1992). In addition, enormous pressure from the U.S. seeking the 
liberalization of Taiwan’s domestic market, pushed the government to adopt a more 
liberal and open attitude concerning economic policies. The New Taiwanese Dollar 
appreciated sharply, tariff duties were lowered, labor costs rapidly grew, and Taiwan 
quickly lost its competitive advantage in laborintensive manufacturing (T. J. Chen & Ku, 
1995). Industrial production dropped greatly at this time, and unemployment became a 
serious problem (Chu, 2003d). To sustain Taiwan’s economy, the government bega  
promoting high technology and information-intensive industries to replace tr ditional 
labor-intensive industries. At this point, the service industry for the first time surpassed 
manufacturing to become the largest contributor to GDP and to the employ ent of the 
labor force ("National Statistics Database," 2007). However, this paradigm shift from 
labor-intensive manufacturing to information-intensive industries and service industries 
was accompanied by a striking increase in wage inequality. The Gini coefficient rose 
from 0.287 to 0.312 (Cornia, 2000; "Directorate for General Budget, Accounting, and 
Statistics "). Reasons for this rise in inequality were attributed to the industrial 
transformation and its consequent increasing unemployment as well as to the increase in 
globalization and liberal market policies.  
The 1990s, “the age of high-tech industry,” witnessed fast developmnt in 
Taiwan’s informatization and the emerging information economy. At this time, Taiwan’s 
IT production began to claim a lion’s share of the whole world’s market. Moreover, 
under the pressure of domestic enterprises, the government removed restrictions on 
immigrant workers in 1991 so as to lower labor costs. As a result of industrial 
transformation and immigrant worker policies, Taiwan’s unemployment rate surged and 
the inequality of its income distribution deepened. Unemployment rose f m 1.67 to 
2.99% and the Gini coefficient grew from 0.312 to 0.326 ("Directorate for General 
Budget, Accounting, and Statistics ").  
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From the year 2000 to the present, the Taiwanese government has been engaged 
in developing knowledge-intensive industries (T. J. Chen & Lee, 2004b), with Taiwan’s 
IT industry playing a crucial role in global IT production. However, the highly reliance 
on export of information products has sometimes been problematic. In 2001, the world’s 
IT industry suffered from a severe recession; Taiwan had its first historical economic 
negative growth (-2%), and the unemployment rate and wage inequality both hit an all-
time high. Since 2003, while economic growth has gradually climbed back to normal and 
Taiwan’s GDP growth rate has returned back to around 4-5%, the unemployment rate a d 
wage inequality have still remained at a much higher level than before. During this 
period, unemployment hit the highest point in Taiwan’s history at 5.17% in 2002 and the 
Gini coefficient also set a historical record at 0.35 in 2001. Therefor , this knowledge 
economy is also characterized by the highest unemployment rate and highest income 
inequality in Taiwan’s history ("National Statistics Database," 2007).  
 
RELEVANT RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN TAIWAN  
Taiwan was generally believed to be an astonishing example of high-speed 
economic growth and very equal income distribution, especially in the 1960s and 70s. 
While after 1980 when the income inequality was worsening, it was still much milder 
than in other developed and developing countries (Amsden, 1985; Wade, 1990). If this 
was true, what were reasons for Taiwan’s change toward greater conomic inequality, 
especially after 1980?  In reference to Taiwan’s wage inequality, Vere (2005) pointed out 
that education and technical changes such as informatization and automation within 
manufacturing industries were the primary forces shaping Taiwan’s wage inequality in 
the 1980s and 1990s respectively. In his study, education expansion in the 1980s helped 
reduce Taiwan’s wage inequality; however, the technical changes in the 1990s, in 
contrast, increased the wage disparity. Other social factors such as age and gender, 
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according to Vere’s research, have had much less impact on wage inequality in the last 
three decades. 
Cornia (2000) also observed Taiwan’s economic development and inequality, 
coming to a conclusion that, after 1983, the development of skill/information intensive 
sectors did increase wage inequality but other reasons leading to increasing income 
inequality included the development of large corporations and escalation in land prices, 
especially between 1983 and 1993, a time of growing land speculation trends.  
Drawing from “the Economic Yearbook of the Republic of China, 2005” 
(Economic yearbook of the Republic of China, 2006), the high-tech and information 
industries are believed to have contributed to the increasing wage distance between 
themselves and other industries, which was believed to be one of th most important 
reasons for Taiwan’s high economic inequality.  
Liou (2001) analyzed the influence of industrial structural transformation on 
income distribution in Taiwan from 1991 to 1996, finding the industrial transi io  from 
traditional labor-intensive manufacturing to information, electronics, and service has 
made the gap between high wage and low wage continue to enlarge. The rason for this, 
according to him, was that the returns of those new information-intesive industries 
continued growing, and the workers in these industries were able to share the benefits of 
this growth by receiving higher payment, which caused the growth f total income 
disparity. In addition, the wage polarization among workers with different skill levels 
also increased for the reason that the dominant new information industries tended to hire 
more skilled or knowledgable workers. Analyzing this issue from an occupational 
perspective, he claimed that the wage disparity among groups of managers, professionals, 
and associate professionals enlarged and that among groups of machine operators and 
physical labor it declined; the result was that the final total wage disparity increased. 
Furthermore, like Cornia, Liou observed that the trend towards larger corporations 
contributed to the effects on inequality as well. Unlike the previous labor-intensive 
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manufacturing stage, when small and middle sized enterprises dominated the production 
activities and the businesses profits and income distribution wereall more even, the 
development of large corporations accelerated the rapid growth of unequal income 
distribution. 
Chuan (2006) investigated the relationship between information economies and 
inequality by analyzing the percentage share of income by percentile group of 
households. He noted that the highest income group benefited from the industrial 
transformation to an information economy because of their higher quality human capital 
and skills; however, the lowest and second lowest groups suffered remarkably from 
structural unemployment as they could not promptly obtain the skills needed to meet the 
skill requirements of high technology and information industries. As a result, the income 
gap between higher and lower income groups kept enlarging. 
Tsai (M. C. Tsai, 2005) also argued that the transformation to an information 
economy has widened Taiwan’s income gap, as the information-intensive i dustries tend 
to hire more higher-skilled workers and fewer domestic blue-collar workers, thereby 
increasing the wages of professional workers.  
In a similar vein, Yu (Yu, 2004) concluded that an information or knowledge 
economy has widened the income and wage gap in Taiwan for two reasons: first, 
enterprises in the electronics and information industries can accumulate massive amounts 
of money in a very short period of time, merely because their share prices can multiply 
several-fold overnight; and second, people who have become very well educated in the 
field of information technology tend to enjoy much higher salaries, while those with 
lower levels of information technology education often find themselves with no jobs at 
all.  
Likewise, by constructing a survey targeting 1,000 Taiwanese companies, Han 
(2001) observed that companies adopting high-level information technologies such as 
computer-integrated manufacturing or computer-integrated businesses, tend to pay higher 
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salaries for higher skilled workers as automation and information-inte sive technologies 
increase the complexity of jobs and require higher labor skills. Han’s research shows that  
the adoption of information-intensive technologies has had a significant and highly 
positive relationship with higher salaries.   
However, comprehensive, systematic, and empirical research on this issue from a 
macroeconomic perspective is still lacking in Taiwan. Moreover, the impacts of state 
policy and other political economic reasons are often overlooked in these research 
studies. Therefore, this dissertation is expected to narrow this gap by tracking the 
influence of more political economic reasons on Taiwan’s labor market changes after the 
information economy transformation.  
 
TRENDS IN TAIWAN ’S ECONOMIC INEQUALITY  
After reviewing the relevant research regarding the reasons for Taiwan’s changing 
economic inequality, now we are going to investigate the actual tendencies of Taiwan’s 
economic inequality and pose the question of whether Taiwan’s trends in economic 
distribution have been similar to other countries with information economies. 
There are three most commonly used indices for measuring a society’s economic 
inequality, including: the Gini Coefficient, Percentage Share of Disposable Income by 
Percentile Group of Households, and the Theil’s Inequality Index. Figure 20 shows the 
trends in the Gini Coefficient and the ratio of income share of highest 20% to that of 
lowest 20% (or the Percentage Share of Disposable Income by Percentil  Group of 
Households). These two indices have high consistency. From these figur s, we indeed 
can see that, after economic inequality reached a historical low around 1977, the income 
inequality continued to grow with the decline of labor-intensive manufacturing and the 
growth of information-intensive industries. In 2001, the inequality index hit a historical 
high because of the worldwide IT industry recession. This reveals th t Taiwan’s 
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economic situation, particularly its income inequality, has become fairly sensitive to and 
influenced by information industries, both domestic and overseas. However, while the 
Gini Coefficient and Percentage Share of Disposable Income by Percentile Group of 
Households tell us about trends in Taiwan’s income inequality, they are not able to show 
the sources or even reasons for this increasing inequality. In addition, they both use 
household income as the base data source, which might not directly reflect the labor 
market situation or the wage distribution, but could also incorporate other influences such 
as income from stocks, rent, capital, and the like. Hence, this study included the 
application of the Theil statistics, which can focus only on wages nd also can show us 
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Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, R.O.C. 
 
Figure 20. Trends in Taiwan’s economic inequality, 1964-2005 
Here the dissertation presents the calculation of a single annual index of 
inequality in the wage structure using the lower-bound, between-group estimate of 
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Theil’s T statistics (T´) as the required data for calculating within-group inequality—the 
individual wage data were usually not available (please refer to Appendix A to see how 
the Theil’s T was calculated). For a group structure, this research used wage and 
employment data from the main employment sectors in Taiwan. Thus, the main sectors 
the paper analyzed include manufacturing; mining and quarrying; electricity, gas and 
water; construction; trade; transportation and telecommunication; finance and insurance; 
real estate, rental and leasing; accommodation and food services; professional, science 
and technical services; health care; cultural, sporting and recreational services; and other 
services. Sectors such as agriculture are not included because they still belong to an 
unofficial employment sector in Taiwan and do not have wage and employent data 
available. The raw data come from measures and survey data gathered by the Taiwanese 
government, mainly from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, a d Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, Republic of China (the GBAS). The group-wise decomposability of 
Theil’s statistic measure of inequality permits us to use these data to compute an estimate 
of the evolution of inequality in the wage structure over time. It produces a measure of 
changing relative wage dispersion that is weighted by the relativ  size of the working 
population in each of the underlying classes of economic activity (Berner & Galbraith, 
2001; Conceição & Ferreira, 2000; Ferguson & Galbraith, 2001). 
The formula used to calculate Theil’ s statistics of income inequality is shown 
below, which is composed of between-group inequality (T ´) plus within-group 
inequality ( wT )  (Conceição & Galbraith, 2001, pp. 264-267). If we consider that the 
population is divided into m  industry groups, 1g , 2g  , …. mg , each with jn  individuals, 
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The employment proportion in each group is represent d by jp = n
n j . The ratio of 
average group income to overall average income is jR = µ
µ j . And the ratio between 
individual income ( iy ) and average income (Yµ ) is represented by iγ .  In this equation, 
n represents employment, µ represents average income, and j represents a subscript 
denoting the group. 
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Figure 21 shows the results of the wage inequality calculations (calculated by 






































Per capital GDP trend
Source: The author’s calculations based on the GBAS data 
 
 Figure 21. Wage inequality between major sectors, 1980-2006 
As we can see from Figure 21, wage inequality within t e economic sector has 
increased unevenly since 1980, the earliest year with a complete set of available data. 
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From 1980 to 2006, wage inequality increased strikingly from 0.0136 to 0.0189, reaching 
its two highest points in 1989 and 2006. The dramatic increase of wage inequality in the 
1980s was due to the first wave of labor-intensive manufacturing moving out of Taiwan 
(a majority moving to South East Asia) and the sudden wave of speculation activities in 
the real estate industry and finance market (which were responsible for the inequality 
peak in 1989) as well as a series of liberalization, globalization, and open market policies 
initiated by the government (C.L. Tsay, 1995). The 1995 peak was due to the second 
wave of labor-intensive manufacturing moving out (mainly to China), and at this time, 
information industries for the first time replaced labor-intensive manufacturing to become 
the dominant industry in Taiwan. Therefore, after the first half of the 1990s, the increase 
of wage inequality is generally attributed to Taiwan’s industrial transformation from 
labor-intensive manufacturing to information-intensive industries (Chu, 2003d). In order 
to prove this, we need to further analyze the sources of these inequalities. 
 
SOURCES OF TAIWAN ’S ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AFTER 1984 
As mentioned earlier, the Theil statistics can show us the sources of wage 
inequality, which the Gini Coefficient and Percentage Share of Disposable Income by 
Percentile Group of Households cannot do. Based on the computation of data of total 
employment and total payroll by industrial category, the lower bound between-group 
estimate of Theil’s T statistics can easily reveal which industries are the main 
contributors to inequality. 
Table 7 and Figure 22 provide evidence of the sources of wage inequality in 
manufacturing—the particular pattern of manufacturing industry-specific wage gains and 
losses in Taiwan between 1979 and 2006. Each number in Table 7 represents the Theil 
element of each year or weighted contribution in relation to the overall inequality of each 
manufacturing industry in that year. As shown in Table 7 and Figure 22, industries whose 
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average income is above the total average had a positive value in relation to the overall 
inequality, while those whose average income was below the total average had a negative 
value. For research purposes, the paper calculated the Theil elements of all categorized 
manufacturing industries from 1979 to 2006, but Table 7 represents only ten years of data 
including only the first and last six industries (the first six positive contributors are above 
the black line in the Table ; the six most negative contributors are below the black line). 
From Table 7 and Figure 22, we can see that computers and electronic parts, two 
important and representative industries of information-intensive manufacturing, appear to 
be two of the main positive manufacturing contributors to the gradual increase in wage 
inequality in Taiwan since 1994. For example, in 2006, the electronic parts industry was 
the highest contributor to wage inequality, at 0.0213, and the computer industry was the 
third highest contributor, at 0.0184. Note that thesecond and the fourth highest wage 
inequality contributors--chemical materials and the m tal industries--provided long-term 
support for other industries’ material needs and ha a more immediate influence on wage 
inequality than that of the computer and electronic part industries. However, they have 
been highly relevant to IT industry development in recent years and can also be claimed 
as belonging to the information industry sector in the last two decades. Furthermore, at 
about the same time, the below-average wage earners in the manufacturing sector include 
industries such as leather and fur, clothing, textil s, machinery, plastics, and fabricated 
metal products--most of which are primarily categorized into the traditional labor-
intensive (as opposed to information and technique ntensive) manufacturing. The most 
obvious example, the clothing industry, had a crucial influence on wage inequality before 
the 1980s.  For example, in 1975, its contribution o wage inequality was -0.029, and this 
influence was still apparent during the 1980s although it eventually began to decline. 
However, after the 1990s, especially after the year 2000, its effect on Taiwan’s wage 
inequality almost disappeared with its industrial bse moving out of Taiwan; for example, 
in 2006, the contribution of the clothing industry o wage inequality was only -0.005. A 
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similar example is the leather and fur industry. From the previous calculations and data, 
we indeed find that information-intensive manufacturing industries such as ICT 
industries, have been gradually replacing other industries, becoming significant wage 
earners and the primary contributors to wage polarization in Taiwan. 
Table 5. Theil Elements, by manufacturing sector 
 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 
Electronic parts -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.0019 0.0081 0.0117 0.0213 
Chemical material 0.0199 0.0123 0.0154 0.0163 0.0165 0.011 0.0111 0.0155 0.0162 0.0193 
Computer -0.0052 -0.0058 -0.003 -0.006 -0.0026 0.001 0.0013 0.011 0.0129 0.0184 
Metal industry 0.0153 0.0116 0.0093 0.0149 0.0168 0.012 0.0119 0.01 0.0128 0.0152 
Petroleum 0.0034 0.0069 0.0058 0.0059 0.0101 0.011 0.0113 0.011 0.0098 0.0108 
Transport equipment 0.024 0.0154 0.0127 0.013 0.0183 0.014 0.0137 0.0091 0.0067 0.0053 
Leather & fur -0.0164 -0.0134 -0.012 -0.014 -0.0112 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0021 
Clothing -0.0243 -0.0152 -0.017 -0.015 -0.0144 -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.008 -0.0051 
Textiles -0.0064 0.0004 0.0027 0.0029 -0.0013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.0055 
Machinery 0.0184 0.0055 0.0074 0.007 0.0013 1E-03 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.0077 
Plastic -0.0031 -0.0009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.0091 
Fabricated metal 0.0065 0.0021 -1E-03 -9E-04 -0.0049 -0.005 -0.005 -0.01 -0.011 -0.0147 
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Source: The author’s calculations based on GBAS data 
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Figure 22. Theil elements- by manufacturing sectors, 1973-2006 
If we extend this analysis to all representative industries in Taiwan, as Table 8 
and Figure 23 show, among the first eight contributors, information-intensive industries 
(including both service and manufacturing) account for seven of the industries that have 
affected Taiwan’s wage inequality (finance & insurance; transportation; electronic parts 
& computers; professional, scientific & technical services; health; chemical materials),  
the eighth is the state-owned monopoly industry: electricity, gas & water. The financial 
sector stands out as having generated the largest wage inequality since 1982, and its Theil 
element in 2006 reached as high as 0.043. Finance is not only the most important industry 
of the information-intensive service sector, but it is also one of the most computerized 
and informationalized industries in Taiwan. Moreover, if we combine the computer and 
electronic parts industries, they would rank third in contributing to increasing wage 
inequality, ranking just above another information-ntensive industry, transportation and 
telecommunication. Another industry worth noting is professional, scientific & technical 
services. Its contribution to total wage inequality has also appeared to be crucial, 
beginning around the 1990s. In regards to the below-average wage earners, the trade and 
accommodation industries--both labor-intensive servic  industries—have suffered since 
1993. Similarly, traditional labor-intensive industries such as fabricated metal products, 
construction, textiles, plastic products, and the clothing industry have also had a negative 
impact on wage equality. Again, we can observe the diminishing importance of clothing, 
leather and fur industries’ impact on wage inequality s nce the 1970s while the trade 
industry has become a much more critical player, especially after 1991.  
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Table 6. Theil Elements, by main industries in service and manufacturing 
  1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 
Finance & Insurance 0.0146 0.0217 0.0237 0.0332 0.0305 0.0412 0.0401 0.0329 0.04 0.043 
Transportation & Telecom 0.0231 0.0198 0.0177 0.0104 0.0138 0.0122 0.0144 0.0146 0.0135 0.0122 
Professional & Technical service 0.0064 0.0049 0.0064 0.0062 0.0089 0.0084 0.009 0.0096 0.0072 0.0106 
Health & Medical 0.0074 0.0022 0.0051 0.0054 0.0051 0.0048 0.0071 0.0096 0.0125 0.0103 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.0057 0.0064 0.0089 0.0074 0.0114 0.0093 0.009 0.0098 0.0102 0.0094 
Chemical material 0.0077 0.0046 0.0063 0.0069 0.0057 0.0032 0.0047 0.0048 0.0052 0.0068 
Electronic parts -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.004 -0.0036 -0.004 -0.002 -1E-03 -3E-04 0.0009 0.0054 
Computer -0.0052 -0.0047 -0.004 -0.0054 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.0016 0.0022 0.0054 
Clothing -0.0155 -0.0112 -0.013 -0.0104 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.0023 
Electronic machinery -0.0052 -0.0055 -0.004 -0.0021 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0028 
Textiles -0.0092 -0.0046 -0.003 -0.0018 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.0028 
Plastic -0.0045 -0.0033 -0.005 -0.0041 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.0044 
Machinery 0.0057 -1E-06 0.0009 0.0009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.0046 
Construction -0.004 -0.0005 0.0042 -0.0021 0.0041 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.0069 
Fabricated metal 0.0005 -0.0014 -0.003 -0.0031 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.0069 
Accommodation, Eat-Drinking -0.0059 -0.0046 -0.004 -0.0072 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.0086 
Trade 0.0039 0.0036 0.0047 0.0053 -0.003 -0.01 -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.0216 
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Figure 23. Theil elements- by main industries in servic  and manufacturing 
 
From the above observations, we find that the information-intensive industries 
(including manufacturing and service) such as the industries of finance, transportation 
and telecommunication, professional services, science and technical services, medical 
services, electronic parts, and computers have actually become the primary source of 
Taiwan’s increasing wage inequality since 1980. In contrast, industries that are less 
information-intensive, with a lower level of informatization  such as accommodation and 
food services, clothing, construction, trade, fabricated metal products, and plastic 
products have become the sectors with the largest blow-average contributions to 
inequality after 1980. 
 
THE LOCI OF INEQUALITY  
 Now that we have recognized that the source of Taiwan’s wage inequality in the 
last two decades has been due to the industrial transformation from traditional labor- 
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intensive industries to information-intensive industries, we want to track the sectors in 
which this inequality is located. We are going to discuss this from the perspectives of 
wages disparities among industries, among occupations, and among different educational 
levels.  
For the wage-changing trends among industries, petroleum was the leading 
industry with the highest rate of wage increase betwe n 1980 - 2006. The percentage of 
its average wage in the total industrial wage doubled, increasing by 100.2%. A possible 
reason for the petroleum industry’s wage superiority is due to the limited or decreasing 
sources and quantity of oil, causing an increase in oil prices as well as an increase in 
profits for the petroleum industry. The following leading industries also had high rates of 
wage increase: electronic parts 58.1%, professional, scientific & technical services 
33.9%, computers 26.3%, finance & insurance 22.7%, and precision manufacturing 
15.0%. The industries whose wage percentage declined included: machinery -38.2%, 
housing -34.1%, printing -32.4%, furniture -32.0%, pulp & paper -29.9%, 
accommodation and dining-29.0%. The industries whose wage stayed comparatively 
stable included: incorporated non-metallic mineral industries 1.1%, trade -2.6%, the food 
and beverage industry -4.6%, transport equipment 1.2% and textiles -1.9%. Again, we 
can clearly see an increasing wage trend for information-intensive industries ( and the 
petroleum industry) in the areas of electronic parts, professional services, computer, and 
finance and insurance; as well as a declining trend for traditional labor-intensive 
industries and service industries that are less information intensive such as machinery, 
printing, furniture, pulp & paper, and housing. These trends resulted in growing wage 
disparities among workers in different industries and thus contributed to Taiwan’s 
increasing wage inequality after the 1980s. Now, however, we need to look at additional 
perspectives on wage trends such as the wage changes mong occupations.  
The following paragraphs examine the issue of economic inequality based on 
occupation, using the economic argument that in an information society or economy, 
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workers with higher skills and knowledge enjoy higher salaries while their contribution to 
wage inequality keeps increasing.  
In Figure 24, we can see that since the 1990s, production machine operators 
started losing their earning advantage and became below-average earners by 2001; in 
contrast, technicians and associate professionals largely replaced machine operators, 
increasing their wage privilege since 1993, and therefore, contributing to wage inequality. 
As for the below-average earners, service workers and s les persons, elementary workers 
(physical labor workers), and clerks occupy the most di advantageous positions in the 
labor market. We also see that in 2006, for the first t me, the contribution of professional 
occupations to wage inequality exceeded that of busines  executive and managerial 
occupations, making professional occupations the largest contributors to wage inequality. 
This seems to confirm the supposition that an information economy leads to the declining 
importance of managers and to the increasing importance of professionals (Martin, 1998; 

























Professionals Business executives and managers Technicians & associate professionals
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Source: The author’s calculations based on GBAS data 
  
 156
Figure 24. Theil elements by occupation, 1987-2005 
Figure 25 shows the ratio of blue to white-collar workers’ average monthly 
wages. From the earliest data available (1989), there is a clear trend towards the uneven 
decline of this ratio, from around 0.979 in 1989 to 0.909 in 2005, with the lowest point in 
2002, at 0.891. This means that as white-collar workers’ wages have risen, blue-collar 
workers’ wages have continued to fall. The decline of labor-intensive manufacturing and 
the surge of information-intensive industries are believed to have caused this trend 
because information-intensive industries hire fewer blue-collar workers. Other possible 
factors may include Taiwan’s open immigration labor policies since 1991 and the 
relocation of labor-intensive sectors of information industries to mainland China since 
1990. All three of these factors resulted in the wage improvement for workers with 
professional knowledge/skills (mainly white-collar), especially for computer 
professionals or financial workers, and the wage decrease for workers replaceable by 
Southeast Asian immigrants and mainland Chinese workers such as machine operators 




















Source: The author’s calculations according to GBAS data 
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Figure 25. Monthly wage ratio, 1989-2005, blue-collar/white-collar workers  
Figure 26 reveals the phenomenon of rising wages for pr fessional, skilled 
workers. The figure displays wage ratios over time, comparing other occupations to 
technicians or associate professionals. As we can see in this figure, the ratio of the 
monthly wages of machine operators to the wages of technicians continually dropped 
from 1.09 in 1987 to 0.85 in 2005. The ratio of themonthly wages of elementary workers 
to the wages of technicians also fell from 0.83 to 0.68. Similarly, the ratios of monthly 
wages of clerks to the monthly wages of technicians and that of service workers to that of 
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Source: The author’s calculations based on GBAS data
 
Figure 26. Monthly wage ratio, 1987-2005, other occupations to technicians  
Figure 27 offers a slightly different perspective, displaying a wage-ratio 
comparison of other occupations to professional position , enabling us to further 
understand wage inequality in Taiwan. As we can see, th  wage ratio of machine 
operators to professionals rose substantially at the end of the 1980s and peaked in 1992; 
but from 1992 on, it continued to decline from 0.79 to only 0.67 in 2005. The clerks-to-
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professionals wage ratio fell gradually and unevenly, from 0.709 in 1987 to around 0.617 
in 2005. The wage ratios of elementary workers to pr fessionals reveal greater 
fluctuations, with change rates as wide as 6% in one year (such as 2001 to 2002, as well 
as 2002 to 2003), although from 1987 to 2005 the ovrall change was less than 0.5%, 
which seems to indicate no change. A wage comparison of service and sales workers to 
professionals reveals minor differences although servic  and sales workers’ wages were 
the lowest on average among all of the occupation categories. The wage ratio reached its 
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Figure 27. Monthly wage ratio, 1987-2005, other occupations to professionals 
Thus, for the wage disparities among occupations, ba ed on the above wage ratio 
comparisons, we can observe an apparent wage loss for blue-collar workers and in 
occupations requiring lower professional and technial skills, compared to professional or 
semi-professional jobs. Although this shift is gradu l rather than dramatic, it has 
increased Taiwan’s economic inequality over the last two decades. 
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If we also consider education, as Figure 28 represents, we observe widening wage 
gaps between each group with varying levels of education after 1988. except for the gap 
between college graduates and vocational school graduates. There was first an increasing 
gap between college graduates and vocational school graduates, but then it dropped when 
the college graduates suffered from wage decline aft r 1998 due to over supply. The 
widening gaps are particularly apparent between workers with graduate school degrees 
and other degrees; the differences jumped in the late 1990s and also in the 2000s. For 
example, looking at the comparison between workers with a graduate degree and those 
with a college degree, it seems that the wage difference stayed comparatively stable in 
the 1980s, but in the early 1990s, wages increased for workers with graduate degrees. 
Between 2001 and 2007, the gap grew even larger due to a decline in wages for workers 
with a college degree. The average wage of college graduates continued to fall after 1998 
as other groups of workers experienced a wage freeze due to Taiwan’s economic 
recession. The only groups that still had a wage increase were workers with graduate 
degrees or vocational school degrees. Additionally, college graduates suffered from a 
large wage loss after 1995 and in the 2000s, due to the ver supply of college graduates 
in the job market. During that time, the Taiwanese government adopted loose college 
entrance standards, allowing an increasing number of colleges to be created between 
1995 and the early 2000s, in order to enhance the average education level of workers in 
Taiwan. This resulted in a flood of university gradu tes that lacked practical skills in the 
market, and their wages fell below the level of vocational school graduates. Nevertheless, 
with the exception of the college graduate group, workers with professional sk such as 
those with graduate and vocational school degrees enjoy d more wage superiority and 
increasing wages than other worker groups. The demand for technicians in the 
information industries provided vocational school graduates with opportunities to work in 
the IT industry, allowing them to use their professional and practical skills. As for other 
groups, the wage difference between high school and junior high graduates revealed little 
 160
change; otherwise, gaps between all of the other groups with different levels of education 
had significant increases (especially the gaps between the group of workers holding 

























Source: GBAS data 
 
Figure 28. Income by education, 1981-2007 
In summary, after determining the trends in wage inequality in Taiwan for the last 
two decades by using the calculations of the Theil statistics presented in the last section, 
we then explored the loci of those increasing wage disparities from three perspectives—
wage inequality among industries, among occupations, a d among different education 
levels. The results show that, first of all, labor in the information-intensive industries did 
enjoy higher, increasing wages and also expanded th wage gaps between workers in 
these industries and other traditional labor-intensive industry workers; second, 
professional and semi-professional occupations benefit d, especially compared to less 
professional and skilled occupations; finally, the wage gaps among different education 
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levels grew (showing an increasing tendency toward wage inequality due to education), 
with the group of graduate school graduates benefiti g the most as they continued to 
receive higher wages than other groups of workers. 
 
  THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN AN INFORM ATION ECONOMY IN 
TAIWAN , 1990-2007: ESTIMATION AND RESULTS  
As in the previous two chapters, the research is concerned with the relationship 
between informatization and inequality. The empirical analysis in this section will 
attempt to identify the relationship between income and wage inequality changes in 
Taiwan’s transition to an information economy.  We will also attempt to isolate the 
impact of informatization from the general trajectory f Taiwan’s economy.   
This discussion of economic inequality utilizes four variables to indicate the 
patterns of wage and income inequality in Taiwan: 1) the wage inequality index, or the 
Theil statistics; 2) the income inequality index known as the Gini coefficient; 3) the 
inequality index based on the ratio of income share of the highest 20% to that of the 
lowest 20%; and 4) the wage ratio between blue-collar and white-collar workers. As in 
the previous two chapters, I will define informatiztion as the extent of the 
informatization of the economy, measured by the percentage contribution of information-
intensive industries to the total GDP; the informatization of production, measured by the 
extent of automation in the economy (the automation equipment density in businesses);21 
the informatization of production, measured by percentage of R & D in the total GDP; 
and information infrastructure and IT usage, quantified by calculating personal computers 
per 100 inhabitants, Internet users per 100 inhabitants, main telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants, and mobile cellular phone subscribers p  100 inhabitants.   
                                                
21 Relevant indicators such as computer ownership and Internet use rates in Taiwan businesses are lacking. 
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Nevertheless, employment pattern changes could be an outcome of general 
economic trends in the economy as a whole; thus, we also need to control for Taiwan’s 
gross domestic product in the current analysis. 
 
Table 7. Correlations for informatization and economic inequality controlling for GDP, 











of highest 20% 




Informatization of the 
economy 
.897** .995** .987** -.434 
Percentage of R & D in 
the total GDP 
.905* .995** .985** .345 
Automation equipment 
density 
.956** .982** .985** -.299 
Personal computers per 
100 inhabitants 
.902** .964** .953** .323 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants 
.961** .982** .973** -.025 
Main telephone lines per 
100 inhabitants 
.885** .992** .982** .054 
Mobile cellular telephone 
subscribers per 100 
inhabitants  
.876** .923** .918** -.115 
N 15 13 15 14 
Note 1:Control variable: GDP  
 Note 2: ** denotes that the value is significant at he 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
As we can see from Table 7, all the informatization indicators reach strong and 
statistical significance on the correlations with wage inequality. The greater the scope of 
informatization and economic informatization, the gr ater the extent of wage inequality.  
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Regarding the two income inequality indicators, the Gini coefficient and the ratio 
of income share of the highest 20% to that of the lowest 20%, all the informatization 
indicators are statistically significant and show a strong  correlation with income 
inequality; the greater the extent of informatization, the greater the income inequality.  
With regard to the last variable, the blue/white-collar worker wage ratio, none of 
the informatization indicators present statistically significant  correlations.  
In summary, the statistical results presented here d monstrate to some extent that 
the growing trend of economic inequality in Taiwan in recent years is closely related to 
the development of an information economy and the process of informatization. This 
finding is consistent with the observation made in other information countries that 
process of informatization and the development of an information economy might worsen 
economic inequality. 
   
CONCLUSION  
Several important trends have been indentified in this chapter. First, drawing from 
the calculation and observation of income and wage inequality indexes, Gini Coefficient, 
Percentage Share of Disposable Income by Percentile Group of Households (the ratio of 
income share of highest 20% to that of lowest 20%), and the Theil Statistics, Taiwan’s 
income and wage inequality has continued to rise since 1980, after its historically lowest 
point in the 1970s. During this time, Taiwan has been confronting an industrial transition 
from labor-intensive manufacturing to information-intensive manufacturing and 
information-intensive services.  
Second, based on the calculation and analysis of the Theil elements, this study 
found that the main sources of the increasing wage inequality are primarily information- 
intensive manufacturing and information-intensive service industries such as electronic 
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parts, computers, transportation & telecommunication, professional, science & technical 
services, medical services, and chemical materials.  
Third, after identifying the sources of increasing wage inequality of Taiwan after 
1980, the study further investigated the loci of this increasing wage inequality from three 
perspectives: the wage inequality among industries, among occupations, and among 
different educational levels. In comparing industries, it was discovered that labor in the 
information-intensive industries enjoyed higher, increasing wages and also expanded the 
wage gaps between workers in these industries and other traditional labor-intensive 
industry workers. On the occupational level, professional, semi-professional, and 
managerial occupations benefited the most from the wage trends, especially compared to 
less professional and skilled occupations, and were the main contributors to wage 
inequality among occupations. Finally, comparing groups with different levels of 
education, wage gaps among different education levels grew (showing an increasing 
tendency toward wage inequality due to education), with the group of graduate school 
degree holders benefiting the most as their wages rose the most in comparison to other 
groups.    
The last section of this chapter examined the relationships of between 
informatization and four different kinds of income or wage inequality indicators: 1) the 
wage inequality index, or the Theil statistics; 2) the income inequality index known as the 
Gini coefficient; 3) the inequality index based on the ratio of income share of the highest 
20% to that of the lowest 20%; and 4) the wage ratio between blue-collar and white-
collar workers. The statistics results show that in Taiwan, the growing wage and income 
inequality is closely correlated to the process of informatization. Furthermore, the 
directions of correlation all conform to the researcher’s expectation that when the extent 
of informatization increases, so does wage and income inequality  
Overall, we can conclude that, like other information society countries, Taiwan 
underwent a growing economic inequality when developing its information economy and 
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informatization. The main cause of Taiwan’s increasing wage inequality has been the rise 
of information intensive industries, and the specific sources of this increasing inequality 
are the enlarging wage gaps between information and traditional industries; between 
professional skilled workers and less professional, less skilled workers; and between 
workers with higher education and workers with less ducation. In addition, the statistical 
analysis supports the claim that informatization is closely related to the increased wage 
and income inequality.   
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
This research investigated the labor market changes that occur when an NIC such 
as Taiwan develops an information economy. This dissertation first traced the 
development of Taiwan’s information economy and more importantly, the various social 
forces or factors that shaped this development. It then identified the changing trends of 
the labor market, incorporating trends of occupation ransformation, unemployment, and 
wage disparity. Based on data for the labor market changes, this investigation traced the 
sources of these changes and, more significantly, the reasons for these changes, by 
employing statistical analyses.  This chapter summarizes and interprets the main findings 
from the research and in the last section, offers a general conclusion and makes a number 
of policy suggestions for governments dealing with an emerging, unbalanced labor 
market in an information economy.  
SOCIAL FORCES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWAN ’S INFORMATION ECONOMY  
The dissertation points out the functions of various social forces in the 
development of Taiwan’s information economy. In thefirst half of the early stage of 
Taiwan’s information industry development (1954-1984), foreign capital played a crucial 
role, initiating the development of Taiwan’s information industry. In the latter half, 
however, the government  stepped in and led the devlopment of Taiwan’s information 
economy with numerous policy instruments including industrial policy (industrial 
development policy, industrial competition policy, industrial support policy, and 
industrial infrastructure policy), technology policy, exchange rates, interest rates, wage 
and labor policy, immigrant policy, and education and human capital policy. However, 
after the late 1980s, the government’s power in controlling Taiwan’s information 
economy development gradually waned and was replaced by the power of industry and 
enterprise, as the domination of the KMT party decreased in both politics and society, 
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alongside the growth in the social and economic influences of the commercial and 
industrial sectors. In addition to these three social forces, because Taiwan’s IT industries 
have always highly relied on exports and international markets, the development of 
Taiwan’s information economy was significantly impacted by international politics and 
economics, especially the trend of global outsourcing as well as by transnational IT name 
brands. Overall, it is evident that transnational capital, government/political leaders and 
policies, technological experts, the industrial elite and IT enterprises as well as 
international political economic factors, structure, and circumstance, all exerted crucial 
influences on the evolution of Taiwan’s information economy. Compared to these forces, 
social forces such as labor unions had much less power in impacting the development of 
the information economy. And different from the information-economy development 
models of developed countries which most information s ciety studies address, in the 
development of an information economy in an NIC such as Taiwan, the government, 
instead of market logic, played practically the most considerable role in shaping the 
developmental direction Taiwan would take to transform from labor-intensive 
manufacturing toward an information-intensive economy. 
 
LABOR MARKET CHANGES IN AN INFORMATION ECONOMY , AND SOURCES AND REASONS 
FOR THESE CHANGES 
The main goal of this dissertation was to investigate l bor market changes and the 
reasons for these changes under the scenario of information-economy development. First 
of all, let us look at the related issues of occupation structure transformation.  
The transformation of Taiwan’s occupational structure 
Previous research has identified several trends in occupation structure changes 
that are brought about in the transition to an information economy such as increasing 
professional and knowledge jobs and declining blue-collar and managerial jobs. In 
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Taiwan’s case, the number of blue-collar workers did rop considerably compared to 
white-collar workers; second, professional occupations as a percentage of total 
employment did continually grow; and third, in contrast to the assertions of information 
society scholars, managerial jobs in Taiwan did not sh w an obvious drop-off.  
Moreover, it is worth noting that the occupation that grows the quickest in Taiwan 
is that of semi-professionals, or technicians. This reveals that Taiwan’s information 
economy is in fact on the semi-periphery of developd countries.  
The correlation analysis shows that the advent of informatization did highly 
correlate to the decline of blue-collar jobs and the growth of professional occupations; 
this was inconsistent with the case of the literature review, where there is a declining 
trend in the number of middle level managers as the information economy develops. 
   
Increasing unemployment 
While considering the employment trend in an information economy, information 
society scholars have not yet reached any common conclusions on the relationship 
between information economy and employment. As is summarized in the literature 
review of this dissertation, four different viewpoints are proposed with respect to the 
employment issue in an information economy, including: enhanced employment, reduced 
employment, long-term balance, and varying according to different situations.      
In Taiwan’s case, the unemployment rate reached its lowest point in the 1970s, 
the end of the golden age of Taiwan’s labor-intensive manufacturing and then began 
rising as the economy shifted toward information-intensive and information-technology 
production. However, the cause and effect of information economy on unemployment 
needed further empirical research.  This study first tracked the sources contributing to the 
growing unemployment rate and an enlarging informal sector. It looked into the 
individual industries and determined that, compared to the increase in the total GDP 
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information-intensive manufacturing did not actually contribute as much to employment 
as it did to the total GDP. And it was common service ndustries and information-
intensive industries that made up the employment loss when labor-intensive 
manufacturing waned.  
The dissertation also compares the trends of GDP and employment contributions 
of labor-intensive manufacturing and information-inte sive industry. The results indicate 
that the increase in the employment ratio of the information-intensive sector lags far 
behind the employment decline in labor intensive manuf cturing. Furthermore, the 
percentage of employment contribution in the total employment of information intensive 
industry also lags far behind its contribution percentage in the total GDP, creating 
excessive industrial profits and causing general unemployment across the board.  
Finally, the study employed statistical analyses to examine the relationships 
between informatization and unemployment. The correlation analyses show that 
informatization is highly and positively related to the unemployment patterns; the higher 
the extent of informatization, the greater the unemployment rate and also the larger the 
informal sector.       
Thus, according to all these analyses, the research did reveal that the transition to 
an information economy actually increased Taiwan’s u employment problem and that the 
main basis for this worsening trend was the development of information-intensive 
industries. Unlike many developed countries that have already outsourced their 
information-intensive manufacturing, Taiwan still depends considerably on IT 
manufacturing industries for economic growth and employment. The extensive 
automation of production in IT industries and the immaturity of information-intensive 
services have caused the inability of information-intensive industries to absorb the 
superfluous labor released after the decline of labor-intensive industries, causing a 




Increasing wage disparity 
  Drawing from the literature, it seems that most scholars tend to agree that an 
information economy might exhibit a gradual movement toward greater wage or income 
disparity. However, scholars are far from reaching a consensus on whether the primary 
reason for this growing inequality is because of either the prevailing adoption of 
information technology (the skill-biased technological change), the increasing application 
of knowledge and information in the economy, a cultural spirit of informationalism, or 
political choices through policies and other long existing economic reasons. This 
dissertation reveals that along with Taiwan’s economic transition from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to an information-intensive economy (starting in the 1980s), no matter 
which kind of wage and income inequality indexes are considered (Gini coefficient, the 
ratio of income share of highest 20% to that of lowest 20%, or Theil’s Statistics), they all 
indicate an obvious trend of increasing wage or income inequality since the 1980s.  
     Further, based on the Theil’s elements shown in the bar graphs, we find that the main 
sources of this increasing wage inequality are prima ily information-intensive industries, 
including both information-intensive manufacturing (such as electronic parts and 
computers) and information-intensive services (such as telecommunication; professional, 
science and technical services; and medical services).  
 This dissertation further examines wage disparity by three perspectives--among 
industries, among occupations, and among different educational levels--and reveals that 
in all three cases, wage gaps did apparently grow with the onset of the information 
economy, and the primary beneficiaries include workers in information-intensive 
industries, workers who are professional, semi-professional, or higher managers, and 
workers who have graduate school degrees. This result seemingly verifies the argument 
that workers with more professional and higher level knowledge and workers who are 
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more closely related to the information economy andinformation technology do enjoy 
higher wages than other workers. However, these results imply show us the sources of 
wage disparity but do not explain why this trend developed.  
This dissertation study applied statistical analysis to test the relationships of 
wage/income inequality to informatization. The correlation analyses show significant, 
strong, and positive correlations between the informatization indicators and the wage and 
income inequality indicators (the Theil’s statistic, the Gini coefficient, and the ratio of 
income share of the highest 20% to that of the lowest 20%). The directions of the 
relationships between informatization and wage/income inequality conforms to the 
researcher’s expectations that the greater the extent of informatization, the wider the 
wage/income inequality.  
In summary, this dissertation identifies an increasing trend of wage and income 
inequality in Taiwan after 1980, and then verifies that one of the important sources of this 
enlarging inequality is the information intensive industry. Finally, the correlation 
analyses in this study show that informatization, especially economic informatization, 
highly correlates to increased wage and income inequality. The findings of these 
statistical analyses are striking since the majority of information society scholars tend to 
focus on the influence of information technology on economic inequality (such as skill 
biased technological change), and tend to ignore the function of government and its 
policies in these processes. These findings reveal that although information technology 
itself matters, economic and industrial transformation, which are highly influenced by 
states and their policies, also matter a great deal.  
 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS  
Overall, in the past fifteen years, the labor market in Taiwan has seemingly 
moved toward a situation of unbalance and greater economic inequality in terms of wage, 
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unemployment, and occupation imbalance, when the economy began shifting from 
traditional labor-intensive manufacturing to information-intensive industries. This 
situation seemingly conforms to the observations of s me information economy or 
political economy scholars describing the growth of economic informatization. 
As for the development processes of information economy, Taiwan (an NIC), 
apparently also diverges from the experience of developed countries. As Katz (1988) 
pointed out, the evolution of developed countries’ informatization and information 
economy was often based on market logic, yet the development of informatization in 
developing countries was very often led by political power for not only economic 
concerns but also sometimes for political or social purposes. This study determined that, 
foreign capital, the state, and the domestic capital were by turns the main actors during 
the different stages in the processes of Taiwan’s (an NIC country) information economy 
development, while all these developments were conditi ed by global political and 
economic situations and contexts. Among these factors, he state actually played the most 
critical function as it shaped the economic direction Taiwan would take to transform its 
economy from labor-intensive manufacturing toward an information-intensive economy. 
Furthermore, the state helped upgrade Taiwan’s information industries from labor- 
intensive information industries such as IC packaging (the age dominated by foreign 
capital) to a real information economy, with more and higher-level production knowledge 
and high-tech information, which includes information intensive-manufacturing and 
information-intensive services. Even though, during the 1980s and 1990s, many aspects 
of society in Taiwan were becoming more liberal and global and the KMT state’s 
autonomy in formulating and executing economic policy was undercut, the state 
consistently acted relatively autonomously from the capitalist class and from the 
influence of globalization.    
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This study also reveals that the total labor demand of information-manufacturing 
and information-intensive services is much less than that of traditional labor-intensive 
manufacturing, resulting in Taiwan’s increasing unemployment problem.       
Combining the results of all the historical, policy, and statistical analyses, this 
dissertation concludes that the transformation from labor-intensive manufacturing to an 
information-intensive economy, as arranged by the Taiwanese government due to its own 
political, governing, and economic purposes, and also in the context of international 
political and economic circumstances, has determined Taiwan’s economic resource 
arrangement, which has resulted in an increasingly unbalanced labor market in terms of 
wage distribution, unemployment, and occupation structure. This transformation changed 
and shaped the structure of the labor market to benefit workers who are more skilled with 
information and more professional, having higher leve  knowledge and a higher level of 
education, while an increasing amount of white-collar and service workers began earning 
comparatively low wages. At the same time, the demand for blue-collar and lower skill 
workers severely declined. Moreover, the total labor demand of information- 
manufacturing and information-intensive services is much less than that of traditional 
labor-intensive manufacturing, resulting in Taiwan’s increasing unemployment problem.  
In a nutshell, the unbalanced arrangement of economic resources led by the Taiwanese 
government on only a number of strategic information industries--which resulted in the 
unbalanced employment selectively affecting certain positions for certain industries, 
which further led to unemployment and structural unemployment, and finally caused an 
unbalanced labor market and also a bias wage structure--is the reality of Taiwan’s 
information economy. Among these processes, many different social, political, policy, 
and economic factors interacted and collectively determined this result. Among them, the 
role of the state in shaping Taiwan’s information economy in general and the labor 
market situation in particular did matter considerably. This viewpoint reminds us to be 
cautious of technological determinism or similar viewpoints often seen in information 
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society studies. Such views point toward skill-biased technological change and 
information determinism or informationalism, which asserts information technology and 
information’s determining power. Advancing beyond these deterministic approaches, we 
should emphasize the importance of the long existing political economic factors such as 
the state’s political choices and policies, industrial transformation, and certainly also 
globalization, international trade, and international political economic structure, 
circumstance, and operation. This dissertation proposes that these are among the most 
important factors shaping an NIC’s, in this caseTaiwan’s, information economy and thus 
influencing its labor market situation over the last two decades.     
Despite some negative impacts on the labor market, we cannot conclude that the 
economic transition in Taiwan should be regretted. In the view of the government and 
domestic capitalists, under the pressure of rising labor and production costs and rigorous 
competition from the low-priced labor and production factors of other developing 
countries, Taiwan had no choice but to relinquish tradi ional manufacturing industries in 
order to upgrade to a higher level of economic production. However, concerns about 
economic development balance, labor market balance, full employment, and economic 
fairness are just as important as considering how to seek quantitative economic growth, 
especially when the unbalanced labor market and the unfair economic result is partially 
caused by the government’s economic development and industrial policies, when the 
government should also support the well-being of its c izens. More importantly, failing 
to acknowledge all of these concerns could lead to serious consequences such as nation-
wide poverty, which would in turn threaten economic development and also a society’s 
stability.  
As Figure 29 shows, Taiwan’s poverty rate shows a growth trend in the last 
decade, from 0.53% in 1997, to 0.73% in 2001, to 0.96% in 2007. This study calculated 
the correlation (r) between poverty and wage inequality (Gini Coefficient), 
unemployment, and occupational transformation, and the results are 0.865, 0.799, and -
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0.878, all significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), revealing a high correlation of wage 
inequality, unemployment, and occupation transformation with Taiwan’s poverty rate in 
the last fifteen years. Thus, the negative effects of economy informatization on the labor 
market and society should not be overlooked by the government as it will not only 
negatively affect people’s well-being but also threaten the sustained growth of the 
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Figure 29. The trend of poverty in Taiwan 
In light of the importance of government policy for impacting the labor market, 
this chapter offers some possible relevant policy orientations, drawing from other 
countries’ experiences and also from Taiwan’s specific ondition as policy suggestions.  
Let us first consider policy from a macro-economic perspective. The macro-
economic policies or means are believed more direct and effective in easing labor market 
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inequality. Most importantly, as Galbraith’s suggested (2002), the government should not 
give up the goal of pursuing sustained full employment, as unemployment is highly 
related to wage inequality as well. Ways to create more jobs and new promising 
industries in Taiwan are discussed later in this chapter. Other helpful means include 
enhancing social insurance, creating reasonable price stability, providing a collective 
bargaining device22, avoiding sharp recession-induced inequality, collecting reasonable 
progressive taxes, raising minimum wages, and maintaini g a proper exchange rate, as 
well as stable interest rates. And for Taiwan in particular, the government should take 
labor market balance into consideration when making i dustrial and other related 
policies. These actions are all believed to be beneficial in alleviating the labor market 
imbalance problem (Cornia, 2000; Fishlow & Parker, 1999; Galbraith, 2000b, 2002). 
Second we can consider the micro or individual worker perspective, also known 
as the labor-market level. The main idea here is for the government to help the labor 
market make a smooth transition when the economy and industrial structure shift.  In 
addition, maintaining inexpensive tuition for university education helps to restrain 
growing economic inequality. Additional initiatives might include tuition assistance for 
the unemployed workers’ advanced education and school-to-work programs, clear 
information for job training programs, a database for job matching linked to resources 
such as education and training opportunities, job placement, childcare, portable health 
insurance, and saturation policies that target poor c mmunities to promote investment in 
housing, businesses, schools, training, and job creation in order to reduce social and 
economic isolation. Moreover, unemployment assistance can be combined with needed 
job training (Black & Lynch, 2003; Freeman, 1999; Lynch, 1999; Steelman & Weinberg, 
2005). 
                                                
22 Collective bargaining devices that can be applied to the whole society would be very helpful as in 
industries such as the service industry where the worker amount is sometimes not big enough to establih a 
labor union (Galbraith, 2002).   
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For Taiwan specifically, the government should take into account the problem of 
the unbalanced labor market when promoting industrial policies; that is to say, when 
choosing strategic industries, the government should be concerned not only with 
economic growth rate and trading surplus but also with the balance of employment. Thus, 
the government ought not to prefer only information-intensive industries, which mainly 
contribute to professional and white-collar workers’ mployment; rather, other promising 
industries that can contribute to blue-collar and lower income workers’ employment 
should also be considered. These industries in today’s Taiwan might include medical care 
and elder care industries, tourism industries, urban renewal, community work for 
deprived and disadvantage communities, local cultural industries, resource recycling 
industries, innovative traditional manufacturing industries with higher added values (such 
as high-tech textile or organic food industries) and finally, new agriculture industry. 
Moreover, policy and financial support for small and medium-sized enterprises should 
also be encouraged since small and medium enterpriss also contribute to a more 
balanced employment and also to a more equal labor wage structure.  
Here I want to specifically address the new agriculture and innovative traditional 
manufacturing industries. In Taiwan, the agriculture industry has encountered serious 
decline in the last fifty years not only because Taiwan’s natural environment limits her 
comparative advantage in agricultural production but also because of the Taiwanese 
government’s suppression and purposeful ignorance i policy. In order to withdraw 
capital, labor, and land from agricultural industries and transfer it to manufacturing, the 
government adopted numerous policies that were believed to strike agricultural and 
village areas severely. However, the agriculture industry is very important to economic 
stability, especially in a recession or when demand for labor undergoes considerable 
change. Under such circumstances, the agricultural industry often becomes a shelter for 
the unemployed, especially for blue-collar workers, a  we see in Taiwan’s situation. 
Though it may at first seem unwise to promote agriculture in an information age, the 
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results of this research indicate otherwise. Compared to other Asian countries, Taiwan 
still has advanced techniques and excellent experts in agriculture R & D, and Taiwan also 
offers a unique environment for planting and developing new, unique and high quality 
agricultural products. Thus, developing a precise, innovative, and information-intensive 
agriculture industry is one possible way to promote cooperation between professional 
experts and blue-collar workers, easing the blue-collar workers’ unemployment problem 
while also helping to solve Taiwan’s serious environmental pollution crisis.  
To help traditional labor-intensive manufacturing upgrade to innovative and new 
manufacturing with more intensive knowledge and information, the government ought to 
change the imbalance of education resources which focus only on information technology 
and information service. Similar supportive policies could be used to encourage the 
development of new manufacturing in order to sustain more blue-collar worker 
employment.    
It seems that a more diverse industrial policy and  more balanced labor market 
would not only reduce the risk of economic strikes such as the worldwide IT industrial 
recession of 2001-2003 but could also address the need to take care of the society at all 
different economic levels and including many different kinds of labor. In addition, 
considering the experience of the U.S. in pursuing an information economy/ new 
economy by placing excessive importance on finance, banking, insurance, lawsuits, R & 
D, and service industries while ignoring manufacturing, which has resulted in the recent 
economic crisis, this report proposes  that manufact ring, agriculture, the production of 
actual materials or construction, the diversity of industries, and a balanced labor market 
are very crucial to an economy’s health and stability. Unbalanced stress on an 
information or knowledge-production economy has been verified as problematic.  
Finally, the Taiwan government ought to consider the unfairness of the present 
education system. Most education resources are given to high and middle-class family 
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students through subsidizing public universities23, which further increases the inequality 
of the future labor market. Moreover, the government should encourage and support 
efforts by domestic universities to produce research of the same high caliber as other 
developed countries, especially fundamental scientif c research and also should be more 
open to hiring professors and researchers from other countries to diversify Taiwan’s 
university research, raising it to an international level.     
Building on this research, a number of country-comparison research studies might 
be needed to further verify the actual influence of economic informatization on labor 
markets, ruling out impacts derived from different historical, political, and economic 
backgrounds.   
Moreover, the influence of the rise of mainland China’s economy should also be 
further considered in the future. As the dissertation pointed out in previous chapters, the 
moving of Taiwan’s labor-intensive industries to mainl nd China sped up and worsened 
the unbalanced situation of Taiwan’s labor market which demanded less blue-collar 
workers during its information economy growth. In recent years, companies and factories 
that moved to China have not been limited to only labor-intensive industries but also to 
information-intensive industries. Thus, will this become a new challenge to Taiwan’s 
economy and also to its labor market?  Can Taiwan keep pursuing further industrial 
upgrades to maintain the competitive advantage in information economy and information 
technology production?  Or will Taiwan finally lose the competitive edge and face a new, 
severe unemployment problem because of the hollow of the industries? This question is 
intriguing and deserving of further research.  
All in all, it is hoped that it is hoped that this dissertation has helped shed light on 
some critical aspects of the relationships between labor market changes in an information 
economy and other social, political, and economic factors and that additional research 
                                                
23 In Taiwan, the public universities are higher academically than private ones, just opposite to the U.S. 
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will be conducted in the future that will aid workes who have been disenfranchised by 
Taiwan’s information economy. 
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Appendix  
THE THEIL STATISTICS  
This dissertation presents the calculation of a single annual index of inequality in 
the wage structure using the lower-bound, between-group estimate of Theil’s T statistics 
(T´) because the required data for calculating within-group inequality—the individual 
wage data—were usually not available. For a group structure, this dissertation uses wage 
and employment data from the main employment sectors in Taiwan. The main sectors 
this paper analyzes include manufacturing industries such as: mining and quarrying, 
electricity, gas and water, construction, trade, transportation and telecommunication, 
finance and insurance, real estate, rental and leasing, accommodation and food services, 
professional, science and technical services, health care, cultural, sporting and 
recreational services, as well as additional servics. Agricultural sectors are not included 
since they are part of an unofficial employment sector in Taiwan and do not have wage 
and employment data available. The raw data come from measures and survey data 
gathered by the Taiwanese government, mainly from the Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting, and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (the DGBAS). The group-
wise decomposability of Theil’s statistic measure of inequality permits us to use these 
data to compute an estimate of the evolving inequality in the wage structure over time. It 
produces a measure of changing relative wage dispersion that is weighted by the relative 
size of the working population in each of the underlying classes of economic activity 
(Berner & Galbraith, 2001; Conceição & Ferreira, 2000; Ferguson & Galbraith, 2001).  
The formula of Theil’ s statistics of income inequality is included below, which is 
composed of between-group inequality (T ´) plus within-group inequality ( wT )  
(Conceição & Galbraith, 2001, pp. 264-267). If we consider that the population is divided  
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intom industry groups, 1g , 2g , …. mg , each with jn individuals, j = 1,…,m , then the 
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The employment proportion in each group is represent d by jp = n
n j . The ratio of 
average group income to overall average income is rpresented by jR = µ
µ j . The ratio 
between individual income (iy ) and average income (Yµ ) is represented byiγ .  In this 
equation, n represents employment, µ represents average income, and j represents a 
subscript denoting the group. 
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OPERATIONALIZATION , MEASURE, AND VARIABLES  
The labor market variables 
A. Occupation transformation in an information economy 
To detect occupation transformation in an information economy, I will adopt three 
indicators based on the literature review: blue-collar to white-collar employment ratio, 
the percentage change of professional occupations in total employment, and the managers 
to other occupation employment ratio.  According to the literature, during a 
transformation to an information economy, there will be less blue-collar workers than 
white-collar workers, more professional employment a d less managers since computers 
will replace managers. 
B. Employment trends in information economy   
 183
I will use two indicators to identify employment trends in an information 
economy: the unemployment rate and the scope of infrmal sector. Unemployment rate, 
according to the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, R.O.C., refers 
to the percentage of unemployed in the entire labor force. The entire labor force refers to 
people who are over 15 years old and have capacity to work. The unemployed refer to 
people who: (1) have no work; (2) can work right away; and (3) are now looking for a 
job. Moreover, people who have found jobs but are waiting to start working are also 
included in the unemployed group.  
As for the informal sector, according to the DGBAS, is the percentage of people 
who are older than 15 years old but not working nor lo king for a job for other reasons in 
the entire labor force. The entire labor force refers to people who are over 15 years old 
and have the capacity to work.  
The unemployment rate and the scope of the informal sector can provide a helpful 
understanding of employment trends in an information s ciety since the informal sector 
includes people who are unemployed long-term and thus have lost the capacity to work or 
look for a job.   
C. Economy inequality in an information economy 
Here I will adopt three different indicators/variables: the wage inequality 
indicator—the Theil’s statistics; the household income inequality indicator—Gini 
coefficient; the ratio of household income share of highest 20% to that of lowest 20%; 
and the blue-collar to white-collar wage ratio to represent and incorporate the idea of 
economic inequality in an information economy. The first two indicators are the most 
widely used indicators to measure wage inequality and household income inequality. The 
third indicator—the blue collar to white collar wage ratio—would keep enlarging the 
wage disparity between blue-collar and white-collar works in an information economy, 
based on the literature review. 
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Informatization variables 
The informatization variables are based on the literature, Taiwan’s specific 
situations, as well as the availability of data.  
• Informatization of the economy: The information economy percentage measured 
by the percentage contribution of information-intensive industries to the total 
GDP.  
• Percentage of R&D in GDP: The percentage of investmn  for research and 
development in the total GDP.  
• Automation Equipment Density: The total investment in automation equipment 
divided by the number of workers. 
• Personal computers per 100 inhabitants: The number of personal computers per 
100 inhabitants.  
• Internet users per 100 inhabitants: The Internet usrs per 100 inhabitants. 
• Main telephone line per 100 inhabitants: The main (fixed) telephone line per 100 
inhabitants. 
• Mobile cellular telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants: The mobile cellular 
subscriber per 100 inhabitants. 
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Definitions and data sources of all variables 
Table 8. Definitions and data sources of all variables 
Wage Inequality of the Theil 
statistics: 
Between group Theil statistic computed for wage inequality between 
major sectors; data source: the author’s calculation based on the 
DGBAS data. 
Income Inequality of Gini 
Coefficient 
The Gini Coefficient index for each year; data sources: the DGBAS 
data. 
The ratio of household income 
share of highest 20% to that of 
lowest 20%: 
The ratio of household income share of highest 20% to that of lowest 
20%: data sources: the DGBAS data. 
 
The blue collar to white collar 
wage ratio 
The blue-collar to white-collar wage ratio: data sources: the author’s 
calculation based on the DGBAS data. 
Unemployment Unemployment rate; data source: the DGBAS data. 
Informal Sector The percentage of informal labor in the total labor force. 
Blue / White Collar 
Employment 
The ratio of blue-collar to white-collar worker employment; data 
source: the author’s calculation based on the DGBAS data. 
Professional Employment The percentage of professional employment (professional, associate 
professional, technician, business executives & managers) in the total 
GDP; data source: the author’s calculation based on the DGBAS data.  
Manager employment  
 
The ratio of manager employment to other occupations; data source: 
the author’s calculation based on the DGBAS data. 
Informatization of the economy  The percentage contribution of information intensive industries to the 
total GDP; data source: data from Wang (2008).  
Percentage of R&D in GDP The percentage of investmen  for research and development in the 
total GDP; data source: National Science Council, R.O.C. 
 
Automation Equipment Density The total investment in automation equipment divided by the number 
of workers: data source: the Department of Statistics, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, R.O.C. 
Personal computers per 100 
inhabitants  
The number of computers per 100 inhabitants; data source: ITU 
database 2007. 
Internet users per 100 
inhabitants 
The Internet users per 100 inhabitants; data source: ITU database 
2007. 
Main telephone line per 100 
inhabitants 
The main (fixed) telephone line per 100 inhabitants: ITU database 
2007. 
Mobile cellular telephone 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
The mobile cellular subscriber per 100 inhabitants: ITU database 
2007. 
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